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Preface: The Right Place of Forensic DNA
Technologies
Barbara Prainsack
I started being interested in forensic DNA technologies in the early 2000s,
when many countries in Europe and worldwide were setting up national for-
ensic DNA databases. I had spent several years studying the governance of
genomic technologies in the medical domain and was struck by how some of
the core ethical and governance-related concerns in medical genomics were
absent in forensics: such as questions about truly free and informed consent,
which were so prominent in the medical domain. Similarly, in the medical
context, the focus was on protecting the autonomy and interests of patients,
while in forensics the main interests to be protected were those of the victim
and her family, as well as society as a whole. The balance between individual
and public interests, so it seemed, was struck very differently in the two
domains.
Up to this day, the ontologies inscribed in data protection frameworks in
Europe and beyond reflect these different rationalities. While genetic infor-
mation is classified as sensitive personal data within the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR),1 and particularly strict rules regarding the
processing and use of genetic personal data apply, the processing of genetic
information for law enforcement purposes by “competent authorities”2 is
removed from the remit of the GDPR and regulated in the Police Directive,3
where some consent requirements are suspended for the purpose of public
interest.
While it could be argued that this division of focus on (a) protecting the
interests of data subjects in the domain of medicine vs. (b) protecting the
interests of the public and third parties in the domain of forensics is self-
evidently justified, owing to the different purposes that medicine and forensics
serve (improving the health of the data subject in the former, and protecting
society on the other), one of the many insights that this important book yields
is how such a stance is no longer tenable. The idea of a fundamental tension
between individual vs. public interests is problematic for empirical and con-
ceptual reasons: First, it implies a conflation of the level of the specific and the
level of the general. Although the interests of an individual person can, in
specific circumstances, very well conflict with public interests (the paradigmatic
case is the tension between individual privacy vs. societal security), the goals of
protecting the rights of individuals, including convicts, arrestees, and sus-
pects − and serving public interests are not conflicting goals in principle. The
relationship between individual and public rights is not a zero-sum game
where one can be “traded” for a bit of the other (see also Pavone et al., 2018
and Samuel & Prainsack, 2019). Security and privacy are both individual
and collective concerns at the same time.
Or they should be.
While it is largely uncontroversial that security is a public good, its mean-
ing has changed in recent decades, and these changes make it easy to forget
that security, embedded in a democratic system, is there to serve and respect
the rights of everyone, instead of undermining the rights and interests of
individuals or groups that are seen as undeserving in one way or another. As
Vincenzo Pavone and colleagues argue, over the last two decades alone:
the concept of security […] has shifted from territorial integrity and
national sovereignty to human security and, after 9/11, to a new concept
of homeland security. New security policies have particularly encouraged
pre-emptive security measures, enacted through the development of data-
intensive security technologies and public-private security collaboration.
These measures have been introduced within policy frameworks which
justify the restriction of individual privacy and freedom - a matter of
political concern.
(Pavone et al. 2018: 640)
Genetic technologies play a prominent role in this development. As Helena
Machado and Rafaela Granja observe, “|the nature of genetic surveillance is
[…] opening the path to extend the fabric of suspicion towards a prospective
surveillance” (Introduction, page 6). This is closely linked to the political
process of reframing social problems as problems of security, including
demographic and social transformations such as migration – and most
recently also the Covid-19 pandemic (e.g. Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015).
At this critical juncture, it is more important than ever to remember that
the entitlement of individual persons to security is an important manifesta-
tion of security as a public good. This individual entitlement is enshrined in
several human rights declarations and frameworks including the UN
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In Europe, the European Convention
on Human Rights, under Article 5.1, provides that “[e]verybody has the
right to liberty and security of the person,” while Article 6 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that “[e]veryone has
the right to liberty and security of the person” (which is to be interpreted
along the lines of Article 5.1 of the European Convention of Human
Rights).
Individual entitlements to security are closely associated with liberty and
the freedom of bodily movement as well as physical integrity vis-à-vis state
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institutions (they are seen by some as an expansion of rights based on the
prohibition of torture and cruel and unusual punishment). In other words, the
substance of the right to security aims to protect people also from undue
interference by state agencies and public authorities. Moreover, the state holds
the monopoly on violence as a representative of the sovereign, the people.
This means that the exercise of the monopoly on violence must be democra-
tically legitimized, transparent, and publicly accountable. Most European
states have functioning legal principles, norms, and processes in place to
ensure that this is so. Part of these legal principles and norms are the protec-
tions of human rights and public goods that can conflict, in concrete situa-
tions, with the rights and public goods that forensic genetic technologies − as
part of the tool box of criminal justice − seek to protect and foster. But this
does not change the fact that neither security, nor privacy, can be realized at
the collective or individual level respectively.
Besides this conceptual caveat against a view that plays out public interest
in security against individual rights and interests there are also empirical
reasons for seeing the two as connected. As Helena Machado and Rafaela
Granja convincingly show in this book, while cutting-edge technologies of
previous periods, such as short-term random (STR)-based DNA profiling,
aimed at linking a specific individual to a specific crime scene based on dis-
crete pieces of evidence, more recent technologies draw much wider ranges of
information into the process of criminal investigation and crime prevention.
In the context of next generation sequencing technologies, even if an analysis
aimed at merely obtaining STR data, other data, such as on a person’s phe-
notypic characteristics, is available as a byproduct. This facilitates function
creep, meaning that data that were collected and analysed for a specific purpose
are used for a wider range of purposes “because they’re available” (Dahl &
Saetnan, 2009). Forensic DNA phenotyping – namely the inference of exter-
nally visible traits, such as skin, eye, and hair colour – from coding parts of the
DNA sample could be seen as an instance of such function creep. Although
there are certainly good arguments for how forensic DNA phenotyping can be
used responsibly in specific circumstances (Samuel & Prainsack, 2020), it also
bears the risk of foregrounding technological solutions at the cost of divesting
from other, low-tech means of criminal investigation (e.g. properly funded and
high quality police work). And it means – in both the case of familial searching
and forensic DNA phenotyping, as also shown in this book – that the analysis
of one DNA sample draws several people – or even entire groups – into the
investigation. Familial searching extends the range of people who the technol-
ogy could throw suspicion on to biological relatives of people whose profiles
are stored in the forensic DNA database. In the case of phenotypic profiling, if
an analysis shows that the perpetrator most likely had a particular skin, eye,
and hair colour, entire groups could become a suspect population, raising
concerns about ethnic and racial discrimination.
Even more urgently than the medical domain, forensic genetics needs legal
and ethical instruments that reflect the relational nature of people and of data
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(McMahon et al., 2020). We need instruments that better reflect the situation
that restrictions of individual privacy and autonomy always also change the
nature of the collective; and that public goods and interests such as security
always manifest themselves also at the level of groups, families, and
individuals.
Through the lens of forensic genetics, this book tells a story about the
changing nature of social control and citizenship in Europe and beyond. The
authors show how systems of forensic genetic surveillance do not only help to
solve and prevent crime, but they also expose – and in some cases, exacerbate
− the fault lines and differences in our societies. Within the tool box of for-
ensic technologies, genetic and genomic practices play a particularly impor-
tant role because of the intimate connection that genetic information is
assumed to have with the person: They are seen to “capture the very essence
of that body and turn it into information” (Introduction, page 2). Against this
backdrop, it is more important than ever to analyse, as this fantastic book
does, how technologies are never merely neutral tools that, in the service of
good or evil intentions, are used for good or evil purposes in society. Inde-
pendent of the intentions of those that develop and deploy them, forensic
genetic technologies have dominant values, hierarchies, and power relations of
the societies from which they emerged inscribed in them. Engagement with
forensic genetic technologies is thus an important part of democratic control
and practice of our time.
Notes
1 Article 4(13) considers “genetic data” (next to “data concerning health”, and “bio-
metric data”) a special category data that deserves specific protection. It also gives
the right to Member States to “maintain or introduce further conditions, including
limitations, with regard to the processing” of these types of data (Article 9(4). For
further details on the GDPR and genomic data in the clinical genetics context, see
PHG Foundation 2020.
2 “Competent authorities” in this definition comprise (a) public authorities compe-
tent for the law-enforcement purposes set out in Article 1.1 of the Police Directive,
and (b) “any other body or entity entrusted by national law to exercise public
authority and public powers” for the law enforcement purposes set out in Article
1.1 (e.g. a privately owned company running a prison; see Purtova [2018]). When a
body not meeting the “competent authority” criteria processes data for law enfor-
cement purposes, such as a financial institution, at the order of a public authority -
the GDPR, and not the Police Directive, applies (e.g. a financial institution pro-
cesses personal data that a law enforcement authority has requested in connection
with an open investigation) (see also Samuel & Prainsack 2018).
3 For the purpose of collecting and storing information for police and forensic uses, a
lex specialis to the more general EU Data Protection Directive entered into force in
May 2016: The “Directive 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purpose
of law enforcement” (we called it Police Directive; see Samuel & Prainsack 2018). It
replaced the data protection rules based on the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA
for the police and criminal justice sector, with the aim of removing barriers to
information exchange for law enforcement purposes between member countries by
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harmonising and simplifying rules. Member countries had to translate the Directive
into national law; they were allowed to require higher data protection standards
than those prescribed in the Police Directive, but not lower ones. In a nutshell,
important differences between the GDPR and the Police Directive lie in the grounds
for lawful processing and in the powers of processing authorities. The grounds for
lawful processing in the Police Directive are much narrower than in the GDPR (see
in particular Article 8.2, and Article 10 Police Directive): “Competent authorities”
processing for the purpose of law enforcement do have more leeway in how they use
data than data controllers or processors within the GDPR. Correspondingly, the
information rights of data subjects within the Police Directive are more limited than
the information rights of data subjects under the GDPR regime (for details see also
Purtova 2018).
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A striking aspect of 21st-century societies in the governance of crime is the
growing role of scientific and technological innovations in the field of forensic
genetics. The aim of forensic genetics is to identify individuals through the
collection of their biological traces – blood, hair, saliva, or other fluids. The
possibility of deriving DNA (a biological structure considered unique to each
individual) from biological matter – whether inadvertently left behind by
criminal suspects at crime scenes or directly obtained from the bodies of
criminal suspects − has contributed decisively in predisposing governments to
support the developments and ambitions of forensic genetics. This book aims
to explore some of the complex and multidimensional social, cultural, and
political implications of forensic genetics’ uses in security and criminal law
activities. We intend to provoke critical thinking about the repercussions of
forensic genetics on the nature of social control and citizenship in con-
temporary societies, viewed through the lens of social science research and
taking as our starting point the social phenomenon of genetic surveillance in
the governance of crime. By genetic surveillance we mean the acts involved in
the systematic monitoring of individuals or groups based on their genetic
body specificities in order to detect and/or reconstruct a crime. By governance
we refer to a cluster of social values and norms, expectations, and practices of
conduct and decision making, as well as institutional provisions taken both
by governmental and non-governmental actors.
The present volume is based on a six-year investigation (the “Exchange
project”1) aimed at studying the expectations of scientists, international
security professionals and other stakeholders with a direct interest in the
technical development of forensic genetic technologies and criminal DNA
databases in Europe. The study was guided by the following overarching
research questions: how is genetic surveillance in the governance of crime
intertwined with society, ethics, culture, and politics? To what extent and how
significantly are the views and expectations related to genetic surveillance
reflected in the discourses of diverse stakeholders? What are the social
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identities, power relations, hierarchies and asymmetries that emerge from this
process? Our interrogations also imply a critical reflection on the role of
genetic surveillance in shaping contemporary societies. More concretely, it
helps us to understand how social life has come to be imagined as explicable
and governable through the decoding and manipulation of genetic material
(Hacking, 2006; Nelkin & Lindee, 1995; Rabinow, 1996), at a historical
period when DNA came to be described as the single most important element
of human identification (Cole, 2001).
In 1985 Alec Jeffreys and colleagues published an article in Nature, entitled
“Individual-specific ‘fingerprints’ of human DNA,” that has since become an
inaugural chapter in the story of the uses of genetics for human identification
purposes. The author presented a technique using highly variable segments of
DNA “… to produce somatically stable DNA “fingerprints” which are com-
pletely specific to an individual (or to his identical twin) and can be applied
directly to problems of human identification…” (Jeffreys, Wilson, & Theint,
1985, p. 76). The technology of DNA profiling promised to provide reliable
knowledge of individual human subjects, rendering the body as a system of
standardized and repeatable properties. However, unlike many other techni-
ques of bio-identification, like fingerprints or anthropometry, the analysis of
DNA is not constructed from an impression of the body or through the
manipulation of the body’s visible aspects; instead, forensic genetics goes
“under the skin,” allowing to capture the very essence of that body and turn
it into information (Lyon, 2001; Van Der Ploeg, 2005; Williams, 2010).
The introduction of DNA profiling into the criminal justice system began
in 1988, when Englishman Colin Pitchfork became the first person to be
convicted through the use of DNA evidence. The case gave rise to highly
optimistic social expectations about the practical application of this method
and its evidentiary value in the formal accusation and prosecution of criminal
offenders. In the decades that followed, broader global networks of scientists,
biotechnology companies, stakeholders, and end-users (e.g., police institutions
and the justice system) stabilized DNA as a powerful tool of justice, estab-
lishing the general consensus that genetics technologies should play a vital
role both in courts and in criminal investigation activities (Aronson, 2007;
Lynch et al., 2008). However, along with its stabilization processes, the inno-
vations in forensic genetics also combine a variety of relatively unstable social
formations, insofar as they are being continually co-constructed and re-
shaped (Granja, 2020; Granja & Machado, 2020; Kennett, 2019; Lawless,
2012; Samuel & Prainsack, 2018; Wienroth, 2018).
In the aftermath of the stabilization process of DNA profiling, one of the
most prominent aspects of forensic genetics’ use in the criminal justice system
has been the growth of national forensic DNA databases as a means of stor-
ing, searching, and comparing crime scene DNA profiles with profiles from
known individuals obtained and retained under a variety of legal regimes
(Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016; Santos, Machado, & Silva, 2013). This
has been possible through a combination of technical, organizational and
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legislative developments which include: improvements in DNA extraction and
analysis; the establishment of national and international laboratory standards;
the judicial avowal and trust in the robustness of DNA evidence; and the
creation of new technical and scientific working groups and associations, at
national and international levels, thus stabilizing the epistemic and ontologi-
cal status of DNA profiling (Derksen, 2010; Lawless, 2012; Lynch &
McNally, 2009).
Alongside these technical and scientific developments, accompanied by
changes in legislation and in criminal justice procedures – a process that
Michel Lynch and Ruth McNally designated as “biolegality” (Lynch &
McNally, 2009) – we witnessed a series of political and historical transfor-
mations that ideologically legitimized − and continue to legitimize − the
expansion of surveillance based on the creation of large-scale information
technology database systems. The increasing interoperability of forensic DNA
databases which, albeit nationally based, are also engaged in transnational
comparing and exchange of DNA profiles and other kinds of data, is a clear
example of the expansion of genetic surveillance (Amelung, Granja, &
Machado, 2020; Machado & Granja, 2018; McCartney, 2014; Prainsack &
Toom, 2010, 2013). The technological innovations in the domain of storing
and exchanging of DNA data are accompanied by issues of safety and
security related with broad social and political concerns about terrorism and
crime, and they are embodied in a variety of biometric surveillance systems.
Another important historical turn is what we call a post-DNA era, in
which the ambitions for genetic informativity are amplified, thereby shifting
the focus of forensic science from the construction of evidence to the genera-
tion of intelligence considered valuable to criminal investigations (Machado
& Granja, 2020; Wienroth, 2018). The move from genetic to genomics, which
has been blurring the general accepted boundary between “non-informative”
and “informative” genetic markers, ushers the advent and consolidation of
technologies that allow a speculative generation of criminal suspects based on
information provided by DNA profiles, such as forensic DNA phenotyping
(FDP) and next generation sequencing (NGS) (Amorim & Pinto, 2018;
Granja & Machado, 2020; Samuel & Prainsack, 2018; Wienroth, 2018). In
this introduction we explore some of the ramifications stemming from this
progress of transition from genetics to genomics in the criminal identification
area.
The work of Robin Williams accurately outlines the interrelated social and
epistemic domains comprising the typical focus of DNA profiling and DNA
databasing governance, namely: the juridical-scientific, the operational, and
the ethico-political domains (Williams, 2010, pp. 140–147). From the author’s
perspective, the juridical-scientific involves the subjection of DNA profiling
and DNA evidence production to a legal framework that both enables and
limits the management of DNA profile data, as well as their legitimate uses
and resistance to judicial and scientific challenges. The operational domain
pertains to the assessment of criminal DNA databases’ effectiveness and
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efficiency for policing and other crime governance-related activities. The
ethico-political domain relates to civil liberties and human rights, namely in
terms of the monitoring and independent scrutiny over the operation and uses
of DNA databases, as well as issues of public trust in governance. Based on
the existing literature on the governance of forensic genetic technologies in the
security and criminal law fields, the following table provides a summary of the
most recurrent themes and issues:
Table 1.1 Governance in forensic genetics applied to criminal investigation





























































Source: Authors, inspired by Williams (2010).
This book aims to expand the academic debate around the governance of for-
ensic genetics, by expanding the approach proposed by Robin Williams to
encompass the “juridico-scientific,” “operational” and “ethico-political” domains
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(see Table 1.1). Williams’ approach broadens the horizons and opens new ways to
address technologies of control and their implications on our conceptions of the
human, justice and the role of science at a time that might be described as a post-
DNA era, insofar as forensic analyses are increasingly converging toward the
study of the human genome. As we reflect upon the social, cultural, ethical and
political implications of genetic technologies, we need to look more closely at the
modes of individual and collective social identity performativity, as well as to
imaginaries of nationhood and historical trajectories that condition the relations
between the state and its citizens (rendering them to a greater or lesser degree
predisposed to release sensitive data), in the context of a society which has been
won over by the promises of genetics and is enthralled with the processes of
datafication.
Genetic surveillance
The expansion of forensic genetic technology uses and centralized DNA
databases in different regions around the world, is often criticized as part of
an ever-widening system of genetic surveillance, through which biological
tokens of identification are becoming increasingly vital (Hindmarsh & Prain-
sack, 2010; Williams & Johnson, 2008). Compiled into computerized data-
bases, DNA identifiers provide the raw material for constructing innumerable
knowable and manageable individuals, groups and populations, rendering
them increasingly vulnerable to governments’ data-driven crime control
ambitions. In this book we analyse and critically reflect upon the social phe-
nomenon constituted by the growth, in breadth and scope, of genetic tech-
nologies and forensic DNA databases at national and transnational levels,
and their involvements with other surveillance systems. Specifically, we will
address how the governance of crime through genetic surveillance encapsu-
lates more than the social, technical-scientific response to crime. It also
incorporates new possibilities for monitoring and controlling behaviors, as
well as reconfigurations of justice administration through which new concepts
of order and social control are co-constructed to fit what some authors have
called “the new surveillance,” a phenomenon that became increasingly pro-
minent towards the end of the 20th century (Marx, 2002).
The collection of large amounts of genetic profiles and other data of inter-
est for crime governance, in computerized forensic databases, does not bear
upon individuals alone; it enables social sorting through increasingly elabo-
rate means, in terms of its impact and reach. In other words, genetic data
provides growing opportunities for monitoring and controlling particular
individuals and specific social groups that are more vulnerable to become
what Richard Hindmarsh and Barbara Prainsack designated as “genetic sus-
pects” (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010). Social sorting refers to the break-
down and classification of raw data pertaining to groups or persons into
various categories. The term was coined and developed by David Lyon in
reference to the discriminatory effects of surveillance, namely its potential to
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facilitate profiling and screening specific social groups (Lyon, 2002). Within
the wider scope of this book, we also seek to contribute to expand the dis-
cussion on the role of genetic technologies and DNA databases in assigning
individuals to groups that are already over-policed, thus subjecting them to
special forms and implications of surveillance (Cole, 2018; Skinner, 2018).
Moreover, understanding the modes of crime governance enacted through
genetic surveillance also allows us to look beyond the strict role of state
structures in governing current societies, including other social institutions
and social actors who also constitute the backbone of the crime governance in
contemporary societies. In the case of forensic genetics, this includes, among
other social actors: laboratory technicians, forensic genetics researchers,
police forces, judges, prosecutors, attorneys, jurors, professional organizations,
supervising entities, non-governmental entities, and politicians.
The seminal work of Robin Williams and Paul Johnson (2004) is relevant here
for its analysis of the unique nature of surveillance operated by DNA data and its
implications for the construction of suspicion and for social sorting through
genetic surveillance. The authors argue that DNA databases allow for “recon-
structive surveillance,” forming a circuit system of surveillance containing infor-
mation which can be used retrospectively, meaning that people and their actions
are not visually monitored, but are inferentially reconstructed by expert practices
of geneticists and forensic practitioners (Williams & Johnson, 2004, pp. 3–6). As
the authors explain, DNA databases form “a type of surveillance which is essen-
tially concerned with ‘management’ of those already deemed criminal (…) deli-
miting them from the wider population and managing them through assured
detection” (Williams & Johnson, 2004, p. 11).
However, the nature of genetic surveillance is currently undergoing profound
changes. No longer solely restricted to a retrospective reach, by focusing on
already criminalized individuals, the post-DNA era is opening the path to extend
the fabric of suspicion towards a prospective surveillance (see Table 1.2 below).
Table 1.2 Genetic surveillance
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Emergent and still controversial genetic technologies based on human genome
analysis are gradually changing the contemporary modes of genetic surveillance.
Recent works in the domain of social studies on forensic genetics have
shown that technologies such as FDP, familial searches, and NGS do not
produce an individual suspect, but instead generate a suspect population
(Granja & Machado, 2020; Wienroth, 2018). At the same time, the increasing
role played by the biologization of appearance, reinforced through genetic
technologies that allow to “predict” the visible external characteristics of the
human body, contribute to reinforce stigmatization of particular ethnic and
racial groups (Hopman & M’charek, 2020; M’charek, 2020). Prospective
surveillance thus emphasizes the continuous transfers between the individual
and the collective (M’charek & Wade, 2020) that increasingly shift the locus
from individualization − that is, identification of specific individuals − to socially
(and scientifically) constituted notions of human populations (Machado &
Granja, 2020).
In Europe, genetic surveillance with the purpose of governing crime stems
from the idea of rationalizing and managing the social order through science
and law. Fragmenting bodies into their lowest units makes it possible to group
individuals into population groups, stripping them of their individuality, but
allowing states to reach the point of biological uniqueness through genetics,
while continuously sorting individuals into groups that will distinguish between
law-abiding and criminal citizens.
The study
This book is theoretically aligned with an essentially constructivist and inter-
pretive perspective, in which we analyze the discourses of forensic geneticists,
police professionals involved in transnational operations involving DNA data
exchange, laboratory practitioners, and civil society organizations engaged in
human rights protection in the specific area of genetics and/or biometrics.
This book was based on an empirical study that had its starting point in a
system implemented by the European Union (EU), which clearly highlights
the role of forensic genetics in the governance of crime. We are referring to
the transnational network for the exchange of DNA profiles for forensic and
policing use in the EU, established by the so-called Prüm Decisions2. Within
the broad framework of a project to create an area of freedom, security, and
justice, the Prüm Decisions compel Member States to create the conditions
for the reciprocal automated exchange of DNA profiles that will enable step-
ping up cross-border cooperation, particularly in fighting terrorism and cross-
border crime.
As mentioned earlier, the present volume is based on long-term study of the
societal, cultural, political, and ethical implications of the so-called Prüm
system. This research followed a qualitative and multi-method approach,
based on the integrated and coordinated combination of three main research
techniques: first, the conduction of semi-structured interviews with different
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professionals whose activity is related with applying forensic genetics to
criminal investigation, as well as other stakeholders directly involved with
these issues. Among the research techniques used in the “Exchange Project,”
interviewing was the method responsible for generating the largest bulk of
empirical information: in total, 124 interviews were conducted with 140
interviewees from 25 different EU countries3. Second, this study relied on
document analysis from several relevant sources, from legislation and official
documents to scientific literature in the domain of forensic genetics. Finally,
the “Exchange Project” involved direct and participant observation in scien-
tific meetings and other relevant situated contexts (such as laboratories and
other workplaces of interviewees engaged in the transnational exchange of
information occurring within the scope of police and judicial cooperation).
Throughout this study, we sought a systematic harmonization between the
principles of grounded theory and discourse analysis. The grounded theory
approach developed by Barney G. Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) was
designed to help researchers to elicit and analyze qualitative data to identify
important categories, with the aim of generating ideas and theory “grounded”
in the data. The further development of this approach is particularly well-
adjusted to discovery-oriented research in areas that are under-theorized
(Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2006, 2016; Clarke, 2005). Based on
this approach, new topics and concepts were gradually incorporated into
interviews and adapted, depending either on the social actors’ specific posi-
tioning as it emerged from the narratives constructed in the course of inter-
views or on interests that we were able to anticipate considering each
participant’s social and professional position (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007).
As the themes, topics, and categories of analysis repeated themselves,
revealing their differences and similarities, we moved on to a second level of
qualitative analysis, guided by the principles of discourse analysis located in a
social constructionist paradigm (Berger & Luckmann, 1996; Hacking, 2000;
Sismondo, 2003). As explained by Charlotte Burck, in a work that sum-
marizes the different methodologies used in social sciences which are parti-
cularly useful for research on subjective experiences and meanings, discourse
analysis allows capturing and understanding how the discourses and inter-
pretive repertoires of individuals provide accounts of themselves and their
social worlds (Burck, 2005). In this book, therefore, discourse is regarded as a
set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images and stories – and in some
cases, as an institutionalized use of language − which produces particular
versions of events and the social world (Burck, 2005).
A European identity? “Utopian” and “dystopian” visions and
expectations
As explained in our earlier description of the empirical study that inspired our
study, this volume’s underlying research theme explores the close links
between a highly-specialized field of expert scientific knowledge – forensic
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genetics – and the fight against crime and terrorism in the EU. However, the
approach presented in this book goes far beyond what this starting point
might lead one to assume and anticipate. First of all, because this book ques-
tions the existence of a unique mode of genetic surveillance and governance of
crime. This volume, therefore, is by no means limited to genetic surveillance in
the EU security policy arenas. We share the interrogation formulated by Sheila
Jasanoff, in her work about biotechnology politics and policy in Europe and the
US, where the author compares the triumphs and tribulations of late capitalistic
technological democracies by asking whether it is even possible to talk about a
European vision, or whether we are dealing instead with a “multiply imagined
community” (Jasanoff, 2005). In Jasanoff’s words:
Europe in particular is a multiply imagined community in the minds of
the many actors who are struggling to institutionalize their particular
versions of Europe, and how far national specificities should become
submerged in a single European nationhood – economically, politically,
ethically – remains far from settled.
(Jasanoff, 2005, p. 10)
The crucial questions, therefore, might be put thus: what visions and expec-
tations are enacted by genetic surveillance in the governance of crime in the
European security policy arena? How are genetic technologies and forensic
DNA databases imagined in Europe? How is Europe imagined in the context
of DNA data use in the fight against crime and terrorism? How does the
European imaginary translate into different national contexts? How do the
different stakeholders ascribe meanings to genetic surveillance in the govern-
ance of crime, and how do these views and expectations contribute to the
making and unmaking of an (un)settled European identity?
To answer these research questions, the concept of sociotechnical imagin-
aries, proposed by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim (2009, 2015), is par-
ticularly useful. In their words, sociotechnical imaginaries are “collectively
imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and ful-
fillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects” (Jasanoff &
Kim, 2009, p. 120). The authors compare imaginaries to discourses, meta-
phors and cultural meanings, out of which actors build their policy pre-
ferences, drawing on a growing recognition that the capacity to imagine the
future is a crucial constitutive element in social and political life. Hence,
sociotechnical imaginaries include not only tightly bound belief systems −
ideologies in a narrow sense − but also policy imaginations containing
implicit understandings of what is good or desirable in the social world.
Through the lens of the sociotechnical imaginaries we can, therefore, see
how genetic surveillance in the governance of crime is imagined within the
European policy context, but also how the ‘European technological zone’
(Barry, 2001, 2006; Mager, 2016) is enacted and infused with meaning in
this particular context.
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Throughout this book, the controversies and problematics connected to genetic
surveillance in the governance of crime are addressed through the visions and
interpretations ascribed by different social actors to their own actions (Weber,
1949). These constructions of meaning – or more simply, these “visions and ideas
of people” – frequently correspond to instances of “imagining the future,” assessing
the present from a utopian or dystopian point of view. The term “vision” is, there-
fore, largely overlapped by the notion of “expectation,” and on many occasions we
will use both terms interchangeably. However, we will also use the term “vision” to
underline the emphasis on its enacting and subjectively normative character
(Borup et al., 2006, p. 286), while using “expectation” to refer directly to techno-
logical advances, since it can be more specifically applied to representations of
future technological situations and capabilities (Borup et al., 2006, p. 286).
Visions and expectations can be seen as fundamentally “generative,” in the
sense that they guide activities, provide structure and legitimation, define
roles, and clarify boundaries of knowledge and action, while tending to have
a persistent future oriented-nature, insofar as they shape some shared con-
ception of what to expect and how to prepare for opportunities and risks
(Borup et al., 2006; see also Brown & Michael, 2003; and more recently,
Tutton, 2020). Our focus on the visions and expectations for forensic genetic
technologies and their potential and capabilities in the governance of crime is
mainly centered on those construed and performed by forensic geneticists.
However, the category of “forensic geneticist” is itself highly heterogeneous,
serving as a blanket term that includes both forensic geneticists who work in
university departments of forensic sciences, as well as forensic geneticists
working in forensic laboratories that provide services to courts or government
police agencies (Cole, 2013).
The prevalence of forensic geneticists’ visions and expectations resulted from the
contingencies of the empirical study guiding this book – originally centered on
exploring and understanding this specific group’s social representations – and not
from any kind of presumption that forensic geneticists’ views and interpretations
are more significant or in any way should be given greater visibility. In fact, the
constructivist and interpretative paradigm followed in this book (Law, 1991, 2008;
Bijker & Law, 1992; Pickering, 1992) leads us to consider that the social construc-
tion of reality implies the intervention of multiple social actors with a diversity of
situated interests, values, agendas and perspectives.
Nevertheless, we must bear in mind the existence of a common and shared
“social repertoire” of views and expectations (Konrad, 2006; Quinlan, 2020),
supported within a widely shared cultural and social stock, which provides
meaning to genetic surveillance and the governance of crime and which might
be either reproduced and reinforced or questioned and challenged.
In order to provide the reader with the context for the multiple views, both
collective as well as those “specific” to certain groups of actors (whether
reflecting utopian, dystopian or a complex and fluid combination of both
views), and their role in the construction of the performativity of genetic sur-
veillance in the governance of crime, we believe that it is important to consider
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two dimensions of analysis: on the one hand, the visions and expectations in
themselves; on the other hand, the material conditions for the actualization of
genetic surveillance. The means through which the uses of genetic technology are
materialized − in terms of legislation, scientific development and technological
infrastructures and institutional and operative conditions (Johnson, Williams, &
Martin, 2003) − will create the context or setting for the views of a specific
group, or those that have the power and resilience to emerge collectively, to
become more effective in their practical and symbolic consequences.
The structure of the book
This book comprises eight chapters: besides the present introduction, where
we introduce the reader to the main themes and topics debated in the litera-
ture about social sciences approaches to forensic genetics in the governance of
crime, the book entails seven other chapters that address a diversity of
empirical cases illustrating the prevailing trends of contemporary genetic sur-
veillance and its social, cultural, and political implications in Europe and
beyond. The second chapter of this book presents a historical and sociological
analysis of the evolution of forensic genetics applied to governance of crime,
from the late 1980s until the present. The manifold developments in DNA
profiling techniques, as well as the creation and expansion of forensic DNA
databases, are illustrated with empirical examples of the uses given to forensic
genetic techniques in different parts of the world. The numerous social, ethi-
cal and political concerns and contentions pertaining to forensic DNA pro-
filing and databasing are situated at the intersection between science, civic
and human rights, and relationships between citizens and the state. In this
chapter we outline how such relations are historically and culturally con-
tingent and situated in local and national contexts. That is, how the benefits
or risks of technology for social order are never obvious, ubiquitous, and
unquestionable.
We focus on providing a context which might help the reader to under-
stand that, while there is a global trend of forensic genetics’ expansion
across many regions of the world, this does not occlude the fact that differ-
ent societies and cultures present diverse histories of technology and gov-
ernance. The examples presented clearly show that DNA profiling and
databasing technologies are, paraphrasing Sheila Jasanoff, technologies of
social control, imagined and produced in the West for use in the rest of the
world, which are never ethically or politically neutral (Jasanoff, 2010).
In order to substantiate the multiplicity, intricacy and fluidity of the social,
ethical and political constellations prompted by forms of genetic surveillance
in the governance of crime, we appeal to diversified geographical and political
contexts: we begin by presenting a case from mainland China which is parti-
cularly revealing of the trends of maximum surveillance society and religious
and ethnic minority stigmatization. Then we go on to highlight the diversity
of trends and trajectories of forensic technologies and genetic databases in the
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United States and, above all, in Europe, referring to examples such as the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, and Portugal. This brief over-
view of national cases demonstrates how these technologies’ different trajec-
tories are concomitantly accompanied by histories of science and technology
governance, evolutions of securitarian policies and political traditions.
The historical and sociological systematization of the social and political ten-
sions that derive from the use of forensic genetic technologies in different regions
around the world, as well as the revelation of the multiplicity and complexity of
circumstances in different national and political contexts, serve in this chapter to
delineate and clarify this book’s scope and ambition. Our aim is to make a
qualitative enhancement of the analytical lens that has characterized the litera-
ture from the social sciences on the theme of genetics in its application to crim-
inal justice. The overwhelming majority of this production places an emphasis
on the intersections between science, human rights, and civil liberties on the one
hand, and the controversies associated with the increasing surveillance of citizens
on the other. This book’s second chapter, while incorporating these concerns and
controversies, also seeks to reach beyond them. We seek to provide a theoretical
and empirically grounded perspective that could contribute toward a broader
social theory on the genetization of society, able to understand the modes of
conceiving the human and the interrelations between justice and science during
what might be described as a post-DNA era.
The third chapter focuses on the empirical subject that served as the starting
point for our study: the sociological approach to a transnational pan-European
system of automated DNA profile exchange between EU Member States, known
as the Prüm System. Prüm is exemplary of how public discourse has seized on the
prevention and investigation of cross-border crime and terrorism as the main
driving force and justification for the proliferation of surveillance systems. Our
main goal in this chapter is to map and comprehend the workings behind Prüm’s
operations. The ostentatiously expansive nature of surveillance promoted through
DNA transnational exchange, should not compel us to limit our analysis to the
political, ethical and human rights aspects implied in Prüm. Instead, we address
the complexity of epistemic cultures, identities, interests and power relations that
characterize the actions and expectations of the two distinct professional groups
directly involved in the operations of the Prüm system: by one side, the National
Contact Points conducting laboratory work, working with DNA profiling and
DNA databases; by the other side, the National Contact Points working within
law enforcement international cooperation forces. These two professional groups
contribute to the visions and expectations regarding the role of genetic surveil-
lance in the governance of crime in Europe, through a combination of both col-
lective and shared beliefs. More particularly, they outline the capacity and value
of the transnational exchange of DNA data to support the investigation of cross-
border crime and terrorism, while at the same time, maintaining their specific
professional positioning and protecting their particular expertise.
Thus, this third chapter illustrates how the increasing expansion of genetic
surveillance’s reach and scope, is constructed, performed and legitimized
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through an “interpretative flexibility” (Konrad, 2006) which, according to
Kornelia Konrad, governs how various actors relate, both with their own
expectations as with others’. As we argue in this chapter, interpretative flex-
ibility operates as a two-sided phenomenon: on one side, the collective
expectations for the Prüm system summon a large number of highly hetero-
geneous actors, based on perceptions of the benefits of expanding the system
of cooperation − speeding up exchange of DNA data and valuable informa-
tion for criminal investigation, increasing accuracy and reliability. On the
flipside, expectations are strategically distributed according to the specific
positioning of actors and their particular situatedness. This interpretative flex-
ibility also sets the ground for nurturing what we have elsewhere described (with
our colleague Nina Amelung) a combined culture of “European integration”
and “hidden disintegration” (Amelung et al., 2020). The Prüm system enacts an
idea of “European integration,” believed to be achievable through the harmoni-
zation of scientific and technical procedures between laboratories and police
forces in different countries. Conversely, “hidden disintegration” derives from the
fact that not only were the mandatory elements of the Prüm Decisions politically
enforced without taking the differences between EU countries into considera-
tion, but also neglected the different professional epistemic cultures involved in
the operation of DNA data exchange.
The fourth chapter of the book is dedicated to forensic genetics technolo-
gies and genetic surveillance specifically in European post-communist coun-
tries, presenting how a particular idea of Europe is construed and thus laying
bare a set of tensions that underlie the image of a “European Identity.” For-
ensic genetics in the so-called Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries is
a theme that has thus far remained largely unexplored by social scientists. We
explore how the meanings attached to forensic genetic technologies in these
countries are influenced by memories of their collective past, namely the
legacy of totalitarian communist regimes. At the same time, this chapter also
seeks to demonstrate the multiplicity of European imagined communities
(Jasanoff, 2005) showing how the power to institutionalize a specific vision of
Europe might be partly inaccessible to CEE countries.
Although the expansion of genetic surveillance is seen as a path for enact-
ing and performing and “European way” (Barry, 2001), this chapter also
evinces the impossibility of a single European nationhood and the continuous
shaping and reshaping of European integration and disintegration (Amelung
et al., 2020). It illustrates how fundamentally different visions and values
rooted in different historical experiences, socio-political traditions, cultures,
and ideological foundations, all participate in the co-production of genetic
surveillance, governance of crime, and the making and unmaking of a Eur-
opean identity (Mager, 2016). This also suggests that the visions and expec-
tations for the role of genetic surveillance in the governance of crime are
shaped by − and concomitant with − unstable European values, which in turn
are not separable from either European politics or convoluted transitions
from authoritarian regimes to democracy.
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In the fifth chapter of this volume, we turn the focus to familial searching −
a technology that detects genetic relatedness and is used to identify criminal
suspects and/or identify missing persons through their connection with rela-
tives whose profiles are included in forensic DNA databases. More specifi-
cally, we move away from traditional approaches that reflect solely upon the
uses of familial searching in criminal investigations, highlighting its ethical,
social, and operational challenges, as a means to explore how this technology
is situated, within the European context, at the intersection of two distinct but
related rationales: control and care. That is, by emphasizing how familial
searching might be either mobilized to expand suspicion by assisting criminal
investigations, and/or to provide historical reparation for collective trauma by
supporting the identification of the missing (Granja & Machado, 2019).
Familial searching is subjected to a diversity of regulatory frameworks around
Europe that oscillate between control and care. While in some countries its use is
solely restricted to assisting criminal investigations, in others there is a more
concrete focus on how this technology might assist the identification of “the
missing” (Smith, 2017). The latter situation is more evident in countries with a
recent history of repression under totalitarian regimes and substantially affected
by the disappearance of its people (Colls, 2016), where DNA identification in the
field of missing persons tends to represent a facilitating mechanism of recon-
stitution. Different uses of DNA-identification, namely control and care, are
thus being amalgamated into a single political project, aimed at expanding
genetic surveillance. This trend is not, however, restricted to innovative technol-
ogies such as familial searching. The move a towards a security − and disaster −
focused identification grounded in global law enforcement, is also clearly patent
in pre-established architectures of crime control, such as Prüm system, which
increasingly incorporates and exchanges data related to missing persons.
The sixth chapter deals with the expansion of genetic informativity, by
looking at two cases of technologies that embody what we shall call a post-
DNA era, where frictions between non-coding and coding DNA are increas-
ingly relevant. The cases in point are Forensic DNA Phenotyping (FDP) and
Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) technologies. Based on interviews with
forensic geneticists, in this chapter we explore how expectations for innova-
tions in forensic genetics might profoundly change contemporary views about
(diverging) principles of legitimacy (or lack thereof) regarding the use of
genetic data in criminal investigation, while opening up new paths for recon-
sidering what criminal identification might consist of, and what the govern-
ance of forensic genetics should allow it to investigate and intend it for.
In relation to FDP − that is, the constellation of techniques used to infer
physical features, such as eye, skin, and hair color, as well as information about
biogeographic ancestry − forensic geneticists point out FDP’s added valued to
criminal investigations, while also underlining its epistemic risk, investigative
character and selective application in criminal cases considered serious or
otherwise difficult to solve. Regarding NGS, forensic geneticists are divided
between portraying it as a revolution, and expressing a deep skepticism about its
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added value for routine case work. Such variable positions are influenced by
forensic geneticists’ diverse locations within a developing network of relation-
ships of innovation, namely their position in terms of access to resources or the
type of work conducted, which might either be more focused on research science
or on forensic applied science.
This chapter clearly shows that, regardless of each technology’s specificities,
the so-called post-DNA era is inevitably marked by attempts to protect for-
ensic science’s credibility and autonomy, by engaging with “anticipatory gov-
ernance” strategies (Tutton, 2011; Wienroth, 2018) that directly address issues
of reliability, utility and legitimacy (Wienroth, 2020). One other feature of the
post-DNA era is the increasing importance of a growing market interested in
the commercialization of science and forensic equipment (Granja, 2020). This
is also particularly visible in one other technology, briefly addressed in this
chapter: long-range familial searches conducted in recreational DNA data-
bases where citizens voluntarily upload genetic information to know more
about their health and/or ancestry. The expansion of genetic informativity,
therefore, couples the ethically sustained debate about enrolling human
appearance, “race,” and medical and family information in the field of for-
ensic genetics, with the compounding tensions and controversies between sci-
entific imperatives, judicial priorities, and commercial interests.
Chapter seven operates a shift in perspective, from the professionals who
are directed involved in the development and/or application of genetic tech-
nologies, such as National Contact Points of the Prüm system or forensic
geneticists seen in previous chapters, to the views of European-based non-
governmental organizations (NGO) representatives concerned and critically
engaged with the development of forensic DNA databases and the application
of innovative and controversial genetic technologies in the criminal justice
system. Within a framework where genetic surveillance is consistently
expanding, it is of upmost importance to understand how NGOs’ self-defini-
tion of their goals and functions, relate to meanings, values and power struc-
tures of forensic DNA databases and innovative forensic genetic technologies.
The main goals of NGOs are concerned with a critique of how genetic
surveillance’s expansion promotes a rebalance power which threatens the
rights of the “biological citizen.” Other goals focus on informing the public
about science and technology innovations and promoting the adoption of a
responsible approach to genetic data. Europe, however, presents a highly dif-
ferentiated landscape in terms of NGO presence and visibility, highly influ-
enced by the broader historical, social, political, and economic principles
embedded in each country’s specific contexts and infrastructures. This implies
that NGOs’ visibility and range of action is highly contingent on each coun-
try’s specific traditions, namely in terms of transparency and accountability
policies while, at the same time, they carve out spaces of public visibility and
legitimate vindication.
The concluding chapter provides the reader with an overview of our main
theoretical advances in the specific field of social studies of science and
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technology, and reveals the most inspiring empirical findings, while also
opening up new paths for future research on the role of forensic genetics in its
multiple forms and diverse performances of surveillance in the governance of
crime. Forensic genetic technologies have emerged at different points in time
and space, but they have all consistently endured: currently they co-exist
around the globe, and their profound cultural and ethical implications are
foreseeable in the near future. In our concluding remarks we make clear how
the presence of forensic genetics in different social and political contexts
across Europe and beyond, demands an urgent and constant discussion about
the kind of governance and modes of public engagement to which democratic
societies require and should aspire.
Our ambition in this book clearly exceeds the context of science produc-
tion: our work aims to investigate how values and expectations constructed
by varied social actors and diverse stakeholders influence the way science and
technology in the domain of forensic genetics become enmeshed in perform-
ing and producing diverse visions of governance of crime, at a variety of
scales and affecting diverse publics. One relevant highlight of this book is
undoubtedly to develop an in-depth understanding of the values, judgements,
power relations, and agendas incorporated in the hopes and promises, as well
as in the fears and anxieties regarding genetic surveillance in the governance
of crime in Europe and elsewhere.
Notes
1 More information can be found here: http://exchange.ics.uminho.pt (last accessed 15
January 2020).
2 The Prüm Convention was signed in 2005 by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain in the town of Prüm, Germany. The
Convention was subsequently adopted into European Union Law (Decisions 2008/
615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA), under the so-called Prüm Decisions that establish the
automated exchange of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data among the
EU Member States for the purpose of fighting crime and terrorism.
3 The interviews were conducted by the authors and other members of the Exchange
project between 2015 and 2019. The authors are deeply indebted to Nina Amelung,
Sheila Khan, Filipa Queirós, Sara Matos, and Filipe Santos for their participation
and collaboration in the collection of data. The main underlying goal of the inter-
views was to capture the diverse embedded meanings and interpretations that illus-
trate a corresponding variety of perspectives on the social, cultural, ethical,
regulatory and political dimensions involved in the use of DNA technologies with
forensic purposes across the EU. In terms of the sampling methods used in the
selection of interviewees, we followed three different strategies: we started by map-
ping out the group of professionals involved in the Prüm system’s National Contact
Points, searching in the public listing available in the documents of the “Working
Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection” (Council of the European
Union, 2015, 2017), as well as through contacts with privileged informants. This
enquiry led to 47 interviews. We also conducted interviews with members of the
European forensic genetic community, whom we reached through the lists of mem-
bers of professional organizations and international research networks. The selec-
tion of forensic geneticists was also based on the literature produced by authors in
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the field of forensic genetics. Finally, we conducted 11 interviews with non-govern-
ment organization representatives working in the areas of human rights and science
(both in the specific domain of genetics as in broader fields, such as “surveillance”)
in five countries selected as case studies (Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
and UK). The interview scripts covered a wide array of topics: the main opera-
tional, scientific and ethical challenges posed by the Prüm system’s implementation;
expectations for the development and innovation in DNA technologies, namely the
development of technologies considered controversial - such as FDP, familial
searching, and NGS -, as well as expectations regarding the impact of the private
sector’s growing presence. Another topic broached in the interviews covered the
questions of public involvement, accountability and transparency in the govern-
ance of forensic DNA databasing, on issues such as the communication of science
in courts and with citizens. This book focuses on 107 interviews selected from a
total of 124 interviews available in the scope of this study. We thus excluded
interviews with stakeholders from the five case studies (Germany, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, and UK), namely: supervisory and regulatory entities, uni-
versity professors and researchers, legislators, criminal investigation agencies, pri-
vate companies, and the media. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, at
the interviewees’ workplace, following the protocols of informed consent approved
by the European Research Council. Before the interviews, all participants signed a
written informed consent document and agreed to be audio-recorded. All inter-
views, except two, were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim by profes-
sional services. The interviews were conducted in a language familiar to
interviewees and interviewers alike, mostly in English (87), but also in Portuguese
(28), German (six), and Spanish (three). The interviews in German and Spanish
were translated to English by external professionals. These translations sought as
far as possible to thoroughly respect the content and meanings conveyed by
interviewees.
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2 Forensic Genetics and Genetic
Surveillance in Europe
A Historical and Sociological Analysis
Introduction
On February 21, 2019 The New York Times published a piece enticingly titled
“China uses DNA to track its people, with the help of American expertise,”
signed by Sui-Lee Wee, a correspondent in the Beijing bureau who has con-
sistently covered and written about genetic surveillance and health care (Wee,
2019). In this instance, Sui-Lee Wee told the story of Tahir Imin, a 38-year-
old Uyghur, who had his blood drawn, his fingerprints collected, his face
scanned, and his voice recorded by the authorities in China’s Xinjiang region.
The Uyghurs are one of China’s 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities, and
most of them are Muslims. It is estimated that since 2015 over a million
Uyghurs have been detained in Xinjiang “re-education camps” set up by the
Chinese government administration with the main purpose of ensuring
adherence to national ideology. Critics of China’s treatment of Uyghurs have
accused the Chinese government of promoting a policy of Uyghur ethnocide
or cultural genocide in Xinjiang in the 21st century (Ramzy & Buckley, 2019).
The story about the collection of Imin’s biometric data and blood samples
points out that authorities called it a “free health check” (Wee, 2019). This
journalistic piece also emphasizes that Imin was just one case among millions
of people caught up in a vast Chinese campaign of surveillance and oppres-
sion in which, according to human rights groups and Uyghur activists, col-
lecting genetic material plays a key role. Finally, The New York Times article
also warned that Chinese officials are building a broad nationwide database of
DNA samples with the help and support of scientists affiliated to Thermo
Fisher, a Massachusetts company that sells equipment for DNA analysis
around the world. Human rights groups and Uyghur activists claim that a
DNA database of this kind could be used to persecute any Uyghurs who
resist such a campaign (Wee, 2019).
In order to establish a comparison with Uyghur DNA, the Chinese officials
allegedly relied on genetic material collected from people around the world
provided by Dr. Kenneth Kidd, a prominent Yale University geneticist. In the
wake of the public scandal that followed the disclosure of this kind of genetic
DOI: 10.4324/9780429261435-2
surveillance practice, targeting a specific ethnic and religious minority with
the aim of asserting authority and political repression, the private corporation
Thermo Fisher declared that it would no longer sell its equipment in Xin-
jiang, the Chinese region where the Uyghur tracking campaign was mostly
taking place. Dr. Kidd also claimed he had been unaware of the use being
given to his material and know-how, stating that he had believed Chinese
scientists were acting within scientific norms that require informed consent by
DNA donors (Wee, 2019, 2020).
This story embodies several issues that help us to put into perspective the
problems dealt with in this book, as well as our empirical analysis of the
interviews conducted with different stakeholders across Europe. The setting of
a dictatorial regime imposed by the Chinese Communist Party comprises
political, social, cultural and historical configurations that are substantially
distinct from the European empirical setting (or rather, its multiple actual-
ities). Nonetheless, the events narrated in The New York Times article involve
a variety of practices, social actors, expectations and relations of power that
are found across different settings, whether in dictatorial or democratic
societies. Among these, we emphasize the following aspects: the use of genetic
surveillance as an instrument of power and its impact on the stigmatization of
particular ethnic or racial minorities; state ambitions to build genetic data-
bases for the collection, storage and use of information about its citizens; the
role of private corporations in supporting the development and expansion of
databases and forensic genetic technologies; and the permeability of the
boundaries that distinguish between the use of genetic databases designed
specifically for criminal identification purposes and the use of non-criminal
genetic databases.
According to Andra le Roux-Kemp (2018), by March 31, 2012 China’s
database contained more than 13 million DNA profiles, making it the largest
forensic DNA database in the world, in absolute numbers (Interpol, 2016).
The lack of any legislative framework or regulatory guidelines for its opera-
tion and the fact that DNA databases in China are operated by notoriously
repressive police forces, together with the fact that criminal courts and pro-
secutors are dependent on the Communist party, raises many questions
regarding the uses of criminal DNA databases (Le Roux-Kemp, 2018). But
while the high levels of mass surveillance implemented by the Chinese Gov-
ernment are the object of wide controversy and international concern from a
human rights’ perspective (Leibold & Emile, 2020; Richardson, 2017), we
must point out that the amplification of genetic surveillance is not the pre-
rogative of dictatorial regimes. No doubt, a wide chasm separates Greater
China and Europe in terms of human rights. For example, in democratic
political systems, police forces – as an executive branch of the government –
have a duty to serve rather than threaten the people (Hufnagel, 2017). In spite
of this general framework, however, we also should note, as suggested in a
previous work with our colleague Nina Amelung (Amelung, Granja &
Machado, 2020), that the European Union (EU) does not possess a common
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and unified human rights’ regime. Consequently, our approach is mindful of
the differences between EU Member States, not only in terms of human rights
practices, but also with regard to technical, scientific, operational and other
legal practices linked to legitimacy claims that are rationalized within the
rhetoric of democracy (Amelung et al., 2020).
One of the most emblematic cases of a maximum surveillance society in
Europe is the United Kingdom (Norris & Armstrong, 1999). It was not only
the first country in the world to create a DNA database for criminal identifi-
cation purposes (in 1995), but also to develop pioneering practices in the
collection of biometric data from its citizens, immigrant populations, and
asylum seekers (Amankwaa & McCartney, 2019; Tutton, Hauskeller &
Sturdy, 2014). Established in 1995, the United Kingdom’s National Criminal
Intelligence DNA Database (NDNAD) is believed to be the world’s oldest
national forensic DNA database (Downey, Stephens & Flaherty, 2012; John-
son & Williams, 2007). On March 31, 2020, the number of DNA profiles
contained in the NDNAD database amounted to about 10 per cent of the
UK’s resident population, making it proportionally the world’s largest
(Amankwaa, 2018; Amelung et al., 2020).
Upon its implementation in 1995, the UK’s NDNAD was initially intended
only to collect the DNA profiles from offenders convicted of serious violent
crimes such as murder, rape, or aggravated assault. However, successive
changes in legislation led to the collection of DNA (and fingerprints) from
any person suspected of having committed an offence, also abolishing the
previous requirement to destroy fingerprints, samples, and profiles upon
acquittal of a suspect. Ultimately, these changes led to the considerable
expansion of NDNAD. Similarly, the growth of federal and national DNA
databases in the USA (which holds the world’s second largest DNA database
in absolute numbers, following China), was also a gradual process. Initially,
state DNA databases in the USA almost exclusively collected DNA profiles
of adult sexual offenders, although they soon expanded to include not only
the DNA profiles of all convicted felons, but also of juvenile and mis-
demeanor offenders and even mere arrestees (Aronson, 2010; Rothstein &
Talbott, 2006).
However, as described by Andra le Roux-Kemp (2018), the legal trajec-
tories of DNA databases in the UK and USA have since followed in opposite
directions. The considerable expansion of the UK’s NDNAD came under
scrutiny in 2008 when, in S & Marper v. United Kingdom,1 the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) expressed privacy concerns regarding the
storage of certain DNA profile categories. This resulted in legislation changes
ordering the destruction of biological samples and elimination of DNA pro-
files of acquitted suspects or persons who have not been formally accused of
any crime (Amankwaa & McCartney, 2019). In contrast, in Maryland v.
King,2 the US Supreme Court emphasized the government’s legitimate inter-
est and extraordinary utility of DNA profiles and comparative searches on
DNA databases like CODIS. In the words of Le Roux-Kemp:
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…judgments of these two cases reflect the competing interests in the
debate on the expansion of existing DNA databases. On the one hand,
proponents of expansion emphasize the utility of DNA profiling and the
potential of increased efficacy that an expanded DNA database holds,
whereas the opponents show concern for individuals’ civil liberties and
particularly their privacy interests with regard to their genetic material
and information. Moreover, an important aspect that was largely ignored
in the Maryland judgment is that in most states in the USA, the burden
to destroy a DNA sample and expunge a DNA profile from a database is
placed on the arrestee, and the majority of these states do not require that
arrestees be informed of state expungement policies.
(Le Roux-Kemp, 2018, pp. 235–236)
In addition to the developments described above regarding criminal DNA
databases in the UK and USA, there are also other circumstances where
information in non-criminal genetic databases might be used in a criminal
investigation and accessed by the police (de Groot et al., 2020). In the UK,
for example, it is possible to issue a court order allowing police access to
stored DNA samples and/or genetic information in any database. In the USA
there have also been a number contentious cases where police have sought
and gained access to genetic information, including an instance where an
individual was wrongly considered a potential suspect based on a familial
search conducted in a recreational database (Forensic Genetics Policy Initia-
tive, 2017). That is, databases voluntarily used by citizens to upload genetic
data in order to know more about their health, ancestry and/or search for
relatives. If storage of genetic information for non-police purposes were to
become widespread and police access to such information were to be broadly
facilitated, including familial searches, this would mean that any individual
and their relatives could, in effect, be tracked using their DNA, undermining
all existing safeguards for forensic DNA databases currently recognized
internationally and urgently needed (Granja, 2020; Kennett, 2019; Murphy,
2018; Samuel & Kennett, 2020).
In sum, notwithstanding our tendency to associate arbitrary abuses of state
surveillance and police action to dictatorial regimes, several features and
characteristics of genetic surveillance used in crime governance can be found
across different political, cultural, and historical settings in regions all over
the world. The expansion of genetic surveillance is thus a global reality
(Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010).
In this chapter we will address genetic surveillance by describing the for-
ensic genetic technologies being used in Europe as an aid to criminal investi-
gation, the trends in legislation and its frequently controversial and turbulent
historical and social evolution. To do so, we have opted for the following
structure: the first part provides an account of the different forensic genetic
technologies and their historical benchmarks since the mid-1980s until the
present. We entwine the historical outline with a discussion of the main
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controversies aroused by the different technologies, on the techno-scientific
field, in the juridical-legal dimension, as well as on the ethical, social, and
political levels.
In the second part, we present the existing regulations, legislative frame-
works, and governance principles in European countries regarding the col-
lection, use, and storage of genetic data. The different perspectives and
perceptions surrounding forensic genetic technologies are not merely a matter
or rhetorical discourse. The views they reflect – both in the form of visions
and expectations – take on substance; they become materially embedded in
structures, machines, routines, systems, objects, matters, bodies, and actions
related to science and technology development (Latour, 1987, 2005).
Although we do not share notions that presuppose a direct and unequivocal
relationship between “ideas” and “matter” (Latour, 2000), the sociological
understanding of the material medium in which forensic genetic technologies
operate is paramount.
In the third part, we focus on the complex, messy and unstable nature of
genetic surveillance for the governance of crime. Understanding the multi-
plicity and heterogeneity of genetic surveillance helps to avoid unwarranted
ethnocentric generalizations that result from an overwhelming focus of
research on the Anglophone world (Boersma et al., 2014).
Between utopian and dystopian views: the trajectory of forensics genetics
One of the reasons that explains the importance given to genetic information
in criminal investigations, is the scientific statute of molecular genetics (Lynch
et al., 2008). From the standpoint of several professional groups – ranging
from forensic scientists to criminal investigators, judges and prosecutors,
attorneys and the general public − DNA technologies and forensic genetic
databases allegedly generate information that is “more scientific” and “more
capable” to identify offenders through a swifter and more credible method
(Cole, 2001; Lynch et al., 2008; Machado & Prainsack, 2012). Thus, many
commentators have emphasized the benefits of using genetic technologies
such as DNA profiling in policing and as forensic evidence in courts, to
improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.
In western liberal democracies, most prominently in North America and
Europe, innovations and developments in forensic genetics have been reg-
ularly accompanied by public controversies instigated by civic organizations
(Amelung & Machado, 2019; Machado & Silva, 2019) and occasionally trig-
gered by the media (Amelung & Machado, 2019; Machado & Santos, 2009,
2011; Martins, 2021). Concerns relating to excessive state control over citi-
zens’ sensitive data, risks to genetic privacy, as well threats to other civic
rights such as presumption of innocence, autonomy, and liberty, have been at
the heart of the public debate promoted by civic organizations (Amankwaa,
2018). Other issues of contention relate to the absent or fragile control over
the state’s handling of genetic and other sensitive data from citizens, as well as
26 Genetic Surveillance and Crime Control
to the scrutiny regarding which agencies have access to such data and their
different purposes (Amankwaa, 2019b; Machado & Silva, 2014, 2016). Social
scientists have also raised concerns concerning the stigmatization and crim-
inalization of specific ethnic-racial populations and vulnerable groups (Duster,
2003; M’charek, Schramm & Skinner, 2014; Machado, Granja & Amelung,
2020; Skinner, 2018b; Toom et al., 2016).
The different viewpoints on the legitimacy and potential usefulness (or lack
thereof) of forensic genetics in the governance of crime, or conversely on the
fears of its risks and dangers to civil liberties and human rights, tend to be
socially constructed within the parameters of what academics in the field of
surveillance studies have described the spectrum between care and control
(Lyon, 2001; Machado & Silva, 2016, 2019; Wilson-Kovacs, 2014) or utopian
and dystopian views. In this framework of co-existence and ambivalence, for-
ensic genetics innovations are construed to serve particular politics of
belonging or of exclusion, by appointing specific publics as beneficiaries of the
technologies in the name of law and security, and other publics as potentially
harmed by targeted re-inscription of suspicion (Amelung et al., 2020; Amelung &
Machado, 2019; Machado et al., 2020).
The activities of forensic genetics engage a diversified set of techniques, objects,
social actors, and infrastructures: while the great revolution of the mid-1980s was
Alec Jeffreys’ “discovery” of “DNA fingerprints” (Williams & Wienroth, 2014a),
more than three decades later, the frontline of the debate in forensic genetics has
shifted to controversial technologies aiming to predict physical appearance of
unknown suspects, the use of recreational DNA databases for criminal investi-
gation purposes, and the emergence of techniques able to generate genome wide
data (Machado & Granja, 2020; Wienroth, Morling & Williams, 2014; Williams
& Wienroth, 2014a). In order to outline the trajectory of forensic genetics, the
following table (see Table 2.1) lays out the main landmarks in the historical evo-
lution of forensic genetic technologies, side by side with the major controversies
and social issues they generated. The structure of summaries presented in
Table 2.1 (see below) was inspired on the “four waves of forensic genetics”
proposed by Matthias Wienroth, Niels Morling, Robin and Williams (2014),
adjusted and completed by a broad number of works on historical trajec-
tories, techno-scientific, ethical, and societal controversies, as well as the main
social and legal-regulatory changes.
Following the “discovery” of DNA fingerprints by Jeffreys, the first wave of
forensic genetics was focused on establishing the credibility of DNA profiling
and regulating its uses in criminal trials (Aronson, 2007; Derksen, 2003, 2010;
Jasanoff, 2006; Lynch et al., 2008). The second wave referred to the estab-
lishment, expansion, and use of national criminal DNA databases across the
world (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010) and the concomitant international
exchange of DNA data (Machado et al., 2020; Machado & Granja, 2018,
2019b; McCartney, 2014; Prainsack & Toom, 2010, 2013). The third wave
had to do with the development and increasing implementation of technolo-
gies that go beyond identification, such as familial searching in criminal DNA
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databases and forensic DNA phenotyping (Granja, Machado, & Queirós,
2020; Granja & Machado, 2019, 2020; Haimes, 2006; Murphy, 2010; Samuel
& Prainsack, 2018; Wienroth, 2018, 2020).
Briefly, familial searching refers to speculative searches in criminal DNA
databases for criminal suspects through genetic relatedness (e.g. partial matches
with potential biological relatives) (Bieber, Brenner, & Lazer, 2006; Chamberlain,
2012; Curran & Buckleton, 2008; Flaus, 2013; García, Crespillo, & Yurrebaso,
2017; Kim et al., 2011; Suter, 2010; Thomas, 2006). Forensic DNA phenotyping
can be described as a set of techniques used to infer externally visible physical
features – eye, hair, and skin color – and continental-based biogeographical
ancestry of criminal suspects based on the analysis of biological materials col-
lected at crime scenes (Daniel et al., 2015; Kayser, 2015; Kayser & de Knijff,
2011; Kayser & Schneider, 2009).
Anticipating the possibility of a fourth wave on the horizon, Wienroth,
Morling, and Williams (2014) referred to the blurring of boundaries between
medical and forensic genetics. The use of next-generation sequencing (NGS)
(or massive parallel sequencing, MPS) is particularly relevant in this context,
as it allows sequencing a whole genome or taking a targeted approach with
DNA and RNA-sequencing (the latter improves the ability to look at alter-
native gene transcripts, mutations and changes in genes expression over time)
(Amorim & Pinto, 2018; Graffelman, Jain, & Weir, 2017). More significantly,
NGS generates a substantial quantity of sensible information that, while not
essential for purposes identification, is relevant to infer traits of medical
importance and to obtain markers that can reveal physical traits and biogeo-
graphic ancestry or reveal markers situated at coding regions.
Based on Matthias Wienroth, Niels Morling, and Robin Williams’ con-
ceptual framework, Granja (2020) argues that we are currently witnessing a
consolidation of the fourth wave in largely unforeseen and unexpected ways.
Coupled with the development and increasing use of NGS, we are also seeing
the advent and expansion of long-range familial searches in recreational
DNA databases. That is, the search of potential suspects’ relatives in data-
bases where citizens voluntarily upload genetic data to know more about their
health, ancestry and/or to search for relatives (Kennett, 2019; Murphy, 2018;
Samuel & Kennett, 2020). In this book, besides addressing the technologies
from previous waves, we also provide a critical enquiry into the ongoing
fourth wave by exploring NGS (see Chapter 6).
The next section presents an overview of genetic surveillance in the governance
of crime in Europe, focusing on legislation trends (more expansive or more restric-
tive) while outlining the uses made of the different forensic genetic technologies.
The landscape of genetic surveillance in the governance of crime in Europe
As described earlier, the establishment of criminal DNA databases began in
the mid-1990s. The first forensic genetic database was set up in England and
Wales in 1995, and countries such as the Netherlands (1997), Austria (1997),
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and Germany (1998) followed suit. It is estimated that there are now 69 countries
around the world operating this type of database and that at least 34 countries are
starting the process of implementing their own database (Butler & Willis, 2020;
Interpol, 2016; Prainsack & Aronson, 2015). Such databases exist in different
regions of the world, with a clear expansion in Europe and North America: how-
ever, recent developments point to growing expansion in Asia, particularly in
China, and in South Africa (Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative, 2017).
The size of forensic genetic databases and their type of organization and reg-
ulation is extremely varied. Legislation can determine the possible purposes or
uses of DNA databases, distinguishing between criminal identification, civil iden-
tification, and scientific research purposes. It can also define the scope and means
of access to the information stored in a database: either extending access to several
official bodies (judicial authorities and police forces) or restricting access to spe-
cific agents within the justice system. In addition, legislation also establishes which
information can be communicated, whether only information about matches
between genetic profiles or if other information can also be communicated (e.g.
personal data of the person identified by means of the genetic profile).
Other issues that are usually contemplated in national legislations refer to the
criteria for inclusion and elimination of genetic profiles and biological samples.
The legislative frameworks across different countries present assorted options to
determine the scope and extent of access to a DNA database, based on criteria
such as crime typology, maximum term of sentence, age, likelihood of recidivism,
etc. As a result, the law is expected to answer the following questions: who can be
subject and under what circumstances shall profiles be inserted into the DNA
database? What is the fate of biological samples collected from suspects or con-
victs? What are the expiration dates for storage of DNA profiles and samples?
In general terms, the criteria that govern the inclusion and removal of profiles
and samples constitute the variable with the most significant impact on the size
of databases of genetic profiles. According to Filipe Santos and colleagues, who
carried out a study on legislative trends in DNA databases in Europe, a distinc-
tion can be made between countries with expansive and restrictive legislations
(Santos, Machado, & Silva, 2013). Following this typology the latter group
includes the following countries: Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, the Nether-
lands, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Sweden. The coun-
tries with expansive legislation are Austria, Denmark, Scotland, Slovakia,
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom.
In the authors’ perspective, a country can be classified as following an expan-
sionist tendency with respect to the development of such databases whenever its
specific legal framework is unrestrictive regarding the insertion of profiles into
the DNA database for forensic purposes (e.g., allows the inclusion of the DNA
profile of any individual suspected of any punishable offense, whether a suspect
or convicted person). Conversely, countries are considered to follow a restrictive
tendency if their current legislation contemplates restrictions and limits to the
uses of DNA databases, such as limits on the types of sentences or crimes eligible
for inclusion of profiles in databases.
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Note that the apparent dichotomy between expansionist and restrictive
tendencies refers to the potential specific effects of legislative provisions. These
effects are reflected, for example, in the proportion of the national population
present in each country’s database. Table 2.2 shows the diversity of size from
a sample of criminal DNA databases in Europe. It should be pointed out that
France, for example, despite displaying a “restrictive” legislation (according
to the previously mentioned study by Santos et al., 2013), has witnessed a
remarkable expansion over recent years, currently possessing the third largest
forensic DNA database in Europe. The database of genetic profiles in the
United Kingdom remains the largest of all, notwithstanding recent legislative
changes introduced in the wake of the ruling by the ECHR following S. &
Marper v. UK (McCartney, Williams & Wilson, 2010).
Furthermore, the distinction between restrictive and expansive trends pro-
posed by Santos and colleagues (2013) should be updated to also include legis-
lation (or lack thereof) on the uses of the different forensic genetic technologies
such as familial searching and forensic DNA phenotyping. For example, a
country such as the Netherlands, previously classified as “restrictive” (2013), due
to the inclusion of minor restrictions on the legal power to obtain DNA samples
(Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016), possesses a jurisdiction which actually
allows a very expansive use of several controversial genetic technologies. In fact,
the Netherlands has a track record of “innovation” regarding the regulation and
practical application of genetic technologies for forensic purposes. In 1994 it
was the first country to introduce specific legislation on the use of forensic
DNA to compare DNA profiles from a suspect and from a crime scene
(M’charek, Toom, & Jong 2020; Toom, 2012). In 2003 the Netherlands was
also a pioneer in regulating the use, in criminal investigations, of externally
visible characteristics determined genetically (Hopman, 2020; Hopman &
M’charek, 2020; M’charek, 2008). Since then, controversial uses of DNA
data techniques, such as forensic DNA phenotyping, familial searching, and
Table 2.2 Size of several forensic genetic databases in Europe
Country Population Total no. of individuals
inserted in the Database
Proportion of population
in the database
Germany 82.000.000 857.000 1,0%
Austria 8.100.000 203.054 2,5%
Denmark 5.500.000 116.433 2,1%
France 66.030.000 3.282.418 5,0%
Netherlands 17.000.000 237.254 1,4%
Scotland 5.500.000 311.107 5,7%
Hungary 9.982.000 148.384 1,5%
England & Wales 53.700.000 4.733.755 8,8%
Sweden 9.894.888 153.008 1,5%
Source: ENFSI (2016).
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mass screenings have become increasingly relevant in criminal investigations
in the country (Jong & M’charek, 2017).
Despite legislative differences between European DNA databases, the
dominant trend towards a generalized use and a more harmonized exchange
of information has been increasingly encouraged (Machado et al., 2020;
Machado & Granja, 2018; McCartney, Wilson, & Williams, 2011; Prainsack
& Toom, 2010, 2013). A clear example of this is the Prüm system − a pan-
European network of reciprocal automated searching and comparison of
DNA profile information (as well as fingerprints and vehicle registration data)
conceived to step up cross-border cooperation, particularly in the fight against
terrorism and cross-border crime (EU Council, 2008a, 2008b). In addition to
fostering a closer collaboration among police forces in EU countries, the
Prüm system was also intended as an additional motor of the pan-European
integration project by attempting to overcome cultural, political and socio-
economic disparities. This is achieved through a combination of measures that
set technological standards among countries and an on-going promotion of dis-
course focusing on security and risk prevention (Prainsack & Toom, 2013).
Nonetheless, the goal to bridge disparities among EU countries is coupled
with two other phenomena. On the one hand, it must contend with the diversity
of criteria for insertion and removal of DNA profiles and preservation of sam-
ples across Europe. Such a heterogeneous landscape makes it difficult to ensure
compliance with the principles of equality, proportionality, and presumption of
innocence in the context of the transfer of information on DNA profiles between
EU Member States. Studies on this topic have been highlighting an apparent
insufficiency in policies regarding both the standardization and monitoring of
cooperation activities, as well as the collection, storage, processing, interpreta-
tion and legal application of DNA profile information (Amankwaa, 2019a;
McCartney et al., 2011; Santos & Machado, 2017; Toom, 2018).
On the other hand, the goal to overcome disparities among EU states is paired
with the consolidation of a broader social sorting system that highlights several
geopolitical tensions. In other words, since national DNA databases tend to
reflect policing practices that usually target minorities, such as foreigners and/or
ethnic minorities (Chow-White & Duster, 2011; Duster, 2006; Skinner, 2013,
2018a), by enabling the transnational exchange of data, the Prüm system has the
power to reassert and extend the discriminatory power of DNA databases. The
transnational exchange of DNA data in the EU thereby enables the (re)making of
the connections between criminality and suspicious movements of data and of
particular populations leaving specific national territories (Machado et al., 2020).
Regardless of its particular challenges, the Prüm system is exemplary of
Europe-building practices. In a recent previous work with our colleague Nina
Amelung (Amelung et al., 2020) we describe the Prüm system as an illus-
trative case to reveal how specific concepts and visions of Europe – and, we
might add, of nationhood – become enacted through the designs of transna-
tional DNA database systems. We show that Member States appropriate
the requirements to join the transnational DNA data exchange as responses
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to and articulations of their own visions of Europe and nationhood. In this
sense, we talk about the “hidden integration” deriving from an analysis of
new transnational polities as outcomes of large-scale techno-political attempts
at European integration. We also argue that multiple visions of “Europe”
have been enacted, so we also understand the Prüm system as a mean of
“disintegration” of Europe (Amelung et al., 2020).
Multiplicity of genetic surveillance in Europe
From decades of social sciences research into surveillance emerges the notion that
nation states have the tendency to grow towards surveillance societies (Lyon,
1994, 2014). Genetic surveillance is by no means an exception. However, char-
acteristics of genetic surveillance vary from place to place. Consequently, we need
empirically informed relational studies of the multiple, hybrid and conflicted
nature of such instances.
Significant economic and political investment has been made in the creation
of criminal DNA databases. This investment is driven by the promise that new
techno-scientific initiatives would deliver a variety of benefits for society, includ-
ing more effective law enforcement and greater security (Tutton & Levitt, 2010;
Williams & Johnson, 2008). However, there is a variety of empirical contours in
how genetic surveillance has been implemented along the last three decades
across countries in Europe. As described in the previous section of this chapter,
although genetic data categories are technically and scientifically standardized,
the national DNA databases have very different compositions – some are
expansive and some more restrictive – and therefore incorporate very differently
affected social groups. Therefore, it is important to view genetic surveillance as a
process and not as an outcome that demands awareness of the social, cultural
and historical roots and seek interconnections.
The main cause of this development of surveillance – and of genetic surveil-
lance – is reputedly the worldwide stress by nation states on countering terrorism
and cross-border crime (Ball & Webster, 2003; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Hairston,
2002). For example, the Prüm system fosters the idea of Europe’s technological
and political integration in law enforcement through the transnational exchange
of DNA profiles stored in the different national DNA databases of cooperating
countries. Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, it is crucial not to under-
estimate the power of nationalism and the role of nation-states (Amelung et al.,
2020; Misa & Schot, 2005). Therefore, two questions are raised: does a mono-
causal relationship between the “global threats” of terrorism and cross-border
crime and the expansion of genetic surveillance indeed exist? How can we
accommodate and represent the heterogeneity of the European history of sur-
veillance? Some North European countries, for instance, do not share the
weighty surveillance past of their Eastern and Southern neighbours where
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have implemented repressive surveillance
systems (Boersma et al., 2014). Nonetheless, criminal DNA databases were first
implemented in North Europe (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010).
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Genetic surveillance refers us to the “sociotechnical imaginaries” described
by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim as the ideas that become rooted in
institutions, culture, and material artifacts and which unite members of a
collective in a shared vision of a future achievable through advances in sci-
ence and technology (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015). From our point of view, the
different countries are crossed by a pervading socio-technical imagery of
“techno-optimism” regarding the value and potential of genetic surveillance
in the governance of crime and its added value to enhance the capability and
efficiency of the justice system. As Andrea Quinlan (2020) explains in her
work on forensic rape kits in US labs, this kind of techno-optimism has a long
history. Quinlan examines how decades of depositing hope on forensic science
to solve the inefficiency and slowness of the criminal justice system gradually
built an imaginary of optimism, extending to the media, political decision-
makers, sexual crime victim activists and other groups. Moreover, techno-
optimist visions are used to their own advantage by a booming forensic
industry profiting from such optimism (Quinlan, 2020).
However, as Sheila Jasanoff also observes, socio-technical imageries become all
the more pressing and visible when they coincide with other existing imageries
(Quinlan, 2020, p. 6). This means that the techno-optimist element of genetic sur-
veillance’s socio-technical imaginary will tend to gain stability, robustness, and vis-
ibility whenever it “coincides” with other collective beliefs (imageries) already
embedded in the scientific and technological and institutions, in political and gov-
ernment actors, in police forces and the justice system. For instance, both France
and the UK currently possess the largest criminal DNA databases in Europe (Reed
& Syndercombe-Court, 2016). There are three main reasons that explain the long
histories of surveillance practices in either country. First, one of the driving forces
ensuring the penetration of central government into the lives of private citizens was
the welfare state and its information-gathering needs, through which the “infor-
mation state” uses technological developments to gather or store enormous
amounts of data (Higgs, 2004). Second, since the late 1870s the “technological
seduction” to use fingerprints was very strong in both countries, as a means to
identify not just criminals, but also a wide range of population groups considered
suspect for other reasons: the natives of colonies; recent immigrants; the poor, itin-
erant populations, “vagrants,” prostitutes, etc. (Cole, 2001). Finally, although the
process of systematic data gathering started long before the recent “Global War on
Terror,” the international discourse around this problem has produced deep long-
term effects on policies and security agendas in both France and the UK.
Coupled with the coincidence of imageries, we argue that techno-optimism also
requires different stakeholders to constantly negotiate between high and low
expectations (Tutton, 2011), combining the optimist outlook of benefits with
concerns regarding risks, fears, dangers and anxieties. On this point, Table 2.3
shows that the visions on DNA profiling among three groups of actors who are
professionally engaged with DNA profiling (namely, scientists and laboratory
technicians, criminal investigators, and attorneys, prosecutors and judges of end-
users) depend on specific epistemic cultures whose focus highlight certain features
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over others (see also Machado & Granja, 2019a; Williams & Johnson, 2004).
Thus, we find common aspects and continuities to genetic surveillance in the
governance of crime across different countries. This coexistence can be witnessed,
for instance, in the concurrent presence of utopian and dystopian values: law and
order vis a vis privacy and freedom; justice system efficiency and DNA as “truth
machine” versus the criminalization of specific social groups; belief in the infall-
ibility of DNA evidence as opposed to justice’s vulnerability to error.
At the same time, the multiplicity and heterogeneity of genetic surveillance in
the governance of crime in Europe also opens the door to explore the complexity
of crucial cultural and historical problems. For instance, we cannot ignore a
specific reference to post-authoritarian societies in Europe. In some contexts,
surveillance has continued to permeate the relationship between the state and its
citizens well beyond the end of past authoritarian regimes. However, not only it
would be misleading to analyze these post-authoritarian societies along the same
lines as “surveillance societies” that have not experienced a transition to
democracy, but even among the former, not all transitions represent the same for
each country or impact similarly upon their societies.
For example, we can briefly evoke three very different national cases of
genetic surveillance in the governance of crime, such as Germany, Portugal,
and Poland (Amelung et al., 2020; Amelung, Queirós & Machado, 2021;
Table 2.3 Visions about DNA profiling
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Granja & Machado, 2019). Despite socio-cultural and historical differences,
as well as huge disparities in economic development and the presence of sci-
ence and technology innovation, they share a common feature: they all fall
into the category of post-authoritarian surveillance societies.
Germany has a historical legacy that combines both the violent state sur-
veillance imposed during the Nazi-regime and the repressive surveillance
imposed in the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) by the
secret police agencies of the Ministry for State Security, commonly known as
the Stasi. East Germany was a communist state, characterized by a totalitarian
or severely authoritarian regime inspired on the Soviet model, whose existence
as a country lasted between 1949 and 1990, when it was dissolved and reunited
with West Germany, on October 3, 1990. Therefore, referring to “Germany” as
a unique, homogenous society becomes particularly problematic and ambig-
uous. More than 70 years after the Second World War and 30 years after
reunification, collective memories of the Nazi regime as well as memories of the
East German police state continue to affect public views of state surveillance
(Lichter, Löffler, & Siegloch, 2020). In this regard, Germany’s historical and
cultural particularities make it stand out in terms of its relation to genetics.
Public perceptions in Germany on this issue are still influenced by memories of
Germany’s Nazi past and the role science played in racializing genetics and
supporting the eugenics movement (Kattmann, 2017). Germany’s past has
contributed to a strong awareness regarding genetics and a general scepticism
about allowing state and law enforcement agencies having to have access to
sensitive genetic information of its citizens (Sperling, 2008). Such public scep-
ticism was also dominant when the German DNA database was established in
1998 (Lee, 2016). The particular sense of nationhood in Germany is therefore
entangled with cultural meanings attached to forensic DNA technologies that
reveal historical traumas and their potential to enforce socially constructed
differences between population groups. Alongside the data protection commis-
sioners and parliament, other stakeholders complement the cluster of public
voices that (often critically) scrutinize the national DNA database, DNA tech-
nology development, and data exchange. Several social scientists as well as civil
society actors within Germany also have cast a critical eye over the evolution of
the DNA database (Williams & Wienroth, 2014b).
Poland also experienced extreme surveillance, through highly secretive and
extensive information systems designed to control and subjugate entire
populations. Between 1795 and 1918 its history was predominantly char-
acterized by occupation and control by foreign powers, as it was divided
between the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Empires before securing inde-
pendence in 1918. However, from the end of the Second World War until the
fall of the communist regime in 1989 Poland once again fell under the control
of a foreign power, this time the Soviet Union. The criminal justice system
was instrumentalized to ensure conformity with the rules of the Communist
Party, and its effects have lasted until today (Ryan, 2016, p. 310). Recently,
Poland passed a couple of laws to reform its judicial and criminal justice
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system, including the police law of 2016, which expanded the powers Polish
police by granting law enforcement agencies much broader surveillance capa-
city over the population (Karolewski & Benedikter, 2017). As a consequence,
there have been some tensions between Poland and the democratic standards
of the EU regarding the rule of law and human rights.
The magnitude of migration flows from Poland (and some other East Eur-
opean countries) to other European countries, coupled with assumptions about
the role of Polish criminal networks, have shaped the imagination of security
professionals engaged in EU transnational police and judiciary cooperation. The
discourse of professionals operating the Prüm system about the importance of
joining collective efforts to control cross-border criminality in the EU are framed
by said assumptions, helping to explain the interest of other Member States in
data exchange with Poland (Machado et al., 2020). This is met by Poland’s own
interest to invest in DNA technologies, as they represent a path towards tech-
nological modernization and integration with Europe, catching up with interna-
tional crime-control standards (Amelung et al., 2020).
Another feature that is specific of Poland concerns its investment in the
potential of DNA technologies to overcome national traumas. In a country
that has been historically affected by the disappearance of its people (Colls,
2016), DNA technologies can be applied to overcome painful and traumatiz-
ing periods in its history and to give visibility, dignity, and respect to victims
of oppression and their relatives (Granja & Machado, 2019).
Finally, Portugal’s twentieth century history is heavily marked by a long period
of political dictatorship (1926–74), characterized by political repression and cen-
sorship (Durão, 2008; Pimentel, 2007; Ribeiro, 1995), leaving an indelible mark
on society which reflected particularly on Portugal’s legal and criminal justice
culture. For example, police forces were strongly linked in the collective imagina-
tion to the authoritarian nature of this dictatorial regime (Durão, 2008). Cur-
rently, the heritage of an authoritarian state is mostly reflected in citizens’ passive
compliance with the state’s heavily bureaucratic mechanisms, namely its power to
collect personal data, while at the same time contributing to undermine public
confidence in the police and the justice system (Machado & Frois, 2014).
After the democratic revolution of 1974, the Portuguese state began to focus on
investing on modernization and progress, turning to European standards as its
figure model (Frois & Machado, 2016). Within this trajectory, DNA technologies
have emerged as a symbol of the modernization and progress that the state has
sought to introduce across its different areas of activity, including criminal inves-
tigation, as a way to emulate the models of other European countries (Machado
& Frois, 2014). The political project of a technologically driven modernization of
criminal investigation – including the establishment of a universal national DNA
database (Machado & Silva, 2010) – has nonetheless suffered the influence of this
country’s socio-economic and cultural particularities, marked by a fragile econ-
omy and a seemingly paradoxical contrast between consistently low criminality
rates and the low levels of public confidence in the state, the police and the
criminal justice system (Transparency International, 2019).
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In sum, this brief description has sought to show that even though not all
post-authoritarian countries rely equally on sophisticated technologies for
surveillance of populations, the multifaceted penetration of cultures of fear
and suspicion are deeply ingrained and enduring. The study of genetic sur-
veillance in the governance of crime across the group of countries con-
templated in this study (Amelung et al., 2020) therefore offers the opportunity
to analyze the multiple and heterogenous dynamics of fluxes between non-
technological to technology-based surveillance.
Conclusion
Within the scope of this book we survey the landscape of genetic surveillance
in the governance of crime in Europe, while keeping in mind that technologies
of genetic surveillance for the governance of crime, as they are envisioned and
produced in the West and Global North, tend also to provide a model for the
rest of the world. This phenomenon reflects the typical diffusion pattern of
“high-tech” innovations, which raises ethical and political dilemmas. In the
words of Sheila Jasanoff:
Novel technologies originate where wealth and knowledge are most con-
centrated and are then exported to other societies and cultures with con-
siderably different histories of technology and governance. We know from
decades of work on the co-production of natural knowledge and social
order that technologies are never ethically or politically neutral: they
carry within them, particular, culturally conditioned imaginaries of good
and evil, what (and, in the case of DNA profiles who) should be encour-
aged and what (or who) should be suppressed.
(Jasanoff, 2010, p. xxiii)
The typical diffusion pattern of forensic genetic technologies in the govern-
ance of crime had a renewed academic impact in the field of social sciences,
where until recently, the existing literature had mostly focused on the cases of
the UK and the USA. From our perspective, this focus tended to ignore the
variability of social, ethical, and political challenges of genetic surveillance in
the governance of crime across different political social and cultural contexts.
Our aim is to highlight the multiplicity and heterogeneity of genetic surveil-
lance in the governance of crime across Europe, based on our analysis and
reflection upon the different challenges posed by the implementation of for-
ensic genetics in specific justice systems. We do so by situating the trajectory
of forensic genetics and the panorama of genetic surveillance within specific
contexts that are shaped by the (differentiated) weight of sociohistorical and
techno-political backgrounds, the availability of technical database infra-
structures and innovation development, the influence of distinctive forms of
state accountability, and the contingent and circumstantial character of what
is each society perceives as socially legitimate uses of genetic technologies.
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This approach allows us not only to identify differences and similarities, ten-
sions and contradictions, within the European scenario, but also to anchor
them on broader historical, social, and political issues. This method thereby
shows how the material dimension of genetic surveillance – legislative frame-
works and regulations; DNA technology and scientific knowledge; technical
database infrastructure for storing and comparing genetic data; and organi-
zational imperatives (Johnson, Williams & Martin, 2003, p. 26) – are not
fixed or given, neither are hopes and promises, or fears and anxieties aroused
by them. They are both relational, and they have to be constructed and
interpreted (Law, 2008; Lynch, 2016).
On the other hand, our intention is also to underline the urgency and
timeliness of debating the broader repositioning of genetic surveillance in the
governance of crime in the post-DNA era. More than ever it is crucial to
provide an ambitious social theorization that might help us to frame and
interpret, on the one hand, how genetics is transforming – in a process made
up of transitions, frictions and tensions – the identities and bodies as they are
entangled in networks of suspicion woven by techo-scientific devices; on the
other hand, how affected publics confer meaning, negotiate and navigate the
complex and challenging relations forged between science and society. In
order to do so, however, it is essential to emphasize the complex, multi-
layered processes underlying the uses of genetic surveillance in the governance
of crime, which in turn privilege, authorize, and legitimate the visions and
expectations of certain actors, while others are marginalized or excluded.
Notes
1 S & Marper vs. UK refers to a complaint lodged with the European Court of
Human Rights by two individuals (S, an 11-year-old child and Marper) against the
United Kingdom. Both S. and Marper were detained in unrelated circumstances in
2001, and their fingerprints and DNA samples were collected. No accusations
resulted from the arrests, leading them to petition the Chief Constable to eliminate
the records. Their requests were denied. After appeals from the Chief Constable’s
decision to the courts and the House of Lords, it was determined that notwith-
standing the absence of criminal charges against these individuals, and despite the
possible breach of privacy, fingerprint retention and DNA profiling was considered
to be beneficial to society (McCartney et al., 2010). The ECHR’s decision ruled
differently, and determined that the retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles of
suspects who haven’t been convicted constitutes a “disproportionate interference”
with an individual’s rights to privacy and “cannot be taken for granted in a demo-
cratic society” (S & Marper vs. UK, 2008, p. par.125).
2 https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/435.
References
Amankwaa, A.O. (2018). Forensic DNA retention: public perspective studies in the
United Kingdom and around the world. Science & Justice, 58(6), 455–464. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2018.05.002.
40 Genetic Surveillance and Crime Control
Amankwaa, A.O. (2019a). Trends in forensic DNA database: transnational exchange
of DNA data. Forensic Sciences Research, 5(1), 8–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/
20961790.2019.1565651.
Amankwaa, A.O. (2019b). Forensic DNA Databasing: Retention Regimes and Efficacy
[Doctoral Dissertation, Northumbria University].
Amankwaa, A.O. & McCartney, C. (2019). The effectiveness of the UK national
DNA database. Forensic Science International: Synergy, 1, 45–55. https://doi.org/10.
1016/J.FSISYN.2019.03.004.
Amelung, N., Granja, R., & Machado, H. (2020). Modes of Bio-Bordering: The
Hidden (Dis)integration of Europe (1st ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://
doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8183-0.
Amelung, N. & Machado, H. (2019). Affected for good or for evil: the formation of
issue-publics that relate to the UK national DNA database. Public Understanding of
Science, 28(5), 590–605. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662519836346.
Amelung, N., Queirós, F., & Machado, H. (2021). Desafios Éticos e Democráticos da
Vigilância Genética na Alemanha e em Portugal. In H. Machado (Ed.), Crime e Tec-
nologia: Desafios Culturais e Políticos para a Europa (pp. 41–63). Porto: Afrontamento.
Amorim, A. & Pinto, N. (2018). Big data in forensic genetics. Forensic Science Inter-
national: Genetics, 37, 102–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.FSIGEN.2018.08.001.
Aronson, J. (2007). Genetic Witness: Science, Law, and Controversy in the Making of
DNA Profiling. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Aronson, J. (2010). On Trial! Governing Forensic DNA Technologies in the USA. In
R. Hindmarsh & B. Prainsack (Eds), Genetic Suspects. Global Governance of
Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing, 240–261. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Ball, K. & Webster, F. (Eds). (2003). The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Ter-
rorism and Warfare in the Information Era. London: Pluto Press.
Bieber, F.R., Brenner, C.H., & Lazer, D. (2006). Finding criminals through DNA of
their relatives. Human Genetics, 312(5778), 1315–1316. https://doi.org/10.1126/sci
ence.1122655.
Bigo, D. & Tsoukala, A. (Eds). (2008). Terror, Insecurity and Liberty Illiberal Prac-
tices of Liberal Regimes After 9/11. London: Routledge.
Boersma, K., Brakel, R. Van, Fonio, C., & Wagenaar, P. (Eds). (2014). Histories of
State Surveillance in Europe and Beyond. London: Routledge.
Butler, J.M. & Willis, S. (2020). Interpol review of forensic biology and forensic DNA
typing 2016–2019. Forensic Science International: Synergy, 2, 352–367. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.fsisyn.2019.12.002.
Chamberlain, M. (2012). Familial DNA searching. A proponent’s perspective. Crim-
inal Justice, 27(1), 18–30. www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/crim
inal_justice_magazine/sp12_dna_search_proponents.authcheckdam.pdf.
Chow-White, P. & Duster, T. (2011). Do health and forensic DNA databases increase
racial disparities? PLoS Medicine, 8(10), e1001100. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pmed.1001100.
Cole, S. (2001). Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identifi-
cation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Colls, C.S. (2016). ‘Earth Conceal Not My Blood’: Forensic and Archaeological
Approaches to Locating the Remains of Holocaust Victims. In J.-M. Dreyfus & É.
Anstett (Eds), Human Remains in Society: Curation and Exhibition in the Aftermath
of Genocide and Mass-violence, 163–196. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Forensic Genetics and Surveillance in Europe 41
Curran, J. & Buckleton, J.S. (2008). Effectiveness of familial searches. Science & Jus-
tice, 48(4), 164–167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2008.04.004.
Daniel, R., Santos, C., Phillips, C., Fondevila, M., Oorschot, R. Van, Carracedo, Á.,
Lareu, M.V., & McNevin, D. (2015). A SNaPshot of next generation sequencing for
forensic SNP analysis. Forensic Science International: Genetics, 14, 50–60. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2014.08.013.
de Groot, N.F., van Beers, B.C., Decock, L., & Meynen, G. (2020). Accessing medical
biobanks to solve crimes: ethical considerations. Journal of Medical Ethics, 1–8.
https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2020-106133.
Derksen, L. (2003). Agency and Structure in the History of DNA Profiling: The Sta-
bilization and Standardization of a New Technology [Doctoral Dissertation, Uni-
versity of California, San Diego].
Derksen, L. (2010). Micro/macro translations: the production of new social structures
in the case of DNA profiling. Sociological Inquiry, 80(2), 214–240. https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1475-682X.2010.00328.x.
Downey, J., Stephens, M., & Flaherty, J. (2012). The ‘sluice-gate’ public sphere and the
national DNA database in the UK. Media, Culture & Society, 34(4), 439–456. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0163443711436357.
Durão, S. (2008). Patrulha e Proximidade: Uma Etnografia da Polícia em Lisboa.
Coimbra: Almedina.
Duster, T. (2003). Backdoor to Eugenics. London: Routledge.
Duster, T. (2006). Explaining differential trust of DNA forensic technology: grounded
assessment or inexplicable paranoia? The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 34(2),
293–300. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2006.00034.x.
ENFSI. (2016) ENFSI Survey on DNA Databases in Europe. http://enfsi.eu/wp-con
tent/uploads/2017/01/ENFSI-Survey-on-DNA-Databases-in-Europe-June-2016.pdf.
EU Council. (2008a). Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping
up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-
border crime. Official Journal of the European Union. Brussels.
EU Council. (2008b). Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the imple-
mentation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border coopera-
tion, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime. Official Journal of
the European Union. Brussels.
Flaus, A. (2013). Familial Searches and the New Zealand DNA Profile Databank: The
Thin Edge of the Genetic Wedge? [Dissertation of the degree of Bachelor of Laws,
University of Otago]. www.otago.ac.nz/law/research/journals/otago065282.pdf.
Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative. (2017). Establishing best practice for forensic DNA
databases. Windsor: Forensic Genetics Policy Initiative. www.genewatch.org/uploads/
f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/BestPractice_Report_plus_cover_final.pdf.
Frois, C., & Machado, H. (2016). Modernization and Development as a Motor of
Polity and Policing. In B. Bradford, B. Jauregui, I. Loader, & J. Steinberg (Eds), The
SAGE Handbook of Global Policing, 391–405. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
García, Ó., Crespillo, M., & Yurrebaso, I. (2017). Suspects identification through
“familial searching” in DNA databases of criminal interest. Social, ethical and sci-
entific implications. Spanish Journal of Legal Medicine, 43(1), 26–34. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.remle.2017.02.002.
Graffelman, J., Jain, D., & Weir, B. (2017). A genome-wide study of Hardy–Weinberg
equilibrium with next generation sequence data. Human Genetics, 136(6), 727–741.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00439-017-1786-7.
42 Genetic Surveillance and Crime Control
Granja, R. (2020). Long-range familial searches in recreational DNA databases: expan-
sion of affected populations, the participatory turn, and the co-production of biovalue.
New Genetics and Society, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/14636778.2020.1853515.
Granja, R. & Machado, H. (2019). Ethical controversies of familial searching: the
views of stakeholders in the United Kingdom and in Poland. Science, Technology,
& Human Values, 44(6), 1068–1092. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243919828219.
Granja, R. & Machado, H. (2020). Forensic DNA phenotyping and its politics of
legitimation and contestation: views of forensic geneticists in Europe. Social Studies
of Science, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312720945033.
Granja, R., Machado, H., & Queirós, F. (2020). The (de)materialization of criminal
bodies in forensic DNA phenotyping. Body & Society, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1357034X20919168.
Haimes, E. (2006). Social and ethical issues in the use of familial searching in forensic
investigations: insights from family and kinship studies. The Journal of Law, Medi-
cine & Ethics, 34(2), 263–276. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2006.00032.x.
Hairston, C.F. (2002, 30–31 January). Prisoners and families: parenting issues during
incarceration [Conference presentation]. From Prison to Home: The Effects of
Incarceration and Reentry on Children, Families and Communities Conference, U.
S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Higgs, E. (2004). The Information State in England: The Central Collection of Infor-
mation on Citizens Since 1500. London: Red Globe Press.
Hindmarsh, R. & Prainsack, B. (Eds). (2010). Genetic Suspects: Global Governance of
Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hopman, R. (2020). Opening up forensic DNA phenotyping: the logics of accuracy,
commonality and valuing. New Genetics and Society, 39(4), 424–440. https://doi.org/
10.1080/14636778.2020.1755638.
Hopman, R. & M’charek, A. (2020). Facing the unknown suspect: forensic DNA
phenotyping and the oscillation between the individual and the collective. BioSoci-
eties, 15, 438–462. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41292-020-00190-9.
Hufnagel, S. (2017). Regulation of cross-border law enforcement: ‘locks’ and ‘dams’ to
regional and international flows of policing. Global Crime, 18(3), 218–236. https://
doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2017.1345681.
Interpol. (2016). Global DNA profiling survey results 2016. Lyons. www.interpol.int/
content/download/4875/file/GlobalDNASurvey.pdf.
Jasanoff, S. (2006). Just evidence: the limits of science in the legal process. The Journal
of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 34(2), 328–341. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.
2006.00038.x.
Jasanoff, S. (2010). Foreword. In R. Hindmarsh & B. Prainsack (Eds), Genetic Sus-
pects: Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing (pp.xix–xxiv).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jasanoff, S. & Kim, S.-H. (Eds). (2015). Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical
Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power. Chicago and London: University of
California Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226276663.001.0001.
Johnson, P. & Williams, R. (2007). Internationalizing new technologies of crime con-
trol: forensic DNA databasing and datasharing in the European Union. Policing &
Society, 17(2), 103–118. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439460701302669.
Johnson, P., Williams, R., & Martin, P. (2003). Genetics and forensics: making the
national DNA database. Science Studies, 16(2), 22–37. www.pubmedcentral.nih.
gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=PMC1351151.
Forensic Genetics and Surveillance in Europe 43
Jong, L. & M’charek, A. (2017). The high-profile case as ‘fire object’: following the
Marianne Vaatstra murder case through the media. Crime, Media, Culture: An
International Journal, 14(3), 347–363. https://doi.org/10.1177/1741659017718036.
Karolewski, I.P. & Benedikter, R. (2017). Poland’s conservative turn and the role of
the European Union. European Political Science, 16(4), 515–534. https://doi.org/10.
1057/s41304-016-0002-x.
Kattmann, U. (2017). Reflections on “race” in science and society in Germany. Jour-
nal of Anthropological Sciences, 95, 311–318. https://doi.org/10.4436/JASS.95010.
Kayser, M. (2015). Forensic DNA phenotyping: predicting human appearance from
crime scene material for investigative purposes. Forensic Science International:
Genetics, 18, 33–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2015.02.003.
Kayser, M. & de Knijff, P. (2011). Improving human forensics through advances in
genetics, genomics and molecular biology. Nature Reviews Genetics, 12(3), 179–192.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg2952.
Kayser, M. & Schneider, P. (2009). DNA-based prediction of human externally visible
characteristics in forensics: motivations, scientific challenges, and ethical considera-
tions. Forensic Science International: Genetics, 3(3), 154–161. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.fsigen.2009.01.012.
Kennett, D. (2019). Using genetic genealogy databases in missing persons cases and to
develop suspect leads in violent crimes. Forensic Science International, 301, 107–117.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2019.05.016.
Kim, J., Mammo, D., Siegel, M.B., & Katsanis, S.H. (2011). Policy implications for familial
searching. Investigative Genetics, 2(22), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1186/2041-2223-2-22.
Latour, B. (1987). Science in Action. How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through
Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Latour, B. (2000). When things strike back: a possible contribution of ‘science studies’
to the social sciences. The British Journal of Sociology, 51(1), 107–123. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2000.00107.x.
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Law, J. (2008). On sociology and STS. The Sociological Review, 56(4), 623–649. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2008.00808.x.
Le Roux-Kemp, A. (2018). Forensic DNA databases in Hong Kong and China: a
BRICS comparative perspective. Indiana International and Comparative Law
Review, 28(2), 221–272.
Lee, J. (2016). The presence and future of the use of DNA-information and the protection
of genetic informational privacy: a comparative perspective. International Journal of
Law, Crime and Justice, 44, 212–229. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2015.10.001.
Leibold, J. & Emile D. (2020, June 17). Genomic surveillance: inside China’s DNA
dragnet. The Strategist. www.aspistrategist.org.au/genomic-surveillance-inside-china
s-dna-dragnet.
Lichter, A., Löffler, M., & Siegloch, S. (2020). The long-term costs of government
surveillance: insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 1–49. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa009.
Lynch, M. (2016). Social constructivism in science and technology studies. Human
Studies, 39(1), 101–112. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-016-9385-5.
Lynch, M., Cole, S. A., McNallly, R., & Jordan, K. (2008). Truth Machine: The
Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
44 Genetic Surveillance and Crime Control
Lyon, D. (1994). The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Lyon, D. (2001). Facing the future: seeking ethics for everyday surveillance. Ethics and
Information Technology, 3(3), 171–180. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1012227629496.
Lyon, D. (2014). Surveillance, Snowden, and big data: capacities, consequences, cri-
tique. Big Data & Society, 1(2), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714541861.
M’charek, A. (2008). Silent witness, articulate collective: DNA evidence and the
inference of visible traits. Bioethics, 22(9), 519–528. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1467-8519.2008.00699.x.
M’charek, A., Schramm, K., & Skinner, D. (2014). Technologies of belonging: the
absent presence of race in Europe. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 39(4),
459–467. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243914531149.
M’charek, A., Toom, V., & Jong, L. (2020). The trouble with race in forensic identifi-
cation. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 45(5), 804–828. https://doi.org/10.
1177/0162243919899467.
Machado, H. & Frois, C. (2014). Aspiring to Modernization: Historical Evolution and
Current Trends of State Surveillance in Portugal. In K. Boersma, R. van Brakel, C.
Fonio, & P. Wagenaar (Eds), Histories of State Surveillance in Europe and Beyond,
65–78. London: Routledge.
Machado, H. & Granja, R. (2018). Ethics in transnational forensic DNA data
exchange in the EU: constructing boundaries and managing controversies. Science
as Culture, 27(2), 242–264. https://doi.org/10.1080/09505431.2018.1425385.
Machado, H. & Granja, R. (2019a). Police epistemic culture and boundary work with
judicial authorities and forensic scientists: the case of transnational DNA data
exchange in the EU. New Genetics and Society, 38(3), 289–307. https://doi.org/10.
1080/14636778.2019.1609350.
Machado, H. & Granja, R. (2019b). Risks and benefits of transnational exchange of
forensic DNA data in the EU: the views of professionals operating the Prüm
system. Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine, 68, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.
JFLM.2019.101872.
Machado, H. & Granja, R. (2020). Forensic Genetics in the Governance of Crime.
Singapore: Springer Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2429-5.
Machado, H., Granja, R., & Amelung, N. (2020). Constructing suspicion through
forensic DNA databases in the EU. The views of the Prüm professionals. The Brit-
ish Journal of Criminology, 60(1), 141–159. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azz057.
Machado, H. & Prainsack, B. (2012). Tracing Technologies: Prisoners’ Views in the
Era of CSI. Farnham: Ashgate.
Machado, H. & Santos, F. (2009). The disappearance of Madeleine McCann: public drama
and trial by media in the portuguese press. Crime, Media, Culture, 5(2), 146–167. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1741659009335691.
Machado, H. & Santos, F. (2011). Popular press and forensic genetics in Portugal:
expectations and disappointments regarding two cases of missing children. Public
Understanding of Science, 20(3), 303–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662509336710.
Machado, H. & Silva, S. (2010). Portuguese Forensic DNA Database: Political
Enthusiasm, Public Trust and Probable Issues in Future Practice. In R. Hindmarsh
& B. Prainsack (Eds), Genetic Suspects: Global Governance of DNA Profiling and
Databasing, 218–239. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Machado, H. & Silva, S. (2014). “Would you accept having your DNA profile inserted
in the National Forensic DNA database? Why?” Results of a questionnaire applied
Forensic Genetics and Surveillance in Europe 45
in Portugal. Forensic Science International: Genetics, 8(1), 132–136. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.fsigen.2013.08.014.
Machado, H. & Silva, S. (2016). Voluntary participation in forensic DNA databases:
altruism, resistance, and stigma. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 41(2), 322–
343. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243915604723.
Machado, H. & Silva, S. (2019). What influences public views on forensic DNA test-
ing in the criminal field? A scoping review of quantitative evidence. Human Geno-
mics, 13(23), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40246-019-0207-5.
Martins, M. (2021). News media representation on EU immigration before Brexit: the
‘Euro-Ripper’ case. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 8(1), 1–8. https://
doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00687-5.
McCartney, C. (2014). Trans-national Exchange of Forensic (Bio)information. In G.
Bruinsma & D. Weisburd (Eds), Emerging Issues in International Forensic Bioin-
formation Exchange, 5302–5313. New York: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-1-4614-5690-2.
McCartney, C., Williams, R., & Wilson, T. (2010). The Future of Forensic Bioinfor-
mation - Executive Summary. University of Leeds.
McCartney, C., Wilson, T., & Williams, R. (2011). Transnational exchange of forensic
DNA: viability, legitimacy, and acceptability. European Journal on Criminal Policy
and Research, 17(4), 305–322. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-011-9154-y.
Misa, T.J. & Schot, J. (2005). Inventing europe: technology and the hidden inte-
gration of Europe. History and Technology, 21(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/
07341510500037487.
Murphy, E. (2010). Relative doubt: familial searches of DNA databases. Michigan
Law Review, 109(3), 291–348.
Murphy, E. (2018). Law and policy oversight of familial searches in recreational gen-
ealogy databases. Forensic Science International, 292, e5–e9. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.forsciint.2018.08.027.
Norris, C. & Armstrong, G. (1999). The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of
CCTV. Oxford: Berg Publishers.
Pimentel, I. (2007). A História da PIDE. Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores.
Prainsack, B. & Aronson, J. (2015). Forensic genetic databases: ethical and social
dimensions. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 9, 339–
345. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.82062-0.
Prainsack, B. & Toom, V. (2010). The Prüm regime. Situated dis/empowerment in
transnational DNA profile exchange. British Journal of Criminology, 50(6), 1117–
1135. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azq055.
Prainsack, B. & Toom, V. (2013). Performing the union: the Prüm decision and the
European dream. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences, 44(1), 71–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2012.09.009.
Quinlan, A. (2020). The rape kit’s promise: techno-optimism in the fight against the
backlog. Science as Culture, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/09505431.2020.1846696.
Ramzy, A. & Buckley, C. (2019, November 16). ‘Absolutely no mercy’: leaked files expose
how china organized mass detentions of Muslims. The New York Times, 1–34. https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.
Reed, K. & Syndercombe-Court, D. (2016). A comparative audit of legislative frame-
works within the European Union for the collection, retention and use of forensic
DNA profiles. EUROFORGEN-NoE. London. www.euroforgen.eu/fileadmin/web
46 Genetic Surveillance and Crime Control
sites/euroforgen/images/Dissemination_Documents/WP4/Reed_and_Syndercombe_
Court_2016_Legal_Audit.pdf.
Ribeiro, M. da C. (1995). A Polícia Política no Estado Novo, 1926–1974. Lisbon:
Editorial Estampa.
Richardson, S. (2017). China: minority region collects DNA from millions private
information gathered by police, under guise of public health program. Humans
Rights Watch.
Rothstein, M.A. & Talbott, M.K. (2006). The expanding use of DNA in law enforce-
ment: what role for privacy? The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 34(2), 153–
164. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2006.00024.x.
Ryan, A. (2016). Comparative procedural traditions: Poland’s journey from socialist to
‘adversarial’ system. The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 20(4), 305–325.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712716655169.
Samuel, G. & Kennett, D. (2020). The impact of investigative genetic genealogy: per-
ceptions of UK professional and public stakeholders. Forensic Science International:
Genetics, 48, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2020.102366.
Samuel, G. & Prainsack, B. (2018). Forensic DNA phenotyping in Europe: views
“on the ground” from those who have a professional stake in the technology.
New Genetics and Society, 38(2), 119–141. https://doi.org/10.1080/14636778.2018.
1549984.
Santos, F. & Machado, H. (2017). Patterns of exchange of forensic DNA data in the
European Union through the Prüm system. Science & Justice, 57(4), 307–313. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2017.04.001.
Santos, F., Machado, H., & Silva, S. (2013). Forensic DNA databases in European
countries: is size linked to performance? Life Sciences, Society and Policy, 9(12), 1–
13. https://doi.org/10.1186/2195-7819-9-12.
Skinner, D. (2013). “The NDNAD has no ability in itself to be discriminatory”: eth-
nicity and the governance of the UK national DNA database. Sociology, 47(5),
976–992. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038513493539.
Skinner, D. (2018a). Race, racism and identification in the era of technosecurity. Sci-
ence as Culture, 29(1), 77–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/09505431.2018.1523887.
Skinner, D. (2018b). Forensic genetics and the prediction of race: what is the problem?
BioSocieties, 15, 329–349. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41292-018-0141-0.
Sperling, S. (2008). Converting ethics into reason: German stem cell policy between
science and the law. Science as Culture, 17(4), 363–375. https://doi.org/10.1080/
09505430802514919.
Suter, S.M. (2010). All in the family: privacy and DNA familial searching. Harvard
Journal of Law & Technology Volume, 23(2), 309–399. http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/a
rticles/pdf/v23.2/23HarvJLTech309.pdf.
Thomas, L. (2006). Nothing to hide, something to fear?: the use of partial DNA
matching in criminal investigations. Journal of Law, Information and Science, 17,
72–93.
Toom, V. (2012). Bodies of science and law: forensic DNA profiling, biological bodies,
and biopower. Journal of Law and Society, 39(1), 150–166. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1467-6478.2012.00575.x.
Toom, V. (2018). Cross-border exchange and comparison of forensic DNA data in the
context of the Prüm Decision. Civil liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Parliament’s
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and Policy Department for
Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs. European Parliament, Brussels.
Forensic Genetics and Surveillance in Europe 47
Toom, V., Wienroth, M.,M’charek, A., Prainsack, B., Williams, R., Duster, T., Heinemann,
T., Kruse, C., Machado, H., & Murphy, E. (2016). Approaching ethical, legal and social
issues of emerging forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) technologies comprehensively:
reply to ‘Forensic DNA phenotyping: predicting human appearance from crime scene
material for investigative purposes’ by Manfred Kayser. Forensic Science International:
Genetics, 22, e1–e4. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2016.01.010.
Transparency International. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, 1–29. Trans-
parency International – the global coalition against corruption. Berlin. www.transpa
rency.org/cpi2019?/news/feature/cpi-2019.
Tutton, R. (2011). Promising pessimism: reading the futures to be avoided in biotech.
Social Studies of Science, 41(3), 411–429. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312710397398.
Tutton, R., Hauskeller, C., & Sturdy, S. (2014). Suspect technologies: forensic testing
of asylum seekers at the UK border. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 37(5), 738–752. https://
doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.870667.
Tutton, R. & Levitt, M. (2010). Health and Wealth, Law and Order: Banking DNA
Against Disease and Crime. In R. Hindmarsh & B. Prainsack (Eds), Genetic Sus-
pects: Global Governance of DNA Profiling and Databasing, 85–104. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Wee, S.-L. (2019, February 21). China uses DNA to track its people, with the help of
American Expertise. The New York Times, 1–9. www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/busi
ness/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html.
Wee, S.-L. (2020, June 17). China is collecting dna from tens of millions of men and
boys, using U.S. Equipment. The New York Times, 1–6. https://nyti.ms/2N7xBHa.
Wienroth, M. (2018). Governing anticipatory technology practices. Forensic DNA
phenotyping and the forensic genetics community in Europe. New Genetics and
Society, 37(2), 137–152. https://doi.org/10.1080/14636778.2018.1469975.
Wienroth, M. (2020). Socio-technical disagreements as ethical fora: Parabon Nano-
Lab’s forensic DNA SnapshotTM service at the intersection of discourses around
robust science, technology validation, and commerce. BioSocieties, 15(1), 28–45.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41292-018-0138-8.
Wienroth, M., Morling, N., & Williams, R. (2014). Technological innovations in for-
ensic genetics: social, legal and ethical aspects. Recent Advances in DNA and Gene
Sequences, 8(2), 98–103.
Williams, R. & Johnson, P. (2004). “Wonderment and dread”: representations of DNA
in ethical disputes about forensic DNA databases. New Genetics and Society, 23(2),
205–223. https://doi.org/10.1080/1463677042000237035.
Williams, R. & Johnson, P. (2008). Genetic Policing: The Use of DNA in Criminal Inves-
tigations. Cullompton: Willan Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781843925576.
Williams, R. & Wienroth, M. (2014a). Ethical, social and policy aspects of forensic
genetics: A systematic review, 1–81. EUROFORGEN-NoE. http://nrl.northumbria.
ac.uk/id/eprint/16313/1/Forensic_Genetics_ELSA_Review_Williams_Wienroth.pdf.
Williams, R. & Wienroth, M. (2014b). Public perspectives on established and emerging
forensic genetics technologies in Europe: a preliminary report, 1–46. EUROFORGEN-
NoE.
Wilson-Kovacs, D. (2014). “Clearly necessary”, “wonderful” and “engrossing”? Mass
observation correspondents discuss forensic technologies. Sociological Research
Online, 19(3), 161–176. https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.3375.
48 Genetic Surveillance and Crime Control
3 Transnational genetic surveillance
in the EU
The case of the Prüm system
Introduction
Criminal DNA databases are typically presented as an almost failsafe tool to
identify individuals and match traces found at crime scenes with a suspect’s profile
(Lynch et al., 2008), and increasingly seen as a crucial tool for enhancing trans-
national police and judicial cooperation for the control of crime in the European
Union (EU) (Amelung, Granja & Machado, 2020; Toom, 2018; Toom, Granja &
Ludwig, 2019). This chapter will address a particular form of genetic surveillance
in the EU emerging from the so-called Prüm system − a technological system
created for the reciprocal automated search and comparison of information on
DNA profiles, fingerprints, and vehicle registration data among EU Member
States. In this chapter, we solely focus on the transnational exchange of DNA
data, on the basis of 37 interviews with 47 professionals in charge of operating the
Prüm system conducted between 2016 and 2019, in 22 countries.
The aims of the Prüm system are directed towards stepping up cooperation
between EU states in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (EU
Council, 2008a, 2008b), therefore fitting in global tendencies of expanding
surveillance. Because of its cross-jurisdictional nature, the Prüm system is a
particularly highlighting example of how genetic surveillance for the govern-
ance of crime might operate in a context of assembling different national
legislations, various models regarding the provision of forensic genetic ser-
vices provision and the organization of laboratories, distinct DNA analysis
methods, diverse criminal investigation and policing practices, and hetero-
geneous functioning of criminal justice systems within the different EU jur-
isdictions. In a system like the EU, where the constituent Member States
retain full national sovereignty over matters of internal security, the role of
the Prüm system in this critical domain is far from obvious or settled.
The Prüm system is an exemplary case of an EU techno-political project
promoting integration in the area of security policies and that highlights how the
techno-optimism contained in widespread and collectively held imaginaries
(Quinlan, 2020; Tutton, 2020) are prevalent elements of genetic surveillance. On
the one hand, the Prüm system outlines the power of “technological seduction,”
DOI: 10.4324/9780429261435-3
and on the other, it is particularly illustrative of what Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-
Hyun Kim called sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009, 2015), to
refer to collectively held and performed visions of desirable futures (or of resis-
tance) supporting the advances in science and technology. According to Jasanoff,
socio-technical imaginaries also entail “aspirational and normative dimensions
of social order” (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015, p. 5).
A particular historical and political context explains the emergence and
development of events that prompted the optimistic sociotechnical imaginary
leading to joint efforts to control transnational criminality in the EU, of which
the Prüm system is an exemplary endeavor. In the aftermath of the Schengen
Agreement that abolished border controls across a number of European coun-
tries, several EU Member States became increasingly concerned about transna-
tional movements of people considered dangerous and, consequently, the growth
of transnational crime (Broeders, 2007; Guild & Geyer, 2008; Hufnagel &
McCartney, 2017). Although some technological systems were already in place
to facilitate the exchange of data across-borders for the purpose of criminal
investigation, such practices were conducted on an ad hoc basis (McCartney,
Wilson &Williams, 2011). A point was reached when pre-existing practices were
no longer deemed sufficient, and the voices calling for a closer cooperation
among police forces in EU made themselves increasingly heard (Luif, 2007).
In 2003 Otto Schily, Germany’s Minister of the Interior, called for closer
cooperation in justice and internal affairs with France, Belgium, and Lux-
embourg, at a time when a Police Centre was opened in Luxembourg by the
four countries. As a response to a growing perception of the need to foster
policing and judicial cooperation, in May 2005 government representatives
from Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Spain came together in the small German town of Prüm to sign a treaty that
set provisions for exchanging data regarding DNA, fingerprints, and motor
vehicle information and which became known as the Prüm Convention. The
preamble of the Convention stated that, considering the existing free move-
ment of persons, EU Member States should:
Play a pioneering role in establishing the highest possible standard of
cooperation, especially by means of exchange of information, particularly
in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, while
leaving participation in such cooperation open to all other Member
States in the European Union.
(EU Council, 2005, p. 3)
In 2008 some of the provisions in the Prüm Convention were subsumed into
police and judicial cooperation provisions in EU law by a Council Decision,
commonly referred to as the Prüm Decisions (EU Council, 2008a, 2008b).
Prüm Decisions made it mandatory for all EU Member States to join the
pan-European network for the exchange of fingerprints, DNA profiles and
motor vehicle information. It was decided that such data should remain the
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property of the Member State where it was collected, eliminating the need for
a centralized database. In sum, this meant that all EU Member States that
had not yet set up their own databases for DNA profiles, fingerprints, and
vehicle data information were obliged to do so in order to make such data
accessible to the relevant EU authorities. The latest report on the progress
made in the implementation of the Prüm System in terms of DNA databases,
dating from January 2021, indicates that there are 25 EU Member States in
operational conditions (EU Council, 2021). The non-operational countries
are Greece and Italy. Although the UK is no longer part of the report, DNA
data exchange is not interrupted, as it is covered by the EU UK Trade &
Cooperation Agreement.
The first section of this chapter describes how the Prüm system operates
modes of genetic surveillance for the governance of crime in the EU. The
subsequent sections explore the views of forensic experts and members of law
authorities involved in this transnational police and judicial cooperation
aimed at fighting cross-border crime and terrorism. In particular, we are
interested in understanding how expectations play a constitutive and perfor-
mative role (Borup et al., 2006), or in other words, how technological inno-
vations go hand in hand with expectations over their potential benefits, which,
in turn fuel societal interest, mobilization of professional network and allo-
cation of resources. Moreover, expectations are also tied to perceptions of
risk, reflecting how particular groups of actors make sense, reflect, and act
upon expectations, considering their particular professional positionings and
work views (Konrad, 2006). Addressing the discourses of the professional
groups who are in charge of operating the Prüm system through the lens of
expectations also provide contextual ground for understanding how the
techno-optimism (Quinlan, 2020) framing sociotechnical imaginaries might
encounter support and/or resistance.
The Prüm system’s modus operandi
Transnational DNA data exchange within the Prüm system works as follows:
when a search is made in a national database for a DNA sample retrieved
from a crime scene and no match is found, the Council Decision authorizes
transmission and search of data in the national databases of other Member
States (the so-called Step 1 of the Prüm system). A notification is then sent to
the original Member State reporting the existence or absence of a positive hit.
If a hit is identified, further requests for information are processed through
the existing police or judicial channels (the so-called Step 2 of the Prüm
system, which is governed by national law).
The EU regulation of the Prüm system stipulates that, for the purposes of
supplying data, each Member State shall designate a National Contact Point
(NCP), and the powers of the NCPs shall fall under the applicable national
law. The NCPs in charge of complying with the technical standards for the
exchange of DNA data information among Member States on a match/no-
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match basis are officially called Step 1 NCPs. Typically, these NCPs are for-
ensic experts working in forensic genetics laboratories. The political scientists
Barbara Prainsack and Victor Toom noted that the increasing importance
given to DNA evidence in transnational cooperation within the EU Prüm
system has led to shifts in epistemic authority within the criminal justice
system. According to the authors, one of the implications of the Prüm system
is the shift of epistemic authority centres away from criminal investigators to
forensic scientists:
[The] current status [of forensic DNA technologies] as a gold standard in
criminal investigation locates the production of crucial evidence for truth-
finding in the laboratory of the forensic scientist. Thus, it is no longer the
criminal investigator who is seen as the bearer of the decisive expertise for
solving a crime, but the forensic scientist.
(Prainsack & Toom, 2010, p. 1125)
The NCPs in charge of the requests for additional information through
mutual assistance procedures are called Step 2 NCPs and are usually pro-
fessionals with experience of police and judicial cooperation in transnational
criminal investigations. While the forensic experts acting as Prüm NCPs for
Step 1 could be the primary drivers of the technological infrastructure for
circulating and validating DNA data, the professionals working as Prüm
NCPs for Step 2 constitute what Didier Bigo calls “professionals of the
management of unease” (Bigo, 2006a, p. 6). In other words, they are pro-
fessionals whose field of action cuts across internal and external borders and
whose work is embedded in a “new generative space of struggles between
security professionals that produces common interests, an identical program
of truth and new forms of knowledge” (Bigo, 2006a, pp. 14–15). Although
these professionals do not share the same logic of experience or practice and
their work does not converge in a single function (Bigo, 2006a, p. 7) they
can form alliances that overstep national boundaries to reinforce the cred-
ibility of their assertions within a context in which they find themselves
competing for the monopoly on legitimate knowledge (Bigo, 2006a, p. 8). In
this sense, despite their internal diversity – which is as much professional as
geographical (Bigo, 2006a, p. 15) – these professionals allegedly have
expectations of creating a “consensual” epistemic community among EU
police forces:
Their ambition is to assemble cells of openly available information,
social-scientific data, and the techniques of police intelligence operations.
This dream of a common and consensual epistemic community haunts
the imagination of these professionals who conduct societal transforma-
tions at a distance – a geographical and temporal distance piloted by the
logic of anticipation.
(Bigo, 2008, p. 101)
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Hence, the Prüm system involves the interaction of diverse professional prac-
tices, entailing both cooperation and coordination, but also conflicts and
struggles for power (Machado & Granja, 2018, 2019; Prainsack & Toom,
2010; Toom et al., 2019). In the next section of this chapter, we outline the
expectations raised by the Prüm system, emphasizing its complex and hybrid
nature. One important aspect in our analysis is how expectations of profes-
sional groups operating the Prüm system on their daily activities combine
“high expectations” with “low expectations” regarding the value and cap-
ability of transnational genetic surveillance in the EU. Since each country
makes its own national digitalized archive of DNA profiles available for
transnational exchange, the Prüm system is supported by the mass availability
of DNA profiles associated with criminal identity archives, something unpre-
cedented in the history of EU policing. This form of surveillance is of recon-
structive nature: it relies on a technological apparatus that is legitimized by
the rhetoric of automation, speed, and accuracy (Williams & Johnson, 2004).
In the next section we address the particular kind of expectations that are
generative and performative of specific form of surveillance organised around
an ideology of “European security” (Machado, Granja & Amelung, 2020).
Expectations raised by the Prüm system
Over the years, the debates following the creation of the Prüm system, have to
some extent served to polarize positions in the sense described by Elise Pieri,
in which promoters of a technology tend to construct scenarios that describe
its benefits, and opponents often project scenarios that highlight possible risks
(Pieri, 2009, p. 1105). On the one hand, drivers of the system − mainly poli-
tical actors in positions of power to enable the integration of the Prüm Con-
vention system into EU acquis − have highlighted the Prüm system’s potential
towards fostering closer transnational cooperation in the fight against cross-
border crime and terrorism, speeding up the exchange of information and
raising efficiency in the detection and solving of transnational crime
(Amankwaa, 2019; Sallavaci, 2017; Santos, 2017; Wilson, 2016). The drivers
of the Prüm system, therefore, envisioned a future in which the implementa-
tion of a techno-scientific infrastructure would be able to surpass and override
the significant differences between EU countries in terms of legislation, type
of criminal justice system and human and economic resources. The techno-
optimism and “aspirational component” of the Prüm system – its sociotechnical
imaginary − derived from the idea that “rationales and objectives are future-
orientated” and work to “prevent crimes, produce state security and public
safety” (Toom et al., 2019; Wienroth, 2020).
On the other hand, critical voices, emerging mainly from academia and
civil society stakeholders and organizations, have been pointing out the
potential risks posed by the implementation and operation of the Prüm
system. Some of the topics debated have been, for instance, the tensions and
frictions created owing to national differences in operational, legal, and
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ethical policies, including privacy safeguards, could raise civil rights concerns
(Machado & Granja, 2018; McCartney, 2014; Prainsack & Toom, 2010,
2013; Toom, 2018). Other discussed topics include issues related to lack of
transparency and accountability of the Prüm system (McCartney et al., 2011;
Toom, 2018; Toom et al., 2019; Wilson, 2016).
During our empirical study with professional groups directly involved in
the operations of the Prüm system we could notice that the term “socio-
technical imaginaries” (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015) was rather useful for analyzing
policy debates and the discourses of political social actors (the macro level of
reality). Applied to this topic, the term both encapsulates the high expecta-
tions for the value of the Prüm system as an asset in fostering transnational
collaboration to monitor and fight crime in the EU, as well as the critical
views concerned with its risks. However, the concept of sociotechnical ima-
ginaries was less useful for understanding and interpreting the discourses at a
meso and micro-level. In our view, a more productive way to understand the
meanings attributed by members of the professional and epistemic commu-
nities in charge of the daily operations of the Prüm system, is to grasp their
meanings as means of performing collective expectations, in the terms set out
by Kornelia Konrad. The author defines the concept of collective expectation
in the following way:
Collective expectations are not only shared by a large number of actors,
they are part of a generalized and taken-for-granted social repertoire.
They have become a depersonalized social construction—a fait social.
Actors refer to them and take them into account and assume that other
actors share these expectations or, at least, that they are aware of them
and will also take them into account.
(Konrad, 2006, p. 431)
According to Konrad (2006), expectations can be very widely accepted for a
period of time, both by supporters of a new technology and also critical
voices faced with the inevitability of a particular technology’s development.
The author points out that the dynamics of expectations must be understood
as a social process. On the one hand, collective expectations play a central
role in creating the necessary momentum for innovation processes and in the
coordination of heterogeneous actors. On the other hand, they could also
be highly problematic, when hype-cycles turn into disappointment phases
(Konrad, 2006, p. 430).
We aim to address expectations for the Prüm system as a social process,
through which the various actors relate, not only to their own, but also to
other’s expectations. Conceiving expectations as a social process allows us to
understand how collective expectations are able to draw together a large
number of highly heterogenous actors, and how expectations are strategically
distributed according to the specific positioning of actors and their specific
situatedness. In the next sections of this chapter, we explore the expectations
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for the Prüm system as revealed by the two distinct professional groups that
operate it – the NCPs conducting laboratory work and the NCPs working
within law enforcement international cooperation forces (the so-called Prüm
Step 1 and Prüm Step 2, respectively).
We shall address the expectations for the Prüm system performed both by
forensic practitioners and police professionals as a product of social interac-
tion. We argue that the expectations of professionals working in the labora-
tory and professionals working in criminal investigation might be widely
shared and thereby serve as coordination devices. At the same time, expecta-
tions might also vary according to the situatedness of particular positionings
of professional groups in the complex networks, social relations and events
occurring in the transnational circulation of DNA data within the Prüm
system of policing and judicial cooperation. Thus, the views, held by the two
distinct groups of professionals on the Prüm system, reveal an “interpretative
flexibility” (Konrad, 2006, p. 436), or in other words, “the results of techno-
logical projects are interpreted in the light of the same expectations they are
supposed to ‘validate’,” strategically oriented to protect specific area of
expertise and the allocation of resources.
Prüm in the laboratory
European scientists and forensic experts follow an elaborate trajectory in the
creation and implementation of standards, protocols and laboratorial prac-
tices for DNA analyses across Europe. This tradition, coined by Barbara
Prainsack and Victor Toom as “forensic technocracy” (Prainsack & Toom,
2010, p. 1125), was particularly relevant in the implementation of the Prüm
system, as it enabled the establishment of procedures and infrastructures
conducive to data exchange.
In the aftermath of the Prüm Decisions, the “Working Party on Data Pro-
tection and Information Exchange – DAPIX” was created to overview,
implement and support the tasks and procedures involved in the transnational
exchange of information. This group developed significant work in terms of
standardization and harmonization of scientific and technical procedures
between laboratories based in different countries. As a result, NCPs working
in laboratories, usually in charge of Step 1 procedures, tend to emphasize the
Prüm system’s potential in enabling to streamline the adoption of interna-
tional standards, enabling the harmonization of forensic DNA analysis pro-
cedures, and supporting further collaboration among different countries.
Since Prüm started, we had more discussions about inclusion rules,
matching rules, reporting rules (…) We now know that we have interna-
tional matches and we need to be more harmonized. (…) If we didn’t
have Prüm, each country would be completely separated from the others,
they do on their own, and we wouldn’t need to discuss, really.
(Interview I01)
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Thus, it becomes clear that such professionals reproduce the kinds of
expectations that rely on the ability of techno-scientific standardization to
achieve increased transnational collaboration and interoperability. However,
such a scenario brings with it the increased risks of false positives (invalid
matches), owing to the increment in the volume of profiles available for
comparison. Actually, this problem had already been pointed out and dis-
cussed in the early stages of the Prüm system’s implementation (McCartney,
2014; Van der Beek, 2011). What the NCPs working with Step 1 call attention
to is the fact that the potential for the occurrence of false positives is further
increased by national variability in terms of scientific, infrastructural, human,
and economic resources with a direct influence on how DNA analysis is
conducted. More particularly, some forensic practitioners express strong
skepticism and reservations about their foreign colleagues’ capacity to ensure
that no false matches are communicated to criminal investigators and/or to
judicial entities (Machado & Granja, 2018).
We have good procedures in place to make sure that we first find out if it
is a good match before it is reported to the authorities. I think that in [my
country] there is no risk of a false positive match being used for legal
actions. But I am not sure whether this is also the case in other countries.
(Interview A01)
One other topic currently referred by NCPs working in laboratories, con-
cerns the inexistence of feedback on the matches produced within Prüm.
Usually, after reporting a match, these professionals do not receive any feed-
back on whether the match was followed-up and whether it led to a convic-
tion. Thus, NCPs working in laboratories do not have a proper channel that
would allow them to assess whether their expectations over Prüm’s potential
to step up crime-fighting at a transnational level are substantiated, for
instance, by conviction rates.
We’ve actually had no feedback on what the benefits have been, if there
have been many cases solved; we do not know, because we don’t get any
feedback. (…) We realized this and discussed it last year with our contact
point in the police, but until now there has been no action. We thought of
registering every case from the start, where we would be responsible for
initiating the register and then hand over the information for them to fill
in the resulting outcome – whether it was ignored, becoming outdated,
whether it led to a false positive in the investigation…
(Interview B01)
There is a substantive body of literature showing that expectations are
usually subjected to alternating cycles of hype and disappointment (Borup et
al., 2006; Konrad, 2006). That is, in the early stages, promises are inflated,
and such early hype eventually gives way to disillusionment (Brown, Rip, &
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Van Lente, 2003). Although this is not exactly the case with NCPs working in
Prüm Step 1, insofar as they recognize that the Prüm system did indeed foster
transnational collaboration, there is an overall sense among participants that
there is a lack of “hard facts” (Konrad, 2006, p. 436). In other words, there is
a shortage of results that can be measured against expectations, thereby
attesting to the system’s efficacy or lack thereof. Professionals working in
Prüm Step 1 argue that the number of hits obtained through Prüm should
constitute a suitable “hard fact” in such an assessment and, consequently, to
validate the underlying expectations raised by the system. Such stances are
linked to widely discussed issues around the shortage of information on the
overall effectiveness and efficiency (Santos & Machado, 2017; Taverne &
Broeders, 2015) as well as a variety of issues concerning the Prüm system’s
lack of transparency and accountability (McCartney et al., 2011; Toom, 2018;
Toom et al., 2019; Wilson, 2016).
Our interviews with Prüm NCPs for Step 1 revealed an expectation that
faster and more effective criminal investigation could be achieved by per-
forming DNA comparisons with several countries simultaneously. A few
examples of this optimistic tone towards the potential benefits of transna-
tional DNA data for criminal investigation are expressed in the following
excerpts:
The benefit is that you can find very quick matches from travelling people
who commit crimes.
(Interview U02)
The benefits are clear, we all send every DNA profile that is taken from a
crime scene in [country], or a suspect, to all the other Prüm countries;
that way there is a better chance to get much more hits, compared with
only doing the comparison nationally.
(Interview O02)
According to interviewees, the Prüm system is also beneficial to the pro-
tection of national sovereignty, as it allows countries to maintain national
data ownership and custody while at the same time enabling the DNA data
contained in the national criminal databases to be shared at a transnational
level. In the words of one participant:
Through Prüm we can exchange DNA profiles very quickly without
relinquishing custody of our own data.
(Interview W02)
In view of this, the narratives of NCPs for Step 1 reproduce and consolidate
(at least some of) the Prüm system’s “collective expectations,” underlining the
system’s role in fostering the stepping-up of cross border cooperation, while
still maintaining ownership over national data. However, the kind of
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performative narratives that highlights the fulfillment of expectations about
the Prüm system, coexist with a scenario in which differentiation across
countries is reproduced, creating uncertainties. The same decentralization that
enables the maintenance of data ownership also implies that the interoper-
ability of DNA databases exists in a setting of national differentiation
(Santos, 2017). Such a framework allows autonomy at a local level to choose
what data to make available for transnational exchange. As noted by Didier
Bigo “in effect the exchange of data in the form of the interoperability of
systems does not forcibly imply making a common all data, and even less
common categories of collection” (Bigo, 2006b, p. 3). Within the Prüm
system, this implies, for instance, that while Malta allows access to all data
categories (convicted, suspects, crime stains, victims, unidentified persons,
unidentified human remains, and missing persons) Portugal only exchanges
the following data categories: convicted and crime stains (EU Council, 2021).
Expectations that marked initial debates, about complete interoperability
within EU, are therefore counteracted by the current Prüm situation, since
each country has the autonomy to define which data categories to exchange.
Some participants consider that it hampers the Prüm system’s full potential,
since it is not consistent with a uniform data exchange across EU countries.
The following interview excerpt reflects the disappointment related to parti-
cipants in the Prüm system who are not fully collaborating towards fulfilling
the aims of this transnational network of DNA data exchange:
Those countries are not sending us their person stains. (…) So, I think we
need to coordinate ourselves and everybody should be doing the same
thing.
(Interview W02)
In addition to the level of autonomy countries are allowed as to which data
categories they exchange, several interviewees also acknowledged that the
incomplete connections currently displayed by the Prüm system were incon-
sistent with initial expectations about full implementation soon after the
Decisions. August 2011 was the deadline set for all EU countries to comply
with Prüm Decisions. However, most countries were unable to comply for a
variety of different reasons (McCartney et al., 2011; Prainsack & Toom,
2013). For example, difficulties arising in securing the necessary political
majorities to adapt national laws to the provisions of the Prüm system; con-
flicts between stakeholders over the attribution of responsibilities for the Prüm
system; and human and financial resources (Prainsack & Toom, 2013; Töpfer,
2011). Moreover, Italy, Greece, Ireland, and Malta faced additional con-
straints, as they did not yet have a DNA database nor specific legislation
when the Prüm Decisions were adopted (Toom et al., 2019).
In addition to a protracted period of implementation (currently, there are
still two non-operational countries: Greece, and Italy), the level of connec-
tions is still highly variable across countries. That is, having an operational
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status within the Prüm system does not necessarily imply exchanging data
with all operational countries. The available data shows that while the Neth-
erlands and Austria are connected to 23 countries, Bulgaria is exchanging
DNA data with 13 countries and Ireland with five countries (EU Council,
2021). According to interviewees, such a scenario could pose serious risks
related to the loss of important data. In the words of a participant:
Several countries are not linked (…) and many police officers (…) expect
that as soon as they make an entry in the database, it will be auto-
matically checked everywhere in Europe, so if they do not get a hit they
take it as meaning that there is no DNA hit in the whole of Europe,
which is the wrong interpretation.
(Interview O02)
The Prüm system’s current state of connections, therefore, evinces that initial
expectations overemphasized the simplification that this techno-scientific
solution would allow, while undervaluing the potential obstacles raised by
political, social, and legal issues. Despite the challenges faced by the Prüm
system, participants in this study placed expectations on its further expansion.
Besides mentioning the need to make all countries operational, several inter-
viewees were also in favor of turning the Prüm system into a “global net-
work” − that is, including non-EU countries. As expressed by one of the
interviewees:
Well, I think that the Prüm network will be growing and growing, new
countries will be operational, and they will be establishing new connec-
tions. So, it will be one big network, maybe a global network.
(Interview G05)
The expectations of NCPs for Step 1 reveal a complex and nuanced scenario.
The “collective expectation” of stepping up transnational collaboration was
the basis for enabling the implementation of the Prüm system. According to
NCPs who work in laboratories, that “collective expectation” is indeed being
fulfilled, since the quick exchange of data allows for an enhanced system for
transnational collaboration. NCPs for Step 1 are thus engaged with a legit-
imization work that, besides highlighting the Prüm system’s beneficial out-
comes, also incites further expansion of the system.
However, such a perspective coexists with a perception of the challenges
posed by the overemphasis of initial expectations over Prüm and the ability of
techno-scientific solutions to generate interoperability within such a differ-
entiated scenario. NCPs working in laboratories also underline how initial
expectations about the full implementation of the Prüm system are thwarted
by national autonomy to define the type of data categories exchanged; the
non-operational status of some countries, owing to multiple social, political
and economic issues; and the highly differentiated level of connections among
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states within the Prüm system. It is therefore clear how the genetic surveil-
lance envisioned in the early stages faced daily and pervasive challenges
entailed in such a system. Namely, issues of national sovereignty, data own-
ership, as well as social, legal, ethical, political, and economic challenges
(Machado & Granja, 2018, 2019; Toom et al., 2019).
Prüm in international cooperation of law enforcement
For the international police professionals (NCPs for Step 2), the Prüm system
constitutes an additional tool, whose enhancing of police “scientification”
(Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005), enables to streamline communications
between international partners, thereby intensifying international collabora-
tion (Machado & Granja, 2019). In the words of one of the NCPs for Step 2:
When you do an investigation with the international case officers, you can
complete a puzzle. You could not do that before (…). Prüm gives us the
tools to do this.
(Interview U01)
The Prüm system is also perceived by these professionals as a reinforcement
of the principle of availability, obliging Member States to share certain types
of information available to domestic authorities with their counterparts in
other Member States. As expressed by one of the participants:
Information is now more available. There is a proper channel for issues
related to DNA databases.
(Interview X02)
Thus, according to these narratives it is clear that “collective expectations”
regarding Prüm’s potential to step up transnational collaboration are being
met. Nonetheless, as outlined by Didier Bigo (2006b) the principle of avail-
ability can be divided into two sub-principles: “visibility” and “legibility.”
“Visibility” is ensured within Prüm by allowing to know whether the infor-
mation is available in another country. However, knowing that information
exists is not necessarily tantamount to access which, as Bigo argues, describes
the sub-principle of “legibility” (Bigo, 2006b). This difference is particularly
relevant within Prüm and clearly expresses the challenges faced by law
enforcement officers cooperating internationally in Prüm Step 2. While Prüm
Step 1 entails the automated exchange of DNA profiles according to pre-
defined channels, within Step 2 the scenario is different. Following a DNA
hit, several case scenarios might occur, depending on the countries requesting
or providing data: some countries provide the non-genetic information asso-
ciated to the profile immediately after a match, others ask for additional
analysis of the DNA profile, and some countries only provide information
through a judicial rogatory commission (Machado & Granja, 2019). This
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means the level and speed of access to the information within the Prüm
system is highly variable.
One of the factors contributing significantly to variable procedures within
Step 2 is the diversity of domestic provisions regarding the custody of national
DNA databases throughout Europe. In the vast majority of countries using
the Prüm system, custody over the National Forensic DNA Database belongs
to the Interior Ministry (otherwise designated Ministry of Internal Affairs or
Ministry of Home Affairs) – a department of government typically respon-
sible for policing, emergency management, national security, and immigra-
tion. However, in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Sweden, custody of the National DNA Database belongs to the Ministry of
Justice. Usually, this Ministry has specific duties connected with organizing
the justice system, overseeing public prosecutors and maintaining the legal
system and public order. Police forces and judicial authorities have different
perspectives and follow different rationales regarding crime control: police
agencies work with investigative clues and intelligence (Innes et al., 2005),
while prosecutors are mainly interested in adducing evidence. Consequently,
diverging practices emerge when submitting or responding to international
legal assistance procedures within Prüm (Machado & Granja, 2019).
Generally, Step 2 NCPs who are police professionals already have an
established tradition of cooperation at the international level, grounded on
the principle of reciprocity and based on informal and interpersonal interac-
tions. This implies that, generally, information is easily accessible within the
collaboration between two police agencies. Inversely, the judicial authorities
are viewed by professionals involved in police cooperation as a professional
group operating mainly through formal and bureaucratic networks at a
national or local level (Machado & Granja, 2019). Expectations about the
swiftness of data exchange are therefore only partially fulfilled within Prüm as
differentiated practices emerge, ranging from an informal and quick data
exchange to bureaucratic and lengthy procedures that include the emission of
letters rogatory requesting information access. The following quotation is a
good illustration of the frustration felt by the NCPs for Step 2:
It’s a pity [that some countries] (…) are obliged to go through the judicial
network. Because the exchange is really slow, and most of the time
incomplete, compared with what we can do in the police.
(Interview H02)
As described previously, NCPs working in Step 1 (experts working in forensic
laboratories) call for the need to have more information on the “hard facts”
of the Prüm system. That is, knowing whether DNA hits are (or not) followed
up by criminal investigations and their outcomes within the criminal justice
system. Inversely, NCPs working in Step 2 tend to be highly critical of what
they perceive as being an “excessive focus” on DNA hits. Their view is that
forensic DNA data is merely one piece of information that might, or might
Transnational genetic surveillance in the EU 61
not, become significant in a given criminal case (Machado & Granja, 2019).
Consequently, professionals working in criminal investigation argue that the
efficacy of Prüm should not be measured according to the number of matches
resulting in criminal convictions. In the words of one of the participants:
In my opinion, it’s a mistake, to measure the efficiency of Prüm exclu-
sively by comparing how many cross-checks we did and how many
people were sentenced. (…), the feeling I get is that at the European level,
sometimes they want to have, how should I say this, stupid things: thou-
sands of cross-checks, thousands of people in jail. It doesn’t work like
that.
(Interview H02)
Professionals working in law enforcement international cooperation, there-
fore, argue for a broader interpretation of the Prüm system’s aims. In their
view, Prüm matches are mainly useful to advance the gathering of intelligence
for criminal investigation work, regardless of its outcome (Machado &
Granja, 2019). Consequently, they should not be used as “hard facts.” As
stated by the following participant, a DNA hit is not, the most important
element of a criminal investigation within the Prüm system:
If I were the director of a lab, I might think: “OK, my procedure is of the
highest quality, no chance of error, because when I have a hit it is 100%
correct.” But sorry, for this kind of solution I might just as well have a
trained monkey in the laboratory.
(Interview M01)
Professionals involved in international police cooperation, therefore empha-
size the importance of the work that must be done in order to assess whether
a DNA hit is meaningful in a certain criminal case. As the following quota-
tion shows, the interviewees are particularly clear in defining the procedures
involved between obtaining a DNA hit on the basis of the Prüm exchange
system and producing a conviction on the basis of that hit:
If we are talking about DNA exchange (…) Prüm helps to identify the
person responsible for the crime. (…) it would not help you to secure that
person’s conviction (…) It is effective in identifying the suspect. (…)
taking a person to trial takes more than [DNA data] … for instance, you
still have to prove that the DNA did not find its way there [the crime
scene], let us say, by accident. Proving that a person identified by the
system is responsible for the crime in question is still a lot of work.
(Interview F02)
For Prüm NCPs for Step 2, the DNA data exchanged between EU Member
States must be analyzed and crossed with information from a wide range of
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sources, using a particular set of police skills and knowledge, in order to be
considered intelligence that can (in)form actions concerning the how, when,
why and against whom they take action (Innes et al., 2005). As highlighted by
the following excerpts, for police professionals acting as NCPs for Step 2, the
“Prüm hit” represents a starting point of the process. In order to turn it into
meaningful and useful information (i.e., intelligence), the police must collect
and make sense of the information that contextualizes a hit which might, or
might not be actually valuable in policing practice:
Prüm is a small piece (…). We have to build so much more. That is how I
see my role. Not just negotiating that little piece of information, I have to
make sure that it works fully. So, the Prüm is not: “We have a hit, that is
that.” It is just the beginning; the hit must lead to a result (…) we must
go all the way and hopefully we will put one person in prison.
(Interview U01)
We are not relying on the Prüm hit as the evidence. The Prüm hit is the
intelligence to justify a particular course of action.
(Interview D04)
DNA data is mainly of strategic value to professionals involved in inter-
national police cooperation. The DNA hits generated within the Prüm system
are viewed by these professionals as having a useful potential for identifying
and pursuing links between a certain offence and a potential suspect. In
addition, police professionals are extremely interested in establishing links
between crimes, since this information might eventually allow to map net-
works of itinerant delinquency operating on a transnational level (Wilson,
2016). DNA hits within Prüm are thus seen as a type of information that
might enable law enforcement agencies to construct intelligence (Innes et al.,
2005) about when, where, and how crimes are being committed across bor-
ders, without necessarily requiring detection of the actual offenders in each
instance (Sulca, 2017):
I think the value of DNA databases in helping us to understand offenses
and their perpetrators in more types of crime is very powerful. If we do
that across international boundaries it could provide a useful [tool].
(Interview D01)
Nowadays all of these criminal activities have no borders. (…) So, DNA
could, at least, help to locate the person or check whether the person
committed the same crime in different countries in Europe.
(Interview E02)
One of the most important expected benefits is the potential to maximize
the information obtainable from the Prüm system, even if, after doing the
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follow-up work from the DNA hits, it might not lead to a viable line of
investigation. As one of the interviewees explains:
Our police officers say: “We would like to get more hits and have the
chance to dismiss some, not having to consider or follow up all of them,
instead of just getting one hit and missing all the other ones.” So, this is
the philosophy of our police. They do not want to miss hits which might
be positive hits in the end. (…) It is a sort of philosophy of getting hits -
you would like to have a little bit more work but not miss an opportunity.
(Interview O01)
What the interviewee calls the “philosophy of getting hits” therefore implies
transferring to police work the decision on what might constitute valid, legit-
imate, and useful knowledge, rather than keeping it in the sphere of the forensic
scientists in the laboratories. It also implies a strategy of crime control that
actively reacts to the alleged shifting of power away from criminal investigators
to forensic scientists, which was introduced by the Prüm system (Prainsack &
Toom, 2010). By arguing that the police should be in charge of assessing which
hits should be followed up, the interviewees are substantiating the complexity
and ambiguous nature of forms of scientification of police work, while, at the
same time, protecting the autonomy and distinctiveness of police authority and
expertise. An overview of diversity of expectations and perceived challenges
according to positionings of NCPs is summarized in Table 3.1.
The collective expectation about the benefits emerging from stepping up
transnational collaboration brought by the Prüm system is perceived by NCPs
working in law enforcement agencies as having been fulfilled. Similarly, to the
views expressed by the NCPs working in laboratories, the NCPs working in
criminal investigation highlight the positive outcomes of the Prüm system and
encourage its further development and expansion. However, this collective
expectation coexists with specific expectations regarding the specificities of
police work. The particular expectations of the Prüm NCPs for Step 2 create,
advocate, and reinforce certain distinctions in relation to the work methods of
other professionals also involved in transnational cooperation, such as the
judicial authorities and forensic scientists. On the one hand, judicial autho-
rities are perceived as a professional group operating mainly through formal
procedures on a national or local level, lacking an experience and tradition of
international cooperation. Thus, for instance, when police professionals need
swift access to information to validate the importance of DNA data, the
bureaucratic and time-consuming procedures of the judicial authorities tend
to hinder such assessment. On the other hand, police professionals emphasize
the need to moderate high expectations regarding the value and capacity of
DNA data to support criminal investigations. As a result, they attempt to
transfer decision-making concerning the potential validity and usefulness of
data to police work rather than the work of the forensic scientists in the
laboratories (Machado & Granja, 2019).
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Conclusion
Since more than a decade has passed since the implementation of the Prüm
system, this chapter allows us to understand how expectations constructed,
performed, and circulated over the Prüm system have been articulated,
adjusted, and stabilized over time (Hielscher & Kivimaa, 2018). The expec-
tations of forensic experts and members of law authorities involved in the
Prüm network for transnational police and judicial cooperation aimed at
fighting cross-border crime and terrorism feature complex dynamics of genetic
surveillance. To use the concept of “sociotechnical imaginary,” reveals how a
European imaginary of security and role of the EU in the “Global War on
Terror” is forming in the EU policy domain. This term is also useful for
understanding how a “EU identity” is constructed in the envisioned politics
of control and surveillance promised by the Prüm (Amelung et al., 2020). To
address the collective and specific expectations of professional groups who are
in charge, through their daily actions, of operating the Prüm network allows
drawing attention to deep entanglements of technoscientific and political
arrangements.
In this chapter, we considered the Prüm system as a clearly illustrative case
study of how the specific expectations of epistemic communities of forensic
Table 3.1 Summary of expectations being met and challenges, according to different
NCPs










over foreign colleagues’ pro-
cedures for reporting matches
Stepping-up of cross-border
cooperation, while still main-
taining ownership over
national data









Different modus operandi of
police and judicial authorities
with custody of national
DNA databases
Reinforcement of the princi-
ple of availability
Excessive focus on DNA
matches to measure the effi-
ciency of the Prüm system
Source: Authors.
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experts and of members of law enforcement about the capacity and value of
forensic DNA technologies and the exchange of DNA data at a transnational
level play a constitutive and performative role that nourishes the dynamics of
genetic surveillance for the governance of crime in the EU. These expectations
reflect how particular groups of actors receive, interpret, and act in this con-
text considering their particular professional positionings and work views.
These different attitudes shed light on what Kornelia Konrad calls an “inter-
pretative flexibility” (Konrad, 2006), governing how various actors relate, not
only to their own expectations, but also to those of others. In our empirical
case, interpretative flexibility operates as a two-sided phenomenon: on one
side, collective expectations over the Prüm system are able to draw together a
large number of highly heterogeneous actors, based on the perception of the
benefits of expanding the system of cooperation speeding up exchange of
DNA data and valuable information for criminal investigation, increasing
accuracy and reliability. On the flipside, expectations are strategically dis-
tributed according to the specific positioning of actors and their particular
situatedness in the spaces of the technological apparatus sustaining the idea
of a “European security.”
We have also analyzed what Mads Borup and colleagues (2006, p. 286)
describe as processes by which expectations are foundational in vertical, hor-
izontal and temporal coordination. The analysis undertaken in this chapter
shows these dynamics in a particularly illustrative way. Vertical coordination
is illustrated by Prüm system’s mediation between different scales: namely, at a
macro level, evinced by the EU; at a meso level, here represented by national
diversity; and, finally, at a micro level, comprising the variable practices found
within national contexts. Horizontal coordination is underscored by the coex-
istence of different communities within Prüm’s daily activities, involving both
forensic scientists and law enforcement agents. Finally, our chapter also reflects
upon temporal coordination as it looks into how expectations have been
articulated, adjusted, and stabilized, since the implementation of the system,
more than a decade ago.
The relevance of the genetic surveillance disseminated by the Prüm system
has been maintained over time by actively managing the expectations asso-
ciated with it, namely by safeguarding particular expectations and disregarding
others. This has been possible, first, because of the standardization of techno-
scientific procedures across countries, allowing for automated exchange of data
in the first step of the Prüm system. The harmonization and standardization of
procedures among professionals based in different countries has consolidated
expectations regarding the identification of suspects across EU and enhanced
techno-scientific harmonization in ways that safeguard Prüm’s promised pro-
spects. Second, by sustaining transnational DNA data exchange, even when
criteria for assessing the validity of a match has become highly disputed, owing
to the occurrence of false negatives and uncertainties about procedures followed
by counterparts in other countries. Third, in order not to threaten countries’
custody over data, Prüm subsists in a regime that brings together diverse
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epistemic cultures and a shifting set of criminal justice systems supporting the
circulation of information. Expectations over harmonized interoperability
across EU have, therefore, been minimized in favor of maintaining data
exchange in a scenario marked by differentiated procedures across countries,
both in Step 1 and 2 of Prüm.
Thus, the expectations over Prüm work as an ongoing device of legit-
imization that emphasizes Prüm’s role in stepping up transnational colla-
boration, upholding its “global” expansion, while simultaneously playing
down the scrutiny of its promises concerning crime control and detection
(Santos & Machado, 2017; Toom et al., 2019), as well as the possibility of
future alternative means to deal with cross-border crime and terrorism.
Although expectations about the interoperability of EU databases have sta-
bilized over time, we have witnessed the persistence of some reservations.
Namely, full implementation of the Prüm system across all EU countries has
not yet been achieved, and issues of transparency, and therewith accountability,
remain problematic, leading to tensions between the different epistemic cultures
that support the circulation of information. Such disputes are mainly grounded
in conflicting views about how to use and make sense of DNA data within the
Prüm system, about its expected efficacy, and disagreements about the impli-
cations of genetic surveillance in its diverse and ambiguous manifestations.
Elsewhere, in a work with our colleague Nina Amelung, we explored how dif-
ferent national political cultures implement or resist the idea of Europe’s techno-
logical and political integration through borderless data exchange (Amelung et al.,
2020). We argued that it is important to portray and critically examine the com-
plex, multi-layered, and hidden processes of integration and disintegration of
Europe highlighted by the linking and delinking of technological infrastructures
between nation states, in a process mediated by diversity of legislation, infra-
structures, organizational principles, and nationhood. In this chapter, we further
contribute for the critical examining of the diverse and less visible processes of
expectations of forensic experts and professionals working in international police
and judicial cooperation, to reflect on its implications for the interplay between
utopian and dystopian views on the programmatic security policy agenda of EU,
oriented implementation of information systems in which genetic surveillance is
expected to play a considerable role.
The future of the Prüm system, as an EU political project materialized by
supra-state institutions, is still uncertain. Nonetheless, there have been indi-
cations that amendments could be introduced in the near future, such as:
exchanging DNA data with non-EU countries; harmonization of practices of
using DNA matches for supporting criminal investigation in the different EU
jurisdictions; modernization of Prüm’s infrastructure and technology; and the
exchange of additional forensic modalities, namely facial recognition data. As
such, the so-called “next generation Prüm” is characterized by expansion and
convergence (Toom, 2018; Toom et al., 2019) by which technological section
persist and new horizons for function creep (e.g., using technology to fulfill
unforeseen functions) are opened up. Therefore, there is the need, on the one
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hand, to conduct studies that mitigate the overall scarcity of information
about how the Prüm regime contributes to the EU’s criminal justice systems
(Toom et al., 2019). On the other hand, the further expansion of the Prüm
system must be accompanied by an oversight mechanism that effectively
evaluates outcomes and options alike in terms of justice, as well as safeguards
for the principles of equality and privacy, and fosters engagement with
accountability, public trust, and democracy.
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4 Genetic Surveillance in Post-
Communist European Countries
Introduction
There is a scarcity of knowledge about the current situation regarding genetic
surveillance for the governance of crime in countries that are part of the so-
called Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), usually intended to designate those
states formerly comprising the Eastern European bloc. During the Stalinist
period, the communist states and the Soviet Union were totalitarian societies.
In the post-Stalin period, many of the communist states in Europe began to
develop towards a more pragmatic, although not necessarily, less repressive
authoritarianism. This chapter explores the views about genetic surveillance
constructed by forensic geneticists working in laboratories based in CEE
countries. The analysis is based on testimonies collected from interviews car-
ried out between 2016 and 2018 in CEE countries, namely: Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. The
research questions guiding this chapter are the following: what are the
expectations of forensic geneticists towards genetic surveillance in CEE
countries? In which ways the past experience of repressive and violent sur-
veillance (not necessarily with sophisticated technologies) generate implica-
tions for understanding the present and the future of forensic genetic
technologies in these particular social contexts?
This group of countries has undergone diverse transition processes, result-
ing in a wide range of regimes, from authoritarianism and totalitarism to
nearly consolidated democracies, thereby making generalizations rather diffi-
cult. Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield (2007) discussed the con-
trast between the wealthiest states, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovenia, as opposed to countries like Bulgaria, Romania, and
Slovakia, whose weaker economies made it harder to endure such political,
social, and economic transitions. Moreover, transitions were also marked by
each country’s national history, namely their communist legacies. While most
of these countries are known for a past marked by extensive state surveillance,
state paternalism (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), and economic black markets
(Los, 2003), the implementation of institutional reforms have varied widely in
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speed and depth (Rothschild & Wingfield, 2007). In Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, and Poland, a private sector with some autonomy existed in the 1970s
and 1980s, despite periods of severe repression; in Bulgaria and Romania,
however, totalitarianism or severe authoritarianism persisted until 1989 or
1990 (Svenonius & Björklund, 2014).
Poland and Hungary made the transition from authoritarianism to demo-
cratic states in 1989, although the two countries have been frequently under
the scrutiny of the European Union (EU) because of doubts regarding a lack
of compliance with the EU democratic standards (Bunce, McFaul, & Stoner-
Weiss, 2010). The recent democratic backlashes in Hungary and Poland show
that the post-communist democracies could be more fragile than was initially
assumed because of the persistence of legacy and political structures (Sveno-
nius & Tarasova, 2021). Matters of concern are related to high-level corrup-
tion, national justice systems, media freedom, telecommunications data
retention without judicial control, as well as anti-immigration attitudes in the
case of Hungary (Stone, 2018). Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were Soviet
Republics from 1940 onwards, gaining independence after the disintegration
of the USSR in 1991. Czechoslovakia gained independence after the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union, leading to its division on 1 January 1993 and
resulting in the foundation of two states (the Czech Republic and Slovakia).
While the 1989 revolutions, with the exception of Romania, can be considered
peaceful in most nations of the Eastern Bloc (Sztompka, 1996), they also
meant the collapse of former social-control structures and the need to initiate
processes of institutionalization. Some authors suggest that the collective
imagery underlying the democratic transition was inspired by a “return to
Europe” (Lauristin, 2007; Vaduchova, 2015), and this carried with it sig-
nificant social, political, economic, and legal transformations. On 1 May 2004
the EU accepted the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia as new members. On 1 January 2007 Bulgaria
and Romania also joined the EU. The admission of these countries into the
EU made their integration into the cooperative police and legal crime-fighting
networks mandatory. In sum, the CEE countries present varied historical,
political, economic, and social situations. Nonetheless, that fact alone does
not invalidate analyses of common aspects across the various countries,
namely their pasts of extreme surveillance societies and its implications on
expectations towards genetic surveillance for the governance of crime. Highly
secretive and extensive information systems aimed at control and subjugation
of entire populations were a defining characteristic of this group of countries.
Surveillance practices such as infiltration, mail interception, and wiretapping
were integral aspects of everyday life (Svenonius & Björklund, 2014).
Although the terms “post-communist” and “post-socialist” and are mostly
interchangeable, in this chapter we use the term “post-communism” to focus
more on the institutional and formal changes, whereas “post-socialism” is
generally used to refer to issues concerning with culture, subjectivities, and
everyday life. We also follow the proposal by Ola Svenonius and Ekaterina
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Tarasova (2021) to use the term “post-communist” because it is most com-
monly used in literature.
This chapter aims to contributing to studies of surveillance in post-totali-
tarian societies which have experienced a transition to democracy. The evo-
cation of a socialist past can be used to (re)configure and give voice to social
anxieties, enabling a sense of community and nationality (Halbwachs, 1980;
Spülbeck, 2000). However, we also argue that such historical and socio-cul-
tural aspects deserve specific investigations which should not only be framed
by the “legacies” argument (Boersma et al., 2014, p. 3). Considering how
these countries experienced endemic authoritarian surveillance practices for
decades, the point of departure for the analysis presented in this chapter is the
assumption that the widespread abuse of surveillance information, the distrust
of public institutions, and a culture of corruption present in most CEE
countries (Svenonius & Björklund, 2018) might play a crucial role in under-
standing the expectations placed upon the implementation of forensic genetic
technologies in the activities of the criminal justice systems.
This chapter main contribution is, therefore, to provide empirical analysis
about views on genetic surveillance from forensic geneticists living and work-
ing in post-totalitarian societies which have experienced a transition to
democracy. We are actively engaged within critical reflexivity to avoid falling
into the temptation to study the presence of forensic genetics technologies in
the criminal justice system in Eastern European countries as from the
(imperfect) realization of universal theories and laws of development gener-
ated from “modern societies” of the global North (Carrington, Hogg &
Sozzo, 2016, p. 3). This approach is necessarily uncritical and reductionist: it
not only essentializes the knowledge and experiences of “more developed”
societies, as if they were universal, but is also holds the risk of romanticizing
knowledge production in the global South (McLean, Worden, & Kim, 2013,
pp. 121–125).
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first section provides an over-
view in regard to trends of criminality in the historical phase of transition
from totalitarianism to democracy. It also presents arguments related to the
existence of a special kind of “surveillance vulnerability” in CEE countries
mostly linked to the fact that surveillance has permeated the relationship
between the state and the citizens well beyond the end of totalitarianism
(Richterova, 2018; Svenonius & Björklund, 2018).
The second section portrays the expansion of genetic surveillance through
the increasing use of forensic genetic databases. More specifically, we describe
the general legislation trends, the development of forensic genetic databases,
as well as the style of organization, operation, and scale of these databases.
There seems to be a trend towards expanding the size and reach of the genetic
databases controlled by the police, thereby contributing to a phenomenon we
conceptualize as a genetic surveillance expansion.
In the third part of this chapter, we explore the discourses provided by the
interviewees on how they perceive and attribute meaning to the uses of
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genetic technologies and genetic databases for criminal investigation purposes.
We will attempt to show why the visions of forensic geneticists reproduce an
imagery shaped by a socialist legacy, with all the implications entailed by this
political regime in terms of the relationship between the state and its citizens.
The perception of the inherent risks of collecting citizens’ genetic data (and
other kinds of data) as a tool of social control and law enforcement can be
transferred into the complex and ambivalent relationship of public (dis)trust
in the justice system and state institutions.
Finally, the fourth section looks into the particular case of CEE citizens
within the Prüm system. More particularly, by analyzing how Eastern
Europeans are collectively construed as a suspect community. Such a con-
struction is supported by perceptions on the direction of migratory flows
of people travelling from the East to the West, hence underlining the role
of CEE countries in the management of their own “risky” populations
(Machado, Granja & Amelung, 2020).
The case of forensic genetics in post-communist countries in Europe there-
fore integrates at least three elements that will be explored in the next pages.
First, a concrete dimension, materialized in practices of expansion in the use
of genetic technologies to collect data from citizens. Second, a political
dimension, which reverts to relationships of distrust and trauma experienced
under totalitarian regimes of the past. Third, a discursive and symbolic
dimension, present in discourses that criminalize individuals and populations
from post-communist countries in Europe.
Historical legacy and criminality
The concept of legacy plays a vital role in studies about collective memories
in post-communist societies, implying the assumption that certain cultural
mind-sets have prevailed since the time of the communist regimes and that
people’s collective memories of the past shape how they deal with the present
(Wittenberg, 2015). On the one hand, debates have revolved around the
coming to terms with a socialist past. On the other hand, and intimately
connected to that, there are discussions about the pervasive influence of soci-
alism upon interpretations of the current situation across various spheres of
activity (economic, religious, cultural, etc.). In the wake of Peter J. Verovšek’s
proposal for a methodology to study collective memories (2016), this chapter
pursues a dialogical approach that interprets the politics of memory as a
communicative paradigm, involving “not only the substantive content of ideas
but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed” (Verovšek, 2016,
p. 7).
In this context, the concept of legacy associated with varying interpreta-
tions of a socialist past will prove invaluable to analyze the discourses of local
forensic experts concerning the role of genetic technologies in the fight against
criminality. However, the concept of legacy alone does not account for other
values and subjective elements, namely the feelings of (in)security and (dis)
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trust vis-à-vis political power and legal or governmental institutions. Some
authors refer the importance of “existential insecurity” to understand social
representations linked to justice and crime in CEE countries. Despite the vast
differences between types of socialism in the region, the existential insecurity that
characterized the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain in post-communist
societies has been an essential factor behind concepts like “cultural trauma” and
the “post-communist condition” (Holmes, 1997; Sztompka, 2000). As observed
by Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin, in their essay about crime, insecurity
and police reform in post-socialist CEE, such countries faced a wide array of
challenges:
With the change in regime in 1989, CEE states faced a triple challenge:
overcoming the communist legacies in their criminal justice systems;
reforming the police to reflect principles of democratic policing, including
international standards in human rights; and contending with the growth
in crime and public fear of crime.
(Caparini & Marenin, 2005, p. 4)
There seems to be a generalized consensus that the repressive surveillance and
political control were detrimental to social trust (Horne, 2014; Hosking,
2013), and that the lack of civic engagement was prominent (Hooghe &
Quintelier, 2014). One other element that resonates with the past is the
apparent widespread acceptance of state surveillance practices over citizens,
which Ola Svenonius and Fredrika Björklund refer to as a “surveillance vul-
nerability” (Svenonius & Björklund, 2018) and that a “surveillance drive”
persists from the past regime leading to the risk of re-institutionalized
authoritarian regime (Svenonius & Tarasova, 2021). In the perspective of
such works, the notion of surveillance vulnerability and the idea of continuity
of surveillance from the communist era implies that some societies could be
more receptive to harsh, intrusive actions by police forces than others. This
vulnerability and the notion of historical regularities are more prone to occur
wherever communities believe that criminal threats are significant and immi-
nent and wherever they have past experiences of being permanently subjected
to rigorous surveillance by the police and the government. Consequently,
surveillance vulnerability and the materiality of communist legacies can vary
considerably according to each national situation.
Dismantling of the Soviet Union entailed significant political, economic,
and social changes. The emergence and development of a market economy,
the expansion of private services, the opening of borders and the admission of
foreign capital led to social transformations which, according to Beata
Gruszczyńska (2004), might have created more opportunities for criminal
activities. According to this author, the weakening of formal and informal
control, the disarray in which several social structures found themselves, the
police and the courts’ lack of experience to deal with increasing criminal
activity, and the rapidly encroaching poverty, all contributed towards a
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significant increase in criminality during the 1990s (Gruszczyńska, 2004).
This observation is corroborated by other studies (Šelih & Završnik, 2012)
highlighting the marked increase of thefts, robberies and assaults during the
last decade of the past century, as well as the expansion of organized crime
(Hignett, 2004, 2010), and drug-related offences.
The CEE countries experienced both domestic and transnational crime.
They formed an essential link in the criminal corridor from the east to
the west, from the south to the north (and the reverse) in car thefts and
drug crimes. Initially, CEE were destination countries and – over time –
they became transit countries.
(Gruszczyńska, 2004, p. 125)
Nonetheless, it is important to note that this alleged increase in criminality
cannot be accurately gauged or calculated. It is impossible to establish a reli-
able comparison with the criminality statistics from previous decades, since
many communist regimes tended not to divulge or register such statistics.
Similarly, it is difficult to compare criminality trends across European coun-
tries, since the collection and treatment methods for statistical data differ
from one country to the other. Generally speaking, criminality in these
countries follows similar trends to those observed in Western European
countries, albeit with a delay, so that the convergence only took place in the
second half of the 1990s. According to Gruszczyńska:
In some countries and for some types of crime, the trends in CEE are
similar to those in the WE countries. The dynamics of assaults in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are similar to those observed in
Western Europe. This also holds for the dynamics of robbery and theft in
the Czech Republic and Hungary (and also partly in Poland). The drug
offences should be compared in a different perspective. In CEE countries
a significant increase of such crime was observed in the second half of the
1990s.
(Gruszczyńska, 2004, p. 134)
Variation in crime patterns and judicial trends among CEE countries is
therefore perceptible. For example, in Poland, the guiding principles adopted
following the regime change of 1989 led to the implementation of liberal-
ization policies in the justice system, only later followed by the public’s fear of
crime. In this country, around the mid-1990s, sentencing became more severe,
imprisonment rates increased steeply, and Polish penal policies swerved away
from the path towards liberalization. In other countries, namely in the Bal-
kans, the emergence of state-organized syndicates engaged in smuggling all
kinds of goods and people undermined much of the impetus for reform,
leading to an increase of public demand for a crackdown on crime (Caparini
& Marenin, 2005, p. 18). Consequently, there was an implementation of
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policies that sought to tighten control over criminality and perpetuate mass
surveillance systems, which in turn has since perpetuated more repressive
policies and the reinforcement of police authority.
Expansion of genetic surveillance
All the CEE countries included in the analysis proposed in this chapter have a
national forensic genetic database for criminal investigation purposes. In this
section, we will detail their main features in terms of dimension, organization
and regulation. The size of the national forensic DNA databases varies sig-
nificantly across this group of CEE countries. In this respect, Estonia stands
out. Considering proportional population coverage, taking as reference the
statistics for the resident population in the country − a factor normally used
to evaluate the “size” for this type of database − Estonia’s database is one of
the largest in Europe. It is second only to the databases in the United King-
dom, which include 8.8 per cent of the population, and France, including
5 per cent of the population.
As we can see in Table 4.1, the CEE countries with the largest databases
are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is worth noting that, in this group of
countries, databases are larger than those in other western European coun-
tries, such Germany and the Netherlands. This seems especially relevant
considering that Germany and the Netherlands have distinguished themselves
in the landscape of European security for their proactivity when it comes to
developing biometric technological infrastructures and data exchange for
crime fighting purposes, namely through the Prüm System (Amelung, Granja
& Machado, 2020).
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia possess forensic
DNA databases of similar size to other European countries, such as the
Table 4.1 Characteristics of forensic DNA databases in CEE countries
Country Date of creation Number of profiles % of population
included
Czech Republic 2001 186,111 1.8
Bulgaria 2000 17,618 0.2
Estonia 2004 49,421 3.8
Hungary 2004 148,324 1.5
Latvia 2005 53,546 2.6
Lithuania 2002 87,310 2.6
Poland 2007 46,579 0.1
Romania 2008 32,149 0.2
Slovakia 2004 55,559 1
Slovenia 1998 31,533 1.6
Source: Reed & Syndercombe-Court (2016).
Genetic Surveillance in Post-Communist Europe 77
Netherlands (1.4 per cent) and Germany (with 1 per cent of the population).
Countries such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania possess small genetic
databases, closely mirroring the situation in other European countries, as for
example Spain (with 0.6 per cent of the population), Luxembourg (0.4 per
cent), and Belgium (0.35 per cent).
In terms of legal guidelines, the general trend in countries with more
extensive databases is to follow an expansive strategy, while countries with
smaller databases follow more restrictive legal trends (Santos, Machado, &
Silva, 2013). In other words, national legislations responsible for defining the
criteria for the collection, creation, and removal of DNA profiles from the
forensic genetics database will have a bearing on the size of the respective
criminal DNA database.
Countries with expansive legal trends present lower thresholds for inclusion
and lengthier retention periods for profiles, which could allow for faster
expansion in the number of profiles in the DNA database. According to Filipe
Santos and his colleagues (Santos et al., 2013), the CEE countries with more
expansive guidelines are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Generally,
the inclusion criteria in most “expansive countries” allow the submission of
sample collection from individuals suspected of any crime and, consequently,
inclusion of their own DNA profiles in the forensic database. For example, in
Estonia, the police may take a DNA sample from all suspects and convicted
offenders. It is mandatory for any person arrested or convicted for a crime-
related activity to provide a DNA sample. A sample may be taken coercively
if consent is withheld. Estonian legislation allows all DNA profiles to be
entered automatically in the database for speculative searches. No restrictions
are imposed on the type of offence warranting a speculative search, and no
prior court authorization is required (Reed & Syndercombe-Court,2016).
In these “expansionist countries,” the database tends to be controlled and
managed by police forces, without the independent supervision from any
other organization or institution over the activities involving the use of this
kind of databases. For example, the Latvian database is supervised and man-
aged by the Forensic Service Department of the Latvian State Police, imply-
ing there is not an autonomous, external entity monitoring and supervising
that will be liable to rouse ethical issues or conflicts linked to the protection of
personal data and other sensitive information.
In the group of countries where legislation is considered to have a restric-
tive function, typically the condition imposed for including profiles in data-
bases is either that an individual is suspected or convicted of a crime that
could lead to a prison sentence, or that the crimes committed by an individual
subjected to the collection of a biological sample are considered serious
(Santos et al., 2013). This type of legal framework established a predominant
trend of genetic databases with fewer genetic profiles than those in more
“expansive” countries. This results primarily from two interrelated factors:
stricter criteria for the creation of genetic profiles in the databases and/or
more limited retention and storing periods for these kinds of data.
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Within this CEE group, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania might be con-
sidered restrictive countries. In Poland, for example, DNA samples and pro-
files of persons who have been acquitted, whose cases have been dropped, or
have been conditionally discharged, may have their samples and profiles
removed from the database. In Romania, the legal power to take DNA sam-
ples from suspects is subject to the written permission from the investigating
prosecutor or a court order (Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016).
Countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic show a trend towards
expansion in their databases (see Table 4.1), although the legal framework in
both countries might be considered at the same time restrictive and expan-
sionist, as it merges characteristics from both groups. In Hungary, for
instance, DNA profiles from convicted offenders may be retained for up to 20
years from the date of sentencing. But the uploading of the DNA profiles in
the criminal database by police must be overseen and authorized by the
Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement. In the Czech Republic, samples
and profiles alike can be preserved for as long as deemed necessary for crime
prevention and detection or the conduction of criminal investigations. How-
ever, preservation is subject to review every three years to determine whether
retention of the samples and profiles is still warranted (Reed & Syndercombe-
Court, 2016).
Nonetheless, even considering countries with a relatively small database of
DNA profiles, this does not preclude the existence of a trend towards
expanding genetic surveillance. For example, interviewees across all countries
mentioned the use and/or interest in using genetic technologies such as mass
screenings, familial searching and forensic DNA phenotyping. Such technol-
ogies, which are aimed at generating intelligence for criminal investigations,
move the locus from individualization − that is, identification of specific
individuals − towards collectivization (Machado & Granja, 2020, p. 86). Such
a sweeping use of DNA technologies thereby constitutes a clear example of
attempts to expand genetic surveillance beyond DNA profiling and DNA
databasing.
Another important aspect of genetic surveillance expansion of is linked to
the social representations about the future of DNA technologies and the
expectations associated with its governance. Interviewees in this study recur-
rently upheld the view that it would be positive to create a universal database;
that is, containing the genetic data of the entire resident population in a spe-
cific country. Curiously, a specific idea was asserted on this point regarding
the integration of CEE countries. The idea of European integration reveals a
willingness to come closer to European values, while at the same time denot-
ing a criticism towards Eastern European politicians’ subjection to the deci-
sions stemming from the European Commission. The following account by a
participant in the study, lamenting how it is impossible to create a universal
database in his country, is illustrative of such a view. This interviewee believes
that politicians are afraid Europe would reject such projects based on issues
of citizen privacy protection.
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Politicians would never agree with the creation of a universal DNA
database. We can dream about it, but they’d never agree. Why? I think
they are afraid. They are too eager to please Europe. The politicians
would never agree because national laws are all about data protection
and are all strictly reviewed by a data protection agency. And our data
protection agency gets its directions from the EU and follows them.
(Interview B01)
This interview quotation illustrates two interrelated aspects of crucial
importance for understanding the views and expectations towards genetic
surveillance in post-communist European countries: first, that an under-
standing of the past and its legacies could shed light on contemporary per-
ceptions of surveillance, resistance and/or resilience to surveillance. This
aspect will be analyzed in detail in the following sections of this chapter. A
second element relies on how modes of imposing global ways of using and
implementing genetic technologies for governance of crime are articulated in
a specific way in different contexts – and thus are continually “territorialized”
and “de-territorialized” – defining individual, collective values and discursive
forms (Ong & Collier, 2005).
Eastern European countries’ adherence to standards imposed by transna-
tional institutions such as the European Commission or, more abstractly and
generally, by organizations promoting globalization (whether in science and
technology, or in industries and commercial circuits associated with security
and police operations) illustrates the ways in which normative govern-
mentality (Dunn, 2005), emanating from different political and economic
sources, claims to transform technical, scientific, and social structures, and to
be applicable across geographies and diverse histories and institutions.
Examining normative governmentality in the context of CEE countries opens
up a window to criticize claims that the EU and its standardizers make about
harmonization and inclusivity. In CEE countries, owing to the institutional
legacy of communism, the imposition of rules and standardization and har-
monization has the effect of causing some social actors and institutions to try
to imitate these models, and can create strong incentives for resistance to
change. This last type of reaction is often understood as the type of response
expected from populations that have been under the domain of communism
and that instigates people to distrust or avoid any type of new power or social
and disciplinary control (Dunn, 2005, p. 175).
Views about police forces and the influence of legacy
As we noted in the introduction to this chapter, while authoritarian commu-
nist regimes were in power, the state conditioned all social life. The legacy of
socialist societies, therefore, undeniably shapes the present and conditions the
future across many spheres of social life – from scientific production to the
criminal justice system. Interviewees’ accounts reflect signs of a collective
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trauma that gives meaning to actions and social phenomenon as seen through
a prism that projects onto the conditions faced in the present. It’s a “trans-
mutable past” (Pavlovich, 2018) by which people frame, contextualize, and
give meaning to the events and actions. In the words of William V. Pavlovich,
by narrating the experiences of their past, “people engage in meaning-making
practices whereby individual experiences are linked to larger social, political
and economic processes, especially when that past was traumatic and affects
present identities” (Pavlovich, 2018, p. 257).
This “transmutable past” (Pavlovich, 2018) transpires in how interviewees
give meaning to forensic genetic technologies in post-communist societies. A
particularly relevant example of this mindset is provided by a forensic expert,
who alludes to the difficulty in explaining how the authoritarian past con-
tinues to have consequences on the daily lives of societies in the present.
Society was completely controlled and monitored by the state system, from
citizens’ daily lives to how science was produced. State regulation, bureau-
cracy, and surveillance were, therefore, a major part of social life (Svenonius
& Björklund, 2014). In the participant’s words:
We were part of the socialist block of countries in Europe. So, we were
under the strong influence of the Soviet Union and we adopted many
regulations and other things from the Soviet Union. Everything was
regulated in the [country], every aspect of life, of… How to say it? Sci-
ence and other things were under the influence of the socialist thinking
and the Soviet Union (…) life here was very influenced by this (…). We
were not allowed to travel to Western countries, for example, and we did
not have reliable and updated information from the world outside, as it
was filtered by the soviet and socialist control or surveillance.
(Interview L01)
According to this forensic geneticist’s perspective, such a legacy has con-
siderable influence over current relationships between citizens and the police,
which are heavily marked by distrust. When referring to traumatic memories
brought by police forces, this interviewee highlights the tradition and notor-
ious cultural legacy found in post-communist societies regarding the collec-
tion of citizen information and data. In the participant’s perspective, this
massive surveillance was carried out by the police, entrusted with protecting
the interests of the state and keeping citizens under absolute control.
In [this particular country] there is a very bad relationship between citi-
zens and the police (…) I think it has historic reasons. Since it used to be
a socialist country, it was a totalitarian regime, and back then the police
was a tool of government and hence of the leading communist party, so it
had a very bad reputation. It watched and persecuted people, so they had
a very bad relationship with the police. And even though the police has
changed and is now different and more modern, this feeling is still
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present. The relationship of suspicion with the police is still clear. So
people view the DNA database mostly as a danger to their rights and
freedoms.
(Interview L01)
Such a legacy of distrust ultimately influences how citizens perceive the
implementation of a police-managed forensic database containing DNA pro-
files. The following testimony of a forensic geneticist is an example of this
view. According to this account, there is a lack of transparency in how data-
bases of DNA profiles are used by the police, given that citizens cannot know
how the information is used and there is no entity to ensure independent
supervision of police activities involving the use of genetic technologies in
criminal investigations. In his own words:
There is a problem with the transparency of criminal DNA databases. Most
of them are managed by the police, and police services in most countries are
not transparent (…) I can say this regarding our DNA database. Currently
there is no control over our national DNA database, there is no independent
committee checking what is happening in our national DNA database.
(Interview J02)
The same interviewee points out the fear of a future reversion to a dictatorial
regime, a particularly troubling prospect considering how it would place
especially sensitive information, such as the citizens’ genetic data, in the
hands of an authoritarian power:
That’s why I have fears for the future. Now we have a democratic
regime… it is the same in European countries, and as far as we don’t have
dictatorial regimes, things will be under control, let’s say. But you never
know what will happen in the future (…) Political intrusion is the main
concern. Not really the genetic information itself, but the political intru-
sion in this huge information system… And that scenario is… well, let’s
just say it’s not such a distant one for us.
(Interview J02)
Some of the interviewees mention that the consolidation of democratic
regimes could lead citizens to place more trust on authorities and police
forces. One of the forensic geneticists interviewed, at the time working in a
forensic genetics laboratory under the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior,
noted how the police was becoming increasingly modern and set to conquer
the trust of citizens. Nonetheless, memories of past abusive police practices
are still alive in the collective memory.
People do not trust the police enough, right now. I think that, due to
historical reasons, we are still in the process of gaining enough of that
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trust (…) Generally speaking, I think that trust in the authorities is
something that we’re on a good road to achieving. I would really like to
see that, and I think it’s just a matter of time; as enough time passes,
generations will change.
(Interview K01)
The interviewee believes that in order to consolidate such public trust, there
is a need for public engagement with genetic technologies, as well as the
development of regulations ensuring an effective protection of citizens’ sensi-
tive data. In his view, this is an issue in which being aligned with the public’s
interest is of paramount importance. In his own words:
Whether or not the risks of forensic genetic technologies can be averted
through well designed regulations for the usage of data… although it’s not
just a matter of risk, it’s also a matter of the public’s reassurance. I think that
where this kind of deeply personal things are concerned, the opinion of the
public should be the main priority (…) I think the main problem would be
the issue of trust in authorities. If the community trusts the authorities …
the main obstacles would be the fear of releasing information in a way that
could somehow affect the person’s life negatively.
(Interview K01)
A key aspect of post-communist societies’ history and culture to take into con-
sideration, if we are to evaluate the place of forensic genetic technologies in the
criminal justice system, is linked to how society views the role and activity of
police forces. Memories of the past and perceptions about the historic legacy of
police continue to influence current police structures and organizations, as well
as the criminal justice system (Caparini & Marenin, 2005; Mesko et al., 2013).
Although the deep social and political changes that took place in CEE countries
have inarguably altered the structure and role of the police, police forces continue
to be associated, at least from the point of view of common citizens in post-
communist countries, with authoritarian political regimes and oppressive popu-
lation surveillance, including the mass collection of citizen information (Mawby,
2000; Svenonius & Björklund, 2018).
The Prüm system and criminalization of CEE citizens
All the countries mentioned in this chapter participate in a transnational
system for exchanging DNA data among EU Member States, known as the
Prüm system (described in detail in Chapter 3). The European Commission
has made the implementation of the Prüm system a mandatory instrument in
the fight against cross-borders criminality and terrorism. Through the Prüm
system, EU Member States were obligated to create structures for the per-
manent, automated, and reciprocal access to DNA and other types of data
held in national databases. According to Paul Luif (2007), the initiative to
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create the Prüm system was deemed necessary because of “transnational
crime, which had increased after the removing of the Iron curtain at the end
of the Cold War and which had been made easier by the ceasing of border
controls between the participants of the Schengen area” (Luif, 2007, p. 6)1.
Academic studies on the transnational exchange of DNA data through the
Prüm system have mapped the geographical patterns of cross-border crimes
solved by the exchange of DNA data among different EU Member States
(Bernasco, Lammers, & Van der Beek, 2016; Taverne & Broeders, 2015,
2017). One study suggested a territorial divide between Central and Western
European countries on the one side and CEE countries on the other: based
on an analysis of the official statistical dataset of the Prüm system, this
research revealed a trend among Central Western European countries to
accumulate the majority of DNA profiles of individuals originating from CEE
countries (Santos & Machado, 2017). In other words, the study showed how
the geographical patterns of DNA flows between the EU Member States
involved in the Prüm system seemed to confirm previous research on patterns
of criminal mobility affecting Central West European countries, mostly asso-
ciated with a volume of crime that usually involved individuals originating
from CEE countries (Bernasco et al., 2016; Siegel, 2014; Van Daele, 2008).
The Western views on the East as an alien and underdeveloped region (Laur-
istin, 2007) suggest a cautious distrust towards some EU members. The admission
of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2007, for example, raised awave of “moral
panic” (Cohen, 1985) in the British media that vented fears of UK flooding by
migrants from these countries, expressed in headlines which cast citizens from
these countries as “undesirables” or “gangsters” (Light & Young, 2009; Mawby &
Gisby, 2009) and portrayed stereotypical sensationalist images associating immi-
grants with criminality. This continues to be a dominant feature across political,
media, and general public discourses, whereby people from CEE countries are
depicted as crime-prone (Broeders, 2007; Guild & Geyer, 2008; Hufnagel &
McCartney, 2017; Lyon, 2004; Taverne & Broeders, 2015, 2017). By the same
token, the inclusion of CEE countries also roused distinctions and hierarchies
between the East and the West within Prüm, contrasting the directionality of sci-
entific innovation (from the West to the East) versus transnational criminal threats
(in the reverse direction).
The dissemination pattern of “high-tech” innovation, conceived to flow
from the West to the East, is aligned with the reinforcement of geopolitics.
Besides being evidenced by the fact that Prüm’s leading implementation sup-
port teams came from Central European countries (Austria, Germany, and
the Netherlands) (Santos, 2017), this flow is also reflected in the accounts of
practitioners from CEE countries. As the following quotations show, forensic
experts based in CEE countries consider integration in Prüm as an opportu-
nity to foster the national development of forensic science:
We are competitive and try to sit at the same table with other countries.
Sometimes it’s gratifying, it’s an honour, for example – I am talking from
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my point of view – to sit at the same table with countries like Germany or
France, knowing that while there may sometimes be political tensions
caused by our [national citizens] presence in their countries, at the same
time we can cooperate to make a good Europe and to exchange data in
order to be a safer place. So, there´s mutual benefit in cooperating on this
issue.
(Interview J01)
I have heard these discussions. Should we do it, should we not? From our
[country’s] point of view, we like it, we do it, and we’ll take it as far as it
goes. (…) I think we have learned a lot and it has helped our develop-
ment. Because seeing what the others are doing and having to connect
with them and follow their lead, inspires us to improve and do things in a
new way.
(Interview B01)
This particular framing of the uses made by CEE countries of forensic
DNA databases and transnational DNA exchange for purposes of crime
control, thereby reproduces a “premise of Europe’s internal East that is still
behind Europe and still aspiring to become European” (Kuus, 2004, p. 476).
Such a framing continues a long history of opinion and bias that can be
traced, for instance, to the enlightenment, whose intellectual elites similarly
contributed to create an idea of Eastern Europe as distinct and significantly
different from Western Europe (Wolff, 1994).
While discourses on the directionality of scientific innovation chart the flow
from the West to the East, discourses on criminal threats seem to point in the
opposite direction − that is, from East to West. Suspiciousness towards parti-
cular populations located in the territories of CEE countries re-enacts a division
from the Cold War by which former post-communist countries are considered
risky (M’charek, Schramm, & Skinner, 2014). Technological systems, like the
Prüm system, designed for transnational surveillance of criminalized groups,
represent forms of “transmitted discrimination” (Reiner, 2010) that resonate
with what David Skinner has described as forms of operating systems of “tech-
nosecurity” (Skinner, 2018). This social process of constructing suspicion leads
to what we have designated elsewhere as the “co-construction” of suspicion
(Machado et al., 2020), meaning that the assumptions about Eastern Europe’s
risky populations are, as noted by Marje Kuus, “actively used by these countries
against their particular Easts” (Kuus, 2004, p. 479). This way of co-constructing
suspicion is supported by perceptions about the direction of population flows
throughout Europe, hence underlining the role of East European countries in the
management of their own “risky” populations.
Given the asymmetrical geopolitical distribution of power between East and
West, the use of technology coupled with the perceived directionality of crim-
inal threats in the EU could put pressure on CEE countries to internalize the
costs of crime (Wilson, 2016, p. 305). This seems to highlight the asymmetrical
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proportion of contributions (databasing known criminal offenders) and the
reaping of benefits (obtaining information to solve crimes) between the highly
proactive and founding members of Prüm (like Austria, Germany, France, and
Spain) and the CEE countries. In other words, geopolitics is equated with the
binary relation between technological transference versus transfer of crimin-
ality. The co-production of suspicion is not only conveyed by professionals
from Western, Central, and Northern Europe (Machado et al., 2020), but also
reproduced by respondents from CEE countries who, on the one hand, endorse
the assumption that solving crimes depends on their access to bigger DNA
databases located in Central-Western Europe. On the other hand, respondents
from CEE countries reinforce the idea that national citizens are migrating to
other parts of Europe and could commit crimes.
We were mostly looking for areas where you might find larger groups of
people [from my country] going to other countries (…) Countries where
we know a lot of [our nationals] are travelling to, like Germany, France,
Sweden…
(Interview E02)
Regarding the fight against criminality, it’s easy to see that (…) when we
have a lot of [our nationals] going to other countries to work and actually
finding a better place to live, you can have cases, like old cases, that will
only be solved by using other countries’ databases.
(Interview J01)
Following the same reasoning, to indicate the mobility of criminal groups
to richer countries, a forensic geneticist described a criminal case caused by a
group of Serbian and Romanian criminals in Switzerland. According to this
interviewee, it was only possible to solve this crime thanks to a match in
Germany’s genetic database, which contained the genetic profiles of some of
its members:
I remember a case of a team of robbers causing a lot of damage in
Switzerland. They were targeting… very expensive shops with jewellery,
watches and things like that. Three were Serbian and one was Romanian.
During an armed robbery, one of them was injured and a drop of blood
was found on the shop’s windows. And they made the profile, then used it
to check with the databases in Germany, Austria, and so on. They found
the Romanian guy in the German DNA database because several years
before he had been involved in car trafficking (…) This démarche was
very successful for the Swiss police.
(Interview J02)
Traces of suspicion persist and they are operative in the minds of East Eur-
opeans, owing to complex historical and geopolitical intersections between
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power and agency, turning discourses about Eastern Europe fluid and flexible,
and therefore durable (Waever, 2000, p. 261). Construing CEE citizens as a
suspect community is, therefore, a collective action, through which profes-
sionals working with forensic genetics in criminal cases build and reinforce
the idea that East European citizens are prone to migrate to other parts of
Europe and commit crimes. In this context, the co-construction of suspicion
derives from complex geo-political relations, involving certain subjective out-
looks that reproduce a continued reliance on “flexible othering” which, albeit
operating through multiple demarcations, subtly perpetuates dichotomic
notions of East and West, danger, and security (Kuus, 2004).
Conclusion
Considering the historical, social, and political context of European post-
communist societies, it is vital to reflect upon expectations about forensic
genetic technologies, and the views about potential genetic surveillance prac-
tices implemented by the state and police forces. This chapter has addressed
the expectations, concerns, and fears expressed by interviewees in CEE coun-
tries, taking into account the implications of memories aroused by the col-
lective past, namely viewed in the light of the concept of legacy as derived
from the historical transition from totalitarian and authoritarian regimes to
democratic societies. This chapter thereby aimed to account for the re-emer-
gence of unresolved issues concerning the meaning of the past after the fall of
the Iron Curtain and the alleged unification of the European continent under
the banner of representative democracy and capitalism, thus once again
becoming politically significant (Judt, 2009). The prevalence of keeping
returning to a collective past, and invoking national politics through a trau-
matic history, can be considered a particular form of historical consciousness
by which the interviewed forensic geneticists provide meanings to their own
actions and roles in society (Beneduce, 2016; Verovšek, 2016).
The discourses of forensic geneticists in post-communist societies expose
certain concepts of social risks, public good, and the relations of (dis)trust
between the citizens and the state (Granja & Machado, 2019; Jasanoff & Kim,
2015). These are key components for addressing the complex and hybrid forms
of vulnerability to (genetic) surveillance (Svenonius & Björklund, 2018). Just as
the factors influencing the different perceptions about forensic genetic technol-
ogies bear the weight of socio-historical and techno-political backgrounds in a
fragmented and complex way, so too the diverse interpretations of the author-
itarian communist regimes’ legacy pervade discourses of interviewees. The
evocation of the political past in former totalitarian communist regimes is
especially recurrent, reflecting the subjective effects of the influence exerted by
the varying relationships between the state and the citizens, as they transition
from authoritarian regimes to democracy.
Such views display recreations of collective memories related with the con-
tinuous control of the communist states over the social order, the production
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of science, and the organization of public daily life as a whole. Similarly, the
historic legacy of socialism continues to weigh negatively on the public trust
in these countries’ state institutions (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 2010),
namely in terms of the criminal justice system, since the state and the police
controlled courts and sentencing. Collective memories of the past instilled the
widespread belief, still deeply rooted culturally, that the justice system needs
to be more democratic and transparent. Analyzing how meanings and
expectations attributed to forensic genetic technologies in European post-
communist societies result from interactive social processes that project − but
also dispute, silence, and negotiate − interpretations of the past, might pro-
vide an important area of future research in this field.
The European project is not only essential to ensure the mobility of people
and goods, but also to enact and perform a certain “European way” (Barry,
2001). This idea of a “European way” is symbolically important. With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the rhetorical possibility of a “new Europe”
became fathomable − one that could bridge the East−West divide opened by
the Cold War (Sellar, Staddon, & Young, 2009). The acceptance of the so-
called CEE countries into the EU was accompanied by deep societal reforms,
but also by the enhanced possibility of travel for citizens seeking better
opportunities in Western European countries. While the newest members of
the European community might have shared a “utopia of return,” the inclu-
sion into the EU revealed persisting asymmetries between East and West.
Therefore, as Marju Lauristin puts it, from a Western European perspective,
these new members were to be regarded with suspicion and caution: “New
members of the EU were viewed with suspicion, their values, lifestyles and inter-
ests were perceived as alien and ‘non-European’” (Lauristin, 2007, p. 398). Con-
sequently, after their transition to democracy, those countries that comprise the
geopolitical region corresponding to the former Eastern Bloc − post-communist
countries − have been a source of security concerns in Europe. The perception of
weak border control in CEE countries raised fears that they would become
“transit states for crime, drug trafficking, and immigration” (Friis & Murphy,
1999, p. 224). As we have shown in this chapter, representations about the rela-
tionship between criminality and post-communist countries are assimilated and
reaffirmed by the forensic geneticists interviewed in these CEE countries. Such an
association clearly lays the foundations for expectations about the role of genetic
technologies in the criminal justice system and the role of CEE countries within
the Prüm system.
At the same time, the discourses of the forensic geneticists in the CEE
countries pushed attention to the multiple forms in which historical and
national specificities of post-communist societies contribute to what Astrid
Mager (2017) names the “making and unmaking of a European identity”
through technopolitical identities. Instead of speaking of a certain “European
vision,” we should instead look for Europe as a “multiply imagined commu-
nity” in which powerful social actors are struggling to institutionalize their
particular versions of Europe (Jasanoff, 2005, p. 10). The expectations of
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CEE forensic geneticists reveal deep entanglements between technoscientific
and political arrangements by which surveillance has permeated the relation-
ship between the state and the citizen well beyond the end of totalitarian and
authoritarian regimes. In addition, the state expansive surveillance does not
necessarily necessitate using cutting-edge technology in order to orchestrate
control. The views of the forensic geneticists in post-communist countries
showed that penetration of fear and of an overall culture of suspicion is long-
term and even more pervading than sophisticated technologies of genetic
surveillance. Thus, the expectations towards forensic genetic technologies
offer the opportunity to analyze the re-negotiation of meanings on the
transition from repressive past to democracy, but also the transition from
non-technological to technological and genetics-based surveillance (Haggerty &
Samatas, 2010).
More research about the expectations related to the use of forensic genetics
technologies in the context of criminal justice in CEE countries might allow
the field of sociology, criminology and, of course, social studies of science and
technology to become more inclusive. It is also needed to go beyond the the-
oretical and methodological lenses emerging from realities in the countries of
the Northern and Central Europe. But in addition to allowing decolonization
and democratization of knowledge, a study of this type also has the advan-
tage of creating conditions to elucidate the way in which the North-West and
the South-East are socially and historically interconnected and (dis)continued
(Carrington et al., 2016; Pavlovich, 2018; Slade & Light, 2015; Stone, 2018).
Note
1 See also the critical comments elaborated in other academic works, as for example
(Bigo, 2008; Bigo & Guild, 2005; Kuus, 2004; M’charek, Schramm & Skinner,
2014).
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5 The Uses of Familial Searching
In Europe
At The Crossroads Between Expanding
Suspicion And Historical Reparation
Introduction
Between 1983 and 1986 a string of violent attacks and rapes were perpetrated
using the same modus operandi. The victims were middle-aged women, aged
between 18 and 54, returning home alone in the early hours of the morning
from a night out in the Rotherham area of South Yorkshire, England. The
perpetrator always took his victim’s shoes and was nicknamed by the media as
the “Shoe rapist.” Several suspects were detained for questioning at the time,
but the cases remained unsolved.
Twenty years later, the case was reopened. Using DNA samples collected
from the crime scenes and from victims’ bodies, familial searching in the British
National DNA Database (NDNAD) produced a list of 43 people who might be
related to the rapist. The third person investigated by the police, June Lloyd,
had a DNA sample stored in the NDNAD in connection with a drink-driving
offence. Immediately following police contact, she called her brother, James
Lloyd, warning him that officers would be asking him to provide a swab.
Within hours, James Lloyd had called his father to confess having committed
serious offences. When police searched the premises of his workplace, they dis-
covered 124 shoes hidden in a crawl space.1
The Shoe Rapist is one of the first criminal cases in the United Kingdom to be
successfully prosecuted based on familial searching. Familial searching is a
genetic technique that works on the assumption that DNA is inherited and that
members of biologically related families share variable amounts of genetic
material. This technique focuses on finding close matches between DNA pro-
files, rather than perfect matches. The Shoe Rapist case has been repeatedly
referenced and remains a significant example in discussions around familial
searching as a kind of “founding myth” (Prainsack & Toom, 2013) for this
specific investigative technique. By highlighting certain elements in this narra-
tive, presenting only those that lead towards finding “truth” and demonstrating
the technological advantages for justice, such cases serve to remove uncertain-
ties and ethical concerns about the usefulness of biological connections in
identifying crime perpetrators, thus further contributing towards reproducing
DOI: 10.4324/9780429261435-5
narratives that portray “technologies as objective and neutral methods for sol-
ving societal problems” (Prainsack & Toom, 2013, p. 72).
Familial searching is used for two primary purposes: advancing criminal
investigations and assisting civil identification (see Table 5.1). In criminal
investigations, the aim is to identify criminal suspects by finding close mat-
ches through the DNA profile of their relatives. When close matches exist,
there is a probability that the profile obtained at the crime scene, or from the
victim(s), belongs to a close relative of the person in the database − usually
parents, children, or siblings. For civil identification purposes, the same tech-
nical principle holds true (to identify close matches), but in this instance the
aim is to help the search for missing persons and/or the identification of uni-
dentified bodies. Procedures that use DNA have become increasingly relevant
among the set of technologies and strategies used to match unidentified
bodies and/or persons with individuals thought to be their biological relatives,
such as dental records, radiographs, and photographic comparisons.
Civil identification, namely in its uses for identification of human remains
and war crimes in post-conflict settings (Gandsman, 2012; Garibian, 2014;
Moon, 2013), is generally valued and associated with its role in “dignifying”
both the dead and the living. In such contexts, familial searching also enables
forms of sense-making and resignification of past violence and present-day
human atrocities (Schwartz-Marín & Cruz-Santiago, 2017), while at the same
time facilitating the search for family members in processes of truth-making
and reconciliation with the brutality of disappearance, torture, kidnapping,
and even death of loved ones caused by repressive political regimes and dic-
tatorships. Thus, in the field of civil identification, DNA-led identification
tends to represent a mechanism for (re)constituting democracy − that is,
Table 5.1 Types of familial searches
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certain modes of governance, justice, and accountability, through the biology
of the victims (Smith, 2016).
Besides its twofold purpose, familial searching can also be used in different
data sets. The first of these, as outlined in the Shoe Rapist case, involves
conducting searches in criminal DNA databases to identify criminal suspects
by using their genetic connection to biological relatives (Debus-Sherrill &
Field, 2019; Granja & Machado, 2019; Haimes, 2006; Kim et al., 2011; Suter,
2010). The second dataset in which familial searching can be used are intelli-
gence-led DNA mass screenings (Thomas, 2006). That is, procedures invol-
ving the collection of DNA samples from “volunteers” within specific
population groups, to search for potential suspects believed to belong to those
groups, by matching samples with those collected from a crime scene/victim.
Another variant of familial searching might also occur in situations where
laboratory practitioners find an inadvertent partial match while looking for a
perfect correspondence between a certain DNA profile and the biological
material found at a crime scene (Murphy, 2010, p. 9) – what Sara Debys-
Sherril and Michael Field call “partial matching” (Debus-Sherrill & Field,
2019). With regard to civil identification, familial searching is generally con-
ducted in databases for civil identification purposes that aggregate profiles
from unidentified individuals, human remains, and missing persons with pro-
files from biological relatives looking for missing family members.
Each of these different datasets configures specific affected publics (see
Table 5.1). In the case of criminal DNA databases, the affected publics are
criminalized groups (whose profile inclusion in DNA databases is manda-
tory), as well as their close biological relatives. The use of mass screenings
affects individuals in civil society who, regardless of their involvement with
the criminal justice system, “voluntarily” accept to participate, although the
voluntary nature of this procedure will be a topic of discussion throughout
this chapter. This kind of participation implies subjects acknowledging the
potential effects upon their close biological relatives. In the case of partial
matching, conducted ad hoc in the laboratory, the group of affected indivi-
duals is reduced, since only those who were profiled within a particular case,
and their biological relatives, are involved. Finally, familial searches con-
ducted for civil identification purposes affect both the missing – whether dead
or alive –, and their close biological relatives. All the types of familial
searching mentioned above make use of Short Tandem Repeat (STR), the so-
called “non-coding genes” that presumably hold little value other than for
identification purposes (Cole, 2007b) and usually identify close relatives, such
as parents, siblings, or children.
Based on a set of qualitative interviews conducted with forensic geneticists
working in fourteen European countries, in this chapter we will explore how
these professionals perceive the ethical controversies, regulatory challenges,
and logistical issues posed by familial searching. Most of our participants
refer to the uses of familial searching applied to criminal investigations.
However, a small group of the forensic geneticists interviewed also reflect
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upon the implications of familial search uses for civil identification purposes.
Within this framework, we show how forensic geneticists’ discourses around
familial searching provide insights into broader trends that outline a merge of
human-rights forensics with a security-focused DNA identification (Smith,
2017). This movement shows that the increasing expansion of forensic sci-
ences market and commercial interests, fuelled by ideological concerns about
the “global threats” of terrorism and crime, construct the legitimation of
DNA identification efforts within an increasing focus on security (Smith,
2017). Within this scenario, we explore the possibility of locating familial
searching at the intersection between apparently opposite but simultaneously
mutually constitutive rationales – the expansion of suspicion and the care for
the missing – while also describing the implications of those rationales’
increasing embeddedness in the architectures of genetic surveillance.
Legislation and ethical issues of familial searching
Familial searching in criminal DNA databases was first implemented in the
UK in 2002 (Haimes, 2006; Prainsack, 2010) and its use has since been
expanding to other countries. The Netherlands (Simoncelli, 2006) and France
(Pham-Hoai, Crispino, & Hampikian, 2014) introduced legislation allowing
the use of this investigative technique and, more recently, Germany has also
approved the use of familial searching in intelligence-led DNA mass screen-
ings (Amelung, Granja, & Machado, 2020). In other European Union coun-
tries, the situation remains unclear, although criminal cases involving the use
of DNA from relatives to search for criminal suspects have been recorded in
countries such as Spain (Phillips et al., 2017), Poland (Dettlaff-Kakol &
Pawlowski, 2002), and Italy (Jones, 2015).
Countries where familial searching in forensic DNA databases is regulated,
guidelines are typically restrictive and only allow its use in criminal cases
considered serious and whose solution has proved difficult by other means
(Chamberlain, 2012). For example, familial searches conducted by the UK’s
NDNAD are analysed on a case-by-case basis, subject to permission from the
Chairman of the NDNAD Strategy Board and, in some cases, from the
victim (Maguire et al., 2014). Therefore, only a reduced number of criminal
cases are approved to use familial searches in forensic DNA databases. Since
2012 some 120 cases have been authorized for familial searches in the UK
and out of these, nine have been solved through this technique (Biometrics
and Forensics Ethics Group, 2020, p. 11).
The great bulk of scientific publications on the topic of familial searching has
come from the field of socio-legal studies, addressing the ethical issues posed by
the use of this investigative technique (García, Crespillo, & Yurrebaso, 2017;
Haimes, 2006; Kim et al., 2011; Murphy, 2010; Suter, 2010), namely threats to
genetic privacy, sensitive information disclosure, and reproduction of social
inequalities (Machado & Granja, 2020). The debate over genetic privacy
revolves around the question of whether familial searching increases indirect
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surveillance on a certain group of individuals − relatives of potential suspects −
primarily on the basis of their genetic association with someone (Greely et al.,
2006). Sensitive information disclosure poses the problem of a latent risk of
revealing information implied in the use of familial searching. This problem
applies both in the absence or existence of genetic relations (Suter, 2010) and/or
information regarding a person’s involvement with the criminal justice system
previously unknown to other parties. Finally, the reproduction of social
inequalities is discussed in relation to the potential of this technique to reinforce
dominant views about the alleged prevalence of criminality within certain
families (Haimes, 2006). Moreover, it also touches upon familial searching’s
potential to further reproduce the criminalization of certain social groups by
extending the reach of criminal DNA databases (Murphy, 2010) which generally
over represent those groups and social categories that are especially affected by
criminal justice system activity, such as racial and ethnic minorities (Skinner,
2013).
Despite the lively debate stirred around familial searching over the years,
empirical studies on this topic remain scarce. One exception is the study
conducted on a national survey of CODIS Laboratories in the United States
of America about policies, practices and professionals’ views of familial
searching (Debus-Sherrill & Field, 2019). Results show that while perceptions
of familial searching were generally positive − most respondents (87 per cent)
showing a belief in this technique’s potential to assist investigations − parti-
cipants nonetheless shared several concerns regarding familial searching. In
addition to resources issues, appearing as the main concern, 83 per cent of
respondents working in a lab where familial searching was conducted repor-
ted concerns over the risks for civil liberties, against the 30 per cent registered
among respondents working in labs that do not conduct this genetic technique
(Debus-Sherrill & Field, 2019).
In our previous work about familial searching in Europe, we focused on the
uses of this technique in the UK and Poland. More specifically, we outlined
the variability of familial searching in terms of meanings, uses, and regula-
tions (Granja & Machado, 2019). In the UK, familial searching is regulated
on a basis of exceptionality. That is, familial searching can only be used in
criminal cases that are considered serious and have proved difficult to solve by
other investigative means. They must go through a process of selection and
oversight by a regulatory body whose public accountability serves to reinforce
the public trust. In Poland, familial searching is regulated within the frame-
work designed to expand the scope of its applicability in the search and/or
identification of missing persons. As a nation marked by a historical legacy of
missing persons, their identification is framed as an ethically uncontested
public good. Actions taken towards identification of missing persons are
therefore accepted as the kind of public intervention that is conducive to
modes of governance and justice aligned with the establishment and the con-
solidation of an accountable state (Granja & Machado, 2019). In this work
we also demonstrated how familial searching prescribes specific notions of
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social risk, public good, and state accountability. This chapter intends to expand
on this approach, considering the discourses of forensic geneticists based in 14
different European countries. Namely, we focus, on how the shifts between
familial searching for criminal investigation and for historical reparation of past
violence coproduce different perceptions of ethical controversies surrounding
familial searching that carry the weight of sociohistorical and techno-political
backgrounds, as well as contingent and circumstantial notions regarding the
socially legitimate uses of genetic technologies among different societies.
Criminal investigation: expanding suspicion
Perceived ethical issues and logistical challenges
The main debate on the impacts of forensic DNA technologies is focused on how
it affects profiled individuals (suspects, convicted, etc.) (Hindmarsh & Prainsack,
2010). However, familial searching demonstrates heightened collateral inter-
ference on the biological relatives of profiled individuals. This is a central theme
in the discourses of participants, who critically reflect upon the wide ethical
range of implications. One of the most discussed topics among participants is the
latent risk of sensitive information disclosure (Haimes, 2006; Kim et al., 2011;
Suter, 2010). The forensic geneticists we have interviewed expressed significant
concerns about the potential revelation of genetic information that challenges
relationships in ways which might produce disruptive implications in established
kinship structures. In the words of a participant:
More than 25 per cent of offspring, that is, sons and daughters, are not
from the [biological] family. (…) So, familial searching can pose a high
risk and a problem. (…) A problem of who and how [to] handle this
information [regarding kinship]. (…) Because you really can destroy the
whole family. It is a high risk for me.
(Interview L02)
Nonetheless, according to the participants in our study, the risk of disclos-
ing information does not imply ignoring or dismissing the forensic usefulness
of familial searching. Its acknowledgement is the basis of a perceived need to
develop anticipatory approaches and practices (Wienroth, 2018) to avert such
a risk. The following excerpt is by an interviewee who discusses the need to
establish a protocol for such cases, describing how practitioners should pro-
ceed when they find this type of information. In his view, the management of
such information should fall upon prosecutors rather than forensic geneticists.
The responsibility for deciding what to do with such information is thereby
displaced from the production of knowledge and diffused into the realm of
the criminal justice system, specifically assigning it to the prosecution, in such
a way as to protect the autonomy and legitimation of forensic genetics
(Granja & Machado, 2020).
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I have been involved in many cases where reference material was provided
from relatives, but in many instances it turned out that these relatives
were not truly relatives (…) where the legal father is not the biological
father. So I think this is a general problem, and we need to be aware and
prepared for it. But still, I think it should not be restricted, this is the type
of information can be very useful in many cases. (…) The question is
what we should do with this kind of information. Of course, prosecution
should be informed about this, because they provided the reference sam-
ples. What should they do with this information, do they inform the
father about this? I don’t know, it’s not my task (…) I simply report to
the prosecutor.
(Interview G10)
The perceived risks of revealing information about genetic relationships
derives from the relational nature of familial searching. That is, by making
use of genetic connections between individuals, familial searching moves away
from an approach that characterizes bodies as individuated and unique enti-
ties (Cole, 2009) to a relational framework that connects bodies (and iden-
tities) through genetic data. This relationality implies that a body is not an
individual entity: it stands in association with other genetically connected
bodies, even if they are physically removed at a given space and time frame.
This process is achieved by actively constructing genetic ties between indivi-
duals (biological relatives), with the corresponding social sorting, that is,
bodies are framed within police categories (suspect/not suspect) that produce
critical implications for social life, i.e., (non) involvement with the criminal
justice system. Familial searching thereby sheds light into how forensic sci-
ence relates the individual with the collective (M’charek & Wade, 2020). The
forensic geneticists interviewed consider this relational character of familial
searching as ethically challenging, inasmuch as this forensic genetics techni-
que directly interferes with citizens’ right to genetic privacy. According to the
following interviewee, conducting familial searching in criminal DNA data-
bases implies a transgression of the consent given by individuals who were
profiled, who might not have been aware that their DNA would be used to
identify biological relatives. As manifested by an interviewee:
We can set up dragnets; we can run the databases to search, not for
individuals, not for matches between individuals, but for presumable
relatives of [unknown criminal suspect] … And that is absolutely inad-
missible, because it violates all the things that were agreed and contracted
upon construction of [a DNA database]. Namely, the informed consent.
So, you are releasing information on your relatives and there is no way to
make you responsible for that. So that kind of analysis is really difficult to
manage and to tolerate.
(Interview N01)
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The use of familial searching in forensic DNA databases, therefore, fuels
the debate about the rights and duties of the “genetic informant”; the person
whose sample is a partial match with the crime scene sample and who unin-
tentionally implicates family members in criminal investigations (Gabel, 2010;
Murphy, 2010; Suter, 2010). According to interviewees, besides infringing
citizens’ right to genetic privacy, the role of the genetic informant is also
highly contentious as it directly interferes with the right to refuse testifying
against one’s relatives.
I believe we have to lead a very serious discussion with law experts and wider
society if we are to contemplate this option. Because under [national] laws, it
is written that no one can be forced testify against relatives. In the case of
first degree relatives, like a father, son, brother or sister, a person can refuse
to be summoned as a witness and appear in court to testify. And I think the
same should also apply, as a rule, to genetics. Because if you want to change
that, then there must be a very good reason to do it.
(Interview O01)
One other topic discussed by the forensic geneticists when considering the
ethically challenging character of familial searching, regards its discriminatory
potential. The rationale underlying familial searching, i.e. searching for crim-
inal suspects through relatives who have a history of contact/involvement with
the criminal justice system, echoes a dominant notion − circulating across
various spheres of social life − which broadly associates family and crime
(Rose, 2000). According to participants in this study, the link between crime
and family is ethically problematic, inasmuch as it could end up reinforcing
pre-existing notions and assumptions pointing to the alleged prevalence of
crime and criminal behaviour in certain families (Haimes, 2006). According to
the following interviewee, referring to concerns about the problematic associa-
tion made by police in thinking that “crime can have family links,” familial
searching creates two kinds of citizens, corresponding to different entitlements
in relation to genetic privacy.
It’s like producing two types of citizens, those who have relatives on the
database and those who don’t. They don’t have the same rights. The
police think crime can have family links. So, they assume a potential
criminal link between individuals; the element of kinship leads to positive
discrimination, in terms of information, for individuals whose relatives
are not registered in the relevant databases. I don’t think that’s fair, I’m
against it. As an individual, I don’t think it should be allowed. (…) For
that effect I prefer a database including the entire population.
(Interview C05)
Considering the discriminatory potential of familial searching and its
power to reinforce notions of genetic sameness in discourses aligned with a
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dominant narrative of risky and suspect communities (Skinner, 2006, 2018),
this interviewee considers that a universal DNA database would be preferable
(Bieber, Brenner, & Lazer, 2006; Greely et al., 2006; Thomas, 2006). This view is
reasserted by other participants who, considering how familial searching might
render right to privacy more vulnerable, equate the possibility of creating a uni-
versal genetic database for the whole resident population. However, such possi-
bilities raise other issues, such as the potential misuse of genetic data and the
increased incidence of surveillance. In the words of one participant:
[Regarding familial searching] the easiest way to get all the information
would be to have surveillance over everyone: to profile everybody. That
would be the best for the police. (…) it would be useful insofar as getting
the right person in jail, but on the other hand it implies that you have
innocent people and you are searching through them. I don’t know how I
would feel about having no idea what manipulations are being done with
my [DNA] data somewhere. I wouldn’t know what was being searched,
investigated, what was going on. It really is something that would make
one feel to be constantly monitored.
(Interview S04)
In addition to the ethical issues, participants recurrently mentioned the logistical
challenges posed by familial searching. This investigative technology requires a
significant allocation of economic, temporal, and human resources needed to
search, review, and refine the selection and follow up the pool of potential sus-
pects (Flaus, 2013; Greely et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2011) and it can produce lists of
hundreds of potential suspects (Bieber et al., 2006; Kruijver, 2016), many of
whom might be false positives2 (Thomas, 2006). According to participants,
besides considering the ethical challenges posed by familial searching, this is a
technique that implies taking into account availability of resources.
The size of the database, the number of people in it, how we’re likely to
find several candidates we need to investigate, knowing in advance that
probably only one of the candidates is related. So, I feel that is where the
biggest conflict resides. I think that’s the greatest challenge.
(Interview C01)
Familial search takes a lot of time, the success rate is relatively low, below
10% or maybe only a very small percentage, and it means a lot of
laboratory time. Sometimes hundreds of samples, potentially thousands
of samples.
(Interview P02)
Considering Europe’s highly differentiated context in terms of staff and
infrastructures available for forensic science (Amelung et al., 2020) it is clear
that not all countries have the capacity to allocate the required resources to
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conduct familial searching. However, willingness to conduct familial searching
does not reflect only the existence of material and concrete infrastructure and
resources. Complex layers have to be considered when addressing the uses of
familial searching in Europe, namely social, historical, and political aspects that
will influence whether using familial searching is justified or unjustified. Elsewhere
we have demonstrated how the controversies surrounding familial searching are
closely entangledwith notions of social risk, public good, and accountability of the
state, which tend to vary across countries (Granja &Machado, 2019). In addition,
national jurisdictions have differentiated legislation and regulation that might be
more or less prone to accommodate the uses of familial searching, as we will dis-
cuss in more detail in the next section of this chapter.
Regulation (or lack thereof)
As previously mentioned, familial searching has a different regulatory framework
throughout Europe. While some countries have created a particular legislative
framework, such as the Netherlands, the UK, France, and Germany, others lack
any regulation. The regulatory gap usually derives from the obsolescence of legis-
lation created when a division between the coding and non-coding region of DNA
was still scientifically sustained (Cole, 2007a). Familial searching, as well as other
recent forensic DNA technologies, challenge such a division.
For forensic geneticists, the variability found across Europe in terms of
familial searching regulation poses a challenge because, on the one hand, it
runs counter international standardization trends and, on the other, it leaves
ample room for interpretation in countries where regulation is absent.
According to a participant:
The decision makers - politicians, lawyers and ethicists - are not completely
sure of how it is applied in different countries. So, the framework is very…
different; countries do different things. And if you talk to people in [country],
they say: “Sometimes we do it, sometimes we don’t.” Well, what does that
mean? (…) I think that creates problems just to know what is happening.
(Interview C04)
In cases where the possibilities created by familial searching are not
addressed by existing regulatory provisions, several ethical dilemmas emerge.
That is, in countries where explicit regulation is lacking, experts and practi-
tioners might either interpret the perceived regulatory gaps as license to
practice familial searching or as implicitly limiting. This ambiguity is illu-
strated by the following interviewee:
It may be just as likely that this kind of information is allowed in court or
not. Actually, we are in a bit of a limbo, we do not know whether this is
allowed or not.
(Interview O02)
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This ambiguity sets the framework for what Peter Fussey and Ajay Sandhu
(2020) call “surveillance arbitration,” where practitioners are given a wide
scope to interpret regulations and adapt their activities accordingly (Fussey &
Sandhu, 2020). Surveillance arbitration, therefore, implies that even in coun-
tries where familial searching is forbidden or non-regulated, there might be
attempts to use this investigative technique. This is reported by one of our
interviewees, detailing requests in this kind of scenario:
I think that, providing a sufficiently important case pops up, it is going to
happen (…) I get emails from countries where familial searching is cer-
tainly not allowed, from countries where they are not supposed to have
any databases with this, but obviously what happens is that, if the case is
sufficiently important or if it is related to, say, terrorism, this is going to
happen anyway. I mean, there are cases where they kind of bypass the
law.
(Interview Q02)
Finally, there are also cases in which regulation is a work-in-process. This
“regulatory lag” (Fussey & Sandhu, 2020) usually stems from the fact that
technological capabilities emerge at a faster pace than the legislative process,
as outlined by one of the interviewees: “You know, often the science moves
much faster than the legislative process” (Interview D12). It also applies in
the case of countries where the legislation in the process of moving from
considering familial searching illegal to allowing the use of these techniques,
as explained in the following excerpt:
In some cases, they [police officers] wanted to [use familial searching], but
it is really not legal. But they knew about the techniques. So, in some
cases, when they have really extremely high-class cases, top cases, they
send [samples] and ask: “If it is possible please do some familial search
because we are lost.” (…) The project has been finished, we have finalized
all conclusions, so the methodology is available. But we have to wait -
they have to wait -until the legislative background is available. We have
the modification of the actual database law in that sense, that it allows
this kind of service.
(Interview P02)
Regardless of the regulatory landscape in each particular country – regulated,
regulatory gap, or on-going regulation – it is clear that one major factor
influencing the existence or absence of regulation on familial searching is the
occurrence of high-profile criminal cases that can be used to justify and
legitimize its implementation. In this context, it is important to recall the rape
and murder of Marianne Vaastra, which has become a “paradigmatic case”
in the Netherlands, owing to the array of debates involved (M’charek, Toom,
& Jong, 2020). In 1999 a girl named Marianne Vaatstra was murdered in a
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rural area in the Netherlands. In 2007, following the advice of an expert from
a private forensic services company, Marianne’s father pushed for familial
searching. At the time, the use of this forensic genetic technique was not leg-
ally permitted in the Netherlands. However, familial searching technology
was considered particularly suitable to the Vaatstra case. Consequently, sev-
eral parties involved in the case began to push for the regulation of this
technology, as explained by the following participant:
Take the Marianne Vaastra case as one of the examples for why we
should accept kinship techniques. The beauty of the case was that it pro-
vided all the practical examples for considering it a good idea, at the
same time showing that issues of privacy didn’t really apply.
(Interview A07)
High-profile cases are construed by contemporary societies as public, crime
and justice-related dramas, to a large extent influenced and fueled by media
narrative constructions whose purpose is to summon emotional public sup-
port by appealing to feelings of compassion and sympathy for the victims
while at the same time nourishing feelings of moral repulsion towards crim-
inal suspects (Machado & Santos, 2009). As recognized by the following
interviewee, such cases thus function as the perfect outlet to demonstrate the
potential benefits of using a particular technology designed to identify crim-
inal suspects, in ways that capture public support.
If you go back to the source and ask yourself: “Well, what is the differ-
ence between Marianne Vaastra and, let us say, another case nobody ever
heard of?” Well, the only difference is that this type of cases exploded in
the media and were put under a magnifying lens. And because of that,
everybody gets nervous, annoyed, and impatient to get it solved.
(Interview A07)
In 2012 the use of familial searching was approved in the Netherlands,
aligned with this country’s track record of innovation regarding the regulation
and practical application of genetic technologies for forensic purposes (Ame-
lung et al., 2020). In the light of this, although familial searching was not the
key-technology responsible for identifying the suspect in the Vaatstra case, it
remained relevant as this was the criminal case responsible for pushing the
regulation of the investigative technique forward in the Netherlands (Winter
et al., 2019).
Other countries, where the use of familial searching is regulated, have also
reported high-profile cases in which familial searching played a role, such as
the case of Elodie Kulik in France (Pham-Hoai et al., 2014) and several cases
in the UK (Williams & Johnson, 2006), such as the case of the Shoe Rapist
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. In Germany − a country where
familial searches are forbidden in the national DNA database, but allowed in
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mass screenings − the influence of high-profile criminal cases to change reg-
ulation is also visible. The German legislative framework in this area can be
traced to a criminal case occurred in the northern German town of Dörpen,
where a mass screening was conducted on the aftermath of a rape case. Par-
tial matches between crime-scene DNA profiles of the perpetrator and of the
brothers’ profiles led to the identification of a young man as a prime suspect
(Roewer, 2013, p. 7). In 2012 Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court ruled
against future use of evidence derived from familial searching in court.
However, in November 2013 the German government decided to legalize
familial searching when used as part of a DNA dragnet (Lee, 2016, p. 218).
This decision was controversial, in view of the court ruling from the previous
year, determining the lack of any legal basis for using familial searching in
that context (Lee, 2016, p. 218). Yet, in 2017, the legislator legalized familial
searching with the “DNA-Beinahetreffer.” Table 5.2 provides a synthesis of
diverse topics related to regulation and practices surrounding familial
searching in Europe.
In sum, there is a complex regulatory scenario across Europe, influenced by
the variable balances between the weight of sociohistorical backgrounds and
trajectories of implementing forensic genetic technologies in criminal identifi-
cation. This opens scenarios of surveillance arbitration (Fussey & Sandhu,
2020) – that is, forensic practitioners face a wide latitude to interpret regula-
tions (or lack thereof) regarding familial searching and therefore adapt their
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activities accordingly with scarce guidance. In view of this, existence of criminal
high-profile criminal cases are frequently mobilized as outlets for “building-up”
the uses of controversial technologies such as familial searching. Regardless of
each country’s legislative framework, the forensic geneticists interviewed showed
awareness of the need for an ethical debate over the risks and benefits of using
familial searching, as we will explain in the next section of this chapter.
Politics of legitimation
Forensic geneticists interviewed in this study believe that an ethical delibera-
tion over familial searching is largely missing in most countries. Participants
consider that familial searching should be framed as part of a responsible and
accountable innovation framework which considers this technology’s potential
applications, utility and risks. In an area framed by complex politics of legit-
imation and contestation (Granja & Machado, 2020; Skinner, 2018), forensic
geneticists call for the need to address at least some aspects of what social
scientist Matthias Wienroth calls the “RULE” framework: Reliability, Utility
and LEgitimacy (Wienroth, 2020). As the following quotation shows,
according to participants in this study, an ethically grounded debate over
familial searching would ideally entail a comprehensive analysis of the utility
of this technology, by reflecting upon its limitations and effective uses.
So, I do not see anyone discussing the pros and cons of familial search-
ing; as far as I know the [law] only states that familial searching cannot
be done, and that’s it. So, this should be discussed and we should also
look at where this is done. See whether it is successful or not and make a
comprehensive evaluation, including the ethical aspects. (…) But in gen-
eral, I think [country] should allow this [technique] with certain rules,
evaluating the pros and cons and seeing if it works.
(Interview O09)
Besides considering the utility of familial searching, participants also reflect
upon issues of social legitimacy. One of the main issues mentioned by inter-
viewees regarding an ethical debate about familial searching, concerns the
crimes for which the use of this investigative technique should be considered
legitimate. Therefore, interviewees reflect upon the criteria that constitute
good practice/use (Wienroth, 2020). In this regard, forensic geneticists usually
defend the selective use of familial searching. Thus, most interviewees agree
that this technology should be restricted to serious criminal cases with a high
social impact. Framing familial searching as a technology that might provide
useful contribution when all other means have failed, forensic geneticists
therefore justify the infringement of the right to genetic privacy with its
potentially positive social implications: solving serious criminal cases that
have caused serious harm to society, using means that uphold public security
and social justice.
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I think it should also be restricted. I think familial searching is very
challenging. (…) When the case has high impact, everything should be
done. With collegial decisions, because it directly violates some other
basic rights over your own data of your genetic data as well. It should be
a very restricted use, I think.
(Interview O06)
And I can understand that there may be very severe crimes where you
would like to use that method. But then there should be very clear rules
in place to rule on what is ethically acceptable or defensible in the use of
that method.
(Interview O01)
One other significant topic discussed by participants in this study has to do
with deciding the dataset that should be used to conduct familial searches, a
topic which refers to issues of reliability. For criminal investigation purposes,
there are two main options: conducting familial searching in pre-established
forensic DNA databases and/or arrange a mass screening to conduct familial
searching. While reflecting upon these options, some interviewees argued that
familial searching should be mainly used in forensic DNA databases as it
increases its usefulness, with reduced extra costs.
If you do this [familial search] in a database search, fair enough, because
basically it does not cost you extra. If you do this in a mass screening
there is a problem, because it does [emphasis] cost extra. And the idea
that the perpetrator participates in such a dragnet, at least the prob-
ability, is small.
(Interview A02)
Some interviewees actually believe that familial searches are a useful tool to
counterweigh decisions that have limited the range of DNA databases sub-
stantially. In this regard, we should recall the “S. and Marper” case
(Amankwaa & McCartney, 2018), which led to a decision by the European
Court of Human Rights to destroy the samples of non-convicted persons in
the NDNAD. Such decision led to the implementation of the Protections of
Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) in the UK. Since PoFA was implemented, over
1.7 million forensic DNA profiles from innocent individuals have been
deleted, and over 7.7 million DNA samples have been destroyed (Amankwaa
& McCartney, 2018, p. 119). According to the following participant, the use
of familial searches in the UK’s NDNAD is able to counteract the shrinking
of the database:
From an ethical point view, I am in favour of familial searching, because
it makes the database more efficient and useful in more cases. (…) But
also, I think it has been a response to the fact that in the UK the number
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of database profiles has decreased, so you have to do it; the police are
looking for ways to increase the usefulness of the database with less
entries. So, you know, if a sibling is eliminated from a database, because
they have not actually been convicted of a crime, they can still be identi-
fied in the familial search, it recovers some of that usefulness, if you
understand what I mean.
(Interview C04)
The other dataset that can be used to conduct familial searches are mass
screenings. According to some interviewees, this option is preferable, as it
ensures that all participants are aware that their DNA can be used to iden-
tify biological relatives. That is, in the case of familial searches conducted in
forensic DNA databases, informed consent about the intended and future
uses of the contributed DNA is somehow blurred (did donors willingly
consent to the use of their biological materials to prosecute their family
members criminally?) (Granja & Machado, 2019). In the case of mass
screenings, participating individuals tend to provide samples “voluntarily”
and are fully aware of its potential uses and implications, not only for them
but also for relatives.
In many other countries, they use it for database searches. Here, they use
it only for mass screening and at least the law states that all people par-
ticipating should know it is not only used to check them (…) [it might
also] have implications for their any nearest relatives. So, it’s very impor-
tant that people are aware about this.
(Interview O08)
The participation is completely voluntary and people who participate
must be educated about the possibility that a first degree relative may be
involved.
(Interview O01)
This position, however, is not consensual among forensic geneticists. Other
participants showed significant concerns over the alleged “voluntary” nature
of mass screenings. Although mass screenings do not tend to be mandatory,
whenever someone refuses to participate, there is a tendency to immediately
perceive that person as a potential suspect. This kind of rationale, conse-
quently, raises the question of knowing what constitutes voluntary participa-
tion (to a critical view of this see Duster, 2006).
The screening wasn’t mandatory, but if you declined you had to provide a
reason, which, in a certain way, can be considered coercive; and actually,
around that time some bioethics groups claimed “Look, the screening
doesn’t look too voluntary.”
(Interview C01)
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If you have a brother who is asked to give a voluntary sample and he
says: “Actually no, I am not really comfortable with this,” then he
becomes immediately a suspect. So, there must be an ethical dimension to
that. It is actually not voluntary at all.
(Interview D12)
Seeing as ethics is increasingly considered part of the “epistemic toolkit of
science” (Bliss, 2012), participants reflect upon how familial searching, as a
technological innovation, should incorporate values beyond scientific valida-
tion – namely, reliability, utility, and legitimacy (Wienroth, 2020) − by enga-
ging with a transparent, accountable and inclusive public debate. The
different viewpoints on the uses of familial searching, therefore, fit into what
we call the “politics of legitimation” that are being shaped by various forms
of discursive boundary-work, whereby the forensic geneticists construct legit-
imate uses of this technology potential applications, its utility and risks. This
ethical deliberation follows a line of reasoning that we have also encountered
in previous works, in which we invited members of the forensic geneticists
based in Europe to tell us about their views about another controversial
genetic technology: forensic DNA phenotyping (Granja & Machado, 2020,
see also Chapter 6 in this volume).
Civil identification: bringing historical reparation
There are two apparently conflicting perspectives forensic geneticists’ percep-
tion of familial searching. The first of these, explored in the previous section
of this chapter and more commonly found in Central and Northern European
countries, focuses on familial searching’s uses to identify criminal suspects,
consequently expanding suspicion. Another approach considers the uses of
familial searching to support scientific and technological initiatives directed at
identifying “missing persons,” a term which, rather than focus on the causes
of death, is becoming increasingly employed to refer the dead, the dis-
appeared, the murdered, or even the “martyred,” in a way that renders the
different histories and, consequently, their variable political implications,
invisible (Smith, 2017, p. 399). Within this framework of civil identification,
DNA tends to be framed by a humanitarian rationale (Scully, 2014), which is
perceived as having mostly positive outcomes.
Within the present study, discourses that point to civil identification have
shown to be more common in countries with a recent history of repression by
totalitarian regimes, as in the case of some Eastern and Southern European
countries. In this regard, Poland − a country historically affected by the phe-
nomenon of disappearance among its population (Colls, 2016) − is particu-
larly relevant, having promoted several programs to identify “the missing.”
Among these, we find two examples that are particularly noteworthy. The first
of these involves the GeNN consortium, 3 established between ITAKA Foun-
dation − Center for Missing Persons, Warsaw’s Central Forensic Laboratory
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and Agencja Interaktywna Esencja Studio. The consortium aims to search for
long-term missing persons and to identify unidentified buried bodies. Profiles
of missing persons are obtained through the genetic material provided by the
families of persons who disappeared before the January 1, 2004 and inserted
into the catalogue of the National DNA Database for missing persons.
The other program involves the Polish Genetic Database for the Victims of
Totalitarianism (www.pbgot.pl), created in 2012 and supported by the Pomer-
anian Medical University in Szczecin and the Institute of National Remem-
brance − Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation.
The aim of this database is to identify the remains of unidentified victims of
Communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes. This is an autonomous database
(not connected to the Polish forensic DNA database) containing genetic infor-
mation on material collected during exhumations, genetic information from
relatives of victims of totalitarian regimes and historical and archaeological
data (Ossowski et al., 2016).
Poland, however, is not the only case evincing concerted efforts to identify
the missing. Other Eastern European countries equally affected by the dis-
appearance of citizens (Pexa et al., 2018), also recurrently use familial
searching for purposes of civil identification. As the following interviewee
explains, indeed, this technology is much more frequently employed in the
field of civil identification than in criminal investigations:
If [familial searching] is useful to solve any crimes, we have no restriction
for this. (…) For missing persons, we do this very often. (…) Not for
crimes because it is one – I already told you – information which I would
not like to say to an investigator, because the amount of work will
increase. So that is it.
(Interview L02)
The kinds of programs that search and identify “the missing” are usually per-
ceived by most participants as having mostly positive outcomes. According to
the majority of our interviewees, the identification of missing persons allows to
(re)connect persons and bodies with their social relationships and identities
(Schwartz-Marín & Cruz-Santiago, 2017) thus bringing families’ liminality of
uncertainty to a close (Haimes & Toom, 2014). Such positive outcomes are
outlined by several interviewees, as the following quotation from a forensic
expert directly involved with cases of missing persons illustrates:
And it is also very important for us that families looking for relatives will
have the answer to their question, since for many years they have lived
without information about their relatives.
(Interview G01)
Besides Eastern European countries, we find another group of countries
where the potential uses of familial searching for civil identification purposes
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is frequently mentioned as a means to compensate families that have suffered
traumatic losses in the past. A case in point is that of soldiers who went
missing in action in wars instigated by dictatorial regimes in southern Eur-
opean countries with their African colonies, as highlighted in the following
interview quotation:
Returning a body to the family, contributing to discover what happened
to that person at the time of his/her death, how he/she died, etc.; all of
that is very important because there is a feedback, I mean, there is
reparation; a social benefit (…) Portuguese military had died 40 years ago
and their families were still waiting, right? So, mourning can only take
place when the body is found […]
(Interview N05)
Thus, confidence in the power of DNA to reveal the identities of the dead
offers a path towards resolving serious national concerns and assuaging
complex sociohistorical problems, by identifying misidentified corpses, ful-
filling relatives’ “right to know” (Garibian, 2014) and also bringing respon-
sible actors to justice, as outlined by the following interviewee:
We can actually contribute to change things, and it can also lead to
incriminate those responsible, right? People who committed murders, etc.,
in the domain of crimes against humanity. In cases of crimes against
humanity there is also the intention to take those responsible to trial and
that is important.
(Interview N05)
DNA-led approaches to the identification of missing people is, therefore,
perceived as a use of science that serves the public good and contributes
toward establishing a democratic and accountable state, while helping over-
come historical traumas by providing closure to victims of past totalitarian
political regimes (Granja & Machado, 2019). These kinds of programs show
how the concept of re(con)stitution, proposed by Lindsay Adams Smith in the
context of human-rights forensics in post-conflict Argentina, also applies to
other contexts. Re(con)stitution outlines how “the individual restitution of
identity is tied to national constitutions of democratic transition” (Smith,
2016, p. 1040). Therefore, in such contexts, DNA identification functions as a
political mechanism for building post-conflict and post-dictatorship democ-
racies (Smith, 2016).
Between control and care
As explained in the course of this chapter, across Northern and Central Eur-
opean countries, familial searching is repeatedly associated with criminal jus-
tice efforts and often criticized as part of an expanding system of genetic
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surveillance. In Eastern and Southern Europe, familial searching is recur-
rently mentioned in connection with DNA-led identification of missing per-
sons and, therefore, interpreted as a tool for guaranteeing human rights and
re(cons)tituting democracy (Smith, 2017). The interviews we have conducted
across Europe corroborated such trends very clearly. Nonetheless, it also
becomes clear that rationales, which at first sight might be considered con-
flicting, namely controlling offenders and caring for the missing, are becom-
ing increasingly embedded in shared infrastructures of control.
Substantial body of literature has described how the control of mobility
across borders – whether directed at migration control and/or law enforce-
ment – has contributed to justify, implement, and normalize complex data-
base infrastructures and increase transnational police and judicial
collaboration within Europe (Aas, 2006, 2013; Amelung et al., 2020). Two
prominent examples of how DNA-led identification has been used in migra-
tion control pertain to the use of ancestry tests to determine the nationality of
migrants (Abel, 2018; Tutton, Hauskeller, & Sturdy, 2014) and the use of
genetic material as a source of evidence in family reunification claims (Heinemann
et al., 2015). However, less attention is paid to how “the missing” have been justi-
fying a parallel and less visible emerging security − and disaster − focused identi-
fication grounded in global law enforcement (Smith, 2017). This trend is especially
important, not only because it opens another avenue for expanding genetic sur-
veillance, but also because it does so based on a humanitarian rationale. As
observed by Nina Amelung, Rafaela Granja and Helena Machado (2020, p. 24)
“the dominant policy narrative argues that this merging facilitates police coopera-
tion on missing and unwanted persons as well as border control cooperation
regarding the mobility of migrants in irregular situations” [italics added].
With the aim of enforcing transnational cooperation, the architecture of
resources, policies, funding and experts increasingly merges efforts to identify
missing persons with a security-focused forensic genetics (Smith, 2017).
Transnational mechanisms of data exchange, such as Prüm, stand out in this
context. Prüm is a pan-European system for reciprocal automated searching
and comparison of DNA profile information (as well as fingerprints and
vehicle registration data) intended to bolster cross-border cooperation, parti-
cularly in the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime (see Chapter 3).
Within Prüm, DNA files exchanged across countries cover a wide range of
data categories, including convicted persons, suspects, crime stains, victims,
unidentified persons, unidentified human remains, missing persons, relatives
of missing persons, and others (Amelung et al., 2020).
As shown in Table 5.3, 14 countries exchange data from missing persons
(EU Council, 2021): Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia. In addition, Malta exchanges data from relatives of missing
persons. This trend has been gaining momentum over the years, as can be
seen by the number of countries that have started to exchange this kind of
data since the system first became operational. In addition to missing persons
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and their relatives, countries are also actively exchanging data regarding uni-
dentified persons (exchanged by 14 countries) and unidentified human
remains (exchanged by 18 countries) – see Table 5.3.
Therefore, it is clear that there has been a push to embed the scope of
national missing persons’ search and identification systems within an interna-
tional framework, anchored in transnational collaboration and based on a
criminal justice model. Such a move, mostly invisible but nonetheless power-
ful, has been legitimized by three main factors: first, since the scientific pro-
cesses are identical, there is an inclination to treat different situations
independently of their broader context (Smith, 2017); second, the state-of-the-
art resources available for credible identification as well as their infra-
structures are already in place for criminal investigation and could be equally
used use for civil identification purposes; third, a closer link between criminal
investigation and civil identification facilitated by alliances with the interna-
tional community, with global reach.
As outlined by Lindsay Adams Smith “It [is] not the similarity of experi-
ence that bound these various missing together, but the power of a scientific
tool for rendering them identified” (Smith, 2017). Different uses of DNA-
identification, namely control and care are, therefore, being amalgamated into
a single political project aimed at expanding genetic surveillance. The impli-
cations of the interchange between control and care are two-fold: first, it
allows to mitigate ethical concerns related to the expansion of complex
architectures of control (Hufnagel & McCartney, 2017; Machado & Granja,
2018; McCartney, 2014; Prainsack & Toom, 2010, 2013; Toom, Granja, &
Ludwig, 2019), now re-legitimized under the care rationale. Second, as global
security increasingly becomes the main basis for DNA-identification projects,
initiatives based upon human rights lose their foothold and are refocused on
antiterrorism and individual crime (Smith, 2017).
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter we have shown how familial searching creates
opportunities for “processes of restitution [that can] sit alongside those of
discipline and control” (M’charek & Wade, 2020, p. 324). We explored the
discourses of forensic geneticists that revealed how social processes and ethi-
cal controversies are situated at the intersection of two distinct but still related
rationales: expanding suspicion, by assisting criminal investigations and pro-
viding historical reparation and healing of collective trauma through support
for programmes focused on the identification of missing persons.
When referring to the use of familial searching to identify criminal sus-
pects, forensic geneticists usually point out the infringement of genetic priv-
acy, its discriminatory potential, as well as familial searching’ logistical
challenges. Our analysis also shows that the heterogeneous scenario across
Europe in terms of regulation, not only stems from different understandings
of the ethical issues posed by familial searching but is also influenced by each
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country’s tradition in terms of technoscientific innovation and, even more
importantly, by the occurrence (or absence) of a high-profile criminal case
that can be construed as a public drama and mobilized as an outlet to
demonstrate the potential of this technology. Thereby, familial searching, finds
itself in a “liminal space” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999), that is, a transitional and
transformative state in which “the values and the norms of one stage have been
left behind and the values and the norms of the later stage have not yet been
reached” (Derksen, 2010). This implies that while some countries, such as the
UK, the Netherlands, France, and Germany, have already produced legislation
contemplating the specificities of this technology, others remain in a regulatory
lag which opens the door to “surveillance arbitration” (Fussey & Sandhu, 2020).
That is, a situation in which practitioners must decide in each case whether or
not to use familial searching. Nonetheless, forensic geneticists clearly see the
need to engage familial searching within a framework of responsible research
and innovation regardless of each country’s regulatory situation, calling for an
ethically informed debate centred around notions of reliability, utility, and
legitimacy (Wienroth, 2020). As a result, interviewees’ responses reflect their
positions and views about the on-going complex politics of legitimation that
frame the use of familial searching in the criminal justice system.
A small group of forensic geneticists, mostly based in Eastern and Southern
European countries dealing with a recent legacy of authoritarian regimes, also
refer to the uses of familial searching for purposes of civil identification. Fol-
lowing this rationale, technology is framed as a positive endeavour, able to
provide historical reparation and heal collective traumas through the biology
of victims (Haimes & Toom, 2014; Schwartz-Marín & Cruz-Santiago, 2017;
Smith, 2016). Familial searching is, therefore, interpreted as a re(con)stitu-
tion-facilitating instrument (Smith, 2016).
As this framework of humanitarian DNA identification, focused on identify-
ing victims of totalitarian and post-conflict regimes, becomes increasingly
embedded in DNA-led identification efforts, we witness the consolidation of a
type of depoliticized and scientifically grounded work being used universally in
cases of natural disasters, migration, domestic crime, extra-state violence and
terrorism (Smith, 2017). This sheds light on how the potential of familial
searching to transition between criminal investigation purposes and civil identi-
fication efforts signals a subtle but still powerful shift from human-rights foren-
sics towards emerging security and disaster-focused identification, grounded in
global law enforcement (Smith, 2017). Such a trend is clearly demonstrated by
the established architectures of crime control, such as Prüm system, which
increasingly incorporates and exchanges data related to the missing in ways that
mitigate concerns over the indiscriminate expansion of genetic surveillance.
Notes
1 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1524209/Shoe-Rapist-kept-store-of-
stilettos-as-trophies.html (last access November 12, 2020).
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2 Invalid matches that, if followed, might lead to miscarriages of justice.
3 www.projektgenn.pl/o-nas.
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6 Expanding Genetic Informativity
Through Emerging Technologies
The Cases of Forensic DNA Phenotyping
and Next Generation Sequencing
Introduction
Innovations in the field of forensic genetics continuously seek to provide
answers to practical and common exigencies of criminal investigations. In the
early stages of DNA use as evidence in the courts (in the late 1980s), the most
recurrent problem for scientists was to respond to concerns about the quality
of laboratory processes and the reliability of sample collection, preservation,
contamination processes, etc. (Lynch, 2013; Lynch et al., 2008; Lynch &
McNally, 2003). Another topic of dispute had to do with developing trusted
standardization strategies for the estimation of the random match prob-
abilities deemed relevant for reasoning about the significance of DNA mat-
ches in determining particular instances of fact (Amorim, 2012; Kruse, 2013).
While these concerns are still voiced and controversies not yet fully resolved,
in the 2000s, the ambitions of innovation in forensic genetics moved to a dif-
ferent level: to amplify the possibilities of genetic informativity by introducing
direct or indirect analysis of DNA coding regions.
The exceptional richness of information in genetic data, and the idea of the
distinctively informative potential of genetics, had a powerful impact on the
creation of legislation regulating the use DNA technologies in the criminal
justice system in different states around the world (Hindmarsh & Prainsack,
2010). Much of the existing legislation on the collection and use of DNA in
Europe emphasizes the restriction of forensic DNA to “non-coding” or
“uninformative” regions of the human genome (Nuffield Council on Bioethics,
2007; Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016). This “non-coding” region was con-
sidered to be only informative for distinguishing between two DNA donors and
therefore commonly considered not to constitute a breach of privacy or sensitive
information.
This chapter addresses two examples of emerging forensic genetic technol-
ogies that amplify the possibilities of genetic informativity and create frictions
between non-coding and coding DNA, with important implications in genetic
surveillance: forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) and next generation sequen-
cing (NGS). Another example of the expansion of genetic informativity as an
DOI: 10.4324/9780429261435-6
aid to criminal investigation activities, which we will briefly discuss in the
final section of this chapter, is found in long-range familial searches, con-
ducted in recreational DNA databases to detect genetic relatedness with the
purpose of identifying criminal suspects (Granja, 2020; Kennett, 2019;
Murphy, 2018). The expansion of genetic informativity will inevitably lead to
new paths for genetic surveillance, with an enhanced potential for increasing
discrimination and stigmatization that might infringe human rights, funda-
mental freedoms or the human dignity of an individual, family, group or
community. An overview of the aims, differences, and commonalities of FDP,
NGS, and long-range familial search is summarized in Table 6.1.
Despite the ethical and legal controversies at stake, these technologies are
attracting wide interest among scientists, commercial providers, and stake-
holders of the criminal justice system (Granja & Machado, 2020; Samuel &
Prainsack, 2019; Wienroth, 2020a). This chapter explores the expectations
created around FDP and NGS and their application in the realm of criminal
investigations among members of the European community of forensic
geneticists. Studying the views conveyed by this professional group allows us
to understand the ongoing transitions and transformations in the use of for-
ensic genetics in the governance of crime (Machado & Granja, 2020), pro-
viding relevant objects for a critical assessment to discern the robustness,
reliability, and utility of these technologies in the present and future of crim-
inal investigations. Our analysis is based on 47 qualitative interviews con-
ducted with 49 forensic geneticists based in 14 different European countries.
Inspired by the analytical lens of the sociology of expectations, this chapter
will address the following research questions: which promises and hopes,
Table 6.1 Technologies that expand genetic informativity
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along with concerns and anxieties, over present and future capabilities are
associated with FDP and NGS? How do the expectations created by FDP
and NGS influence how forensic geneticists construct and perform the legiti-
macy of their expertise? How do they manage the tensions between opening
up new opportunities for research in the field of forensic genetics and the
uncertainties of their application to case work?
This chapter will show that expectations around innovations in the field of
forensic genetics might profoundly change contemporary views about (diver-
ging) principles of legitimacy (or lack thereof) regarding the use of genetic data
in criminal investigation, while opening up new paths for defining the nature and
limits of criminal identification, as well as to establish what the governance of
forensic genetics should be allowed and willing to inspect. Some of the main
findings and insights gained from this study might be taken up for comment and
critique on future-oriented practices including scenarios and foresight (Brown &
Michael, 2003; Hedgecoe, 2010; Hedgecoe & Martin, 2003; Wienroth, 2020b).
Locating FDP and NGS in the broader trajectory of forensic genetics
According to Matthias Wienroth and colleagues (2014), the scientific and
technological innovations in forensic genetics might be framed within four
waves: the first wave relates to establishing the robustness of DNA profiling
and creating the legitimacy of its status as criminal evidence in court (Jasan-
off, 1995; Lynch et al., 2008). The second wave concerns the establishment
and development of national criminal DNA databases, and the creation of
international standards and harmonization of procedures for internalization
of DNA database and profile exchange (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010;
Machado & Granja, 2018; McCartney, Wilson & Williams, 2011; Prainsack
& Toom, 2010, 2013). The third wave comprises the development and
increasing application of technologies that go beyond individual identification
(Wienroth, Morling & Williams, 2014), namely familial searching (see Chap-
ter 5) and FDP (Amelung, 2021; Amelung & Machado, 2021; Granja &
Machado, 2019, 2020; Granja, Machado & Queirós, 2020; Queirós, 2021;
Samuel & Prainsack, 2019; Wienroth, 2020a).
For the last two decades, research groups and commercial providers have
been developing new analysis methods aimed at providing answers to more
complex cases, in which traditional DNA profiling techniques do not offer a
satisfactory solution. Typically, situations where a biological sample is found
at a crime scene, but the criminal investigation cannot advance based on
genetic information. Circumstances in which the biological traits found at the
crime scene are not useful for locating potential criminal suspects occur, for
example, in the absence of a match between the crime scene profile and the
subject profiles contained in criminal DNA databases. Third wave technolo-
gies are designed to provide answers to these kinds of inconsistencies, and
therefore are expected to help solve serious criminal cases that otherwise
would run out of satisfactory leads to identify offenders.
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FDP began to be developed in the early 2000s (Kayser & Schneider, 2009).
It can be broadly described as a set of techniques that aim to infer externally
visible physical features in humans – eye, hair, and skin color – and biogeo-
graphical ancestry of criminal suspects, through analysis of biological mate-
rials collected at crime scenes (Kayser, 2015; Kayser & de Knijff, 2011).
FDP’s distinctive feature is that it does not aim to provide data capable of
identifying unique individuals on a probabilistic basis, but instead points
towards a collective dimension of suspicion (M’charek, 2008). FDP technol-
ogies have already been applied in different jurisdictions in a very limited
number of high-profile cases (Wienroth, 2018). However, its regulation is
subject to considerable controversies, as the German debate has so illustra-
tively shown (Amelung, 2021; Amelung & Machado, 2021). FDP use in
criminal investigation is also still highly controversial, owing to persisting
concerns about its robustness, reliability and potential for flawed interpreta-
tion of the probabilistic nature of its results (Granja et al., 2020; Granja &
Machado, 2020; Wienroth, 2020b). In addition, several authors have also
expressed concerns that research in the field of FDP might be an attempt to
lay a scientific foundation for racial categorization and that FDP’s opera-
tional application might consolidate racial discrimination (M’charek, 2020;
M’charek, Toom & Jong, 2020; Queirós, 2021; Skinner, 2018). Scientists and
stakeholders of the criminal justice system tend to declare that FDP is helpful
informing police priorities and reducing a suspect pool (Samuel & Prainsack,
2018b; Wienroth, 2018).
The fourth wave of innovation in forensic genetics, according to Matthias
Wienroth and colleagues (2014), is marked by the arrival of NGS, which aims
to provide a comprehensive DNA profile comprising short tandem repeat,
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP), mitochondrial, and Y-chromosome
DNA for forensic genetics. NGS is a term used to describe DNA sequencing
technologies whereby multiple pieces of DNA are sequenced in parallel. NGS
is also known as massive parallel sequencing or high throughput sequencing,
and the terms are often used interchangeably. In this chapter, we will use the
term NGS.
NGS has started to be developed in bioengineering and biomedicine in the
late 1990s and equipment has been commercially available since 2005. Since
the 2010s NGS has been attracting interest in the field of forensic genetics.
However, its uses in this specific field are still at an exploratory phase, and no
concrete application in case work is yet known. Forensic geneticists point out
that recent technological developments made possible by NGS promise an
outbreak of genetic data that will revolutionize forensic genetics (Amorim &
Pinto, 2018; Budowle, Schmedes & Wendt, 2017; Yang, Xie & Yan, 2014).
The promised potential benefits to criminal investigation include increased
speed, efficiency, sensitivity, and depth of information gathered from DNA
(de Knijff, 2019; Scudder et al., 2018). Another expected advantage of NGS is
its higher multiplexing capacity to combine different genetic markers, there-
fore allowing different types of DNA markers to be obtained in just one
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analysis. In addition, NGS is expected to help FDP analysis (among many
other applications), as it might provide more informative DNA markers to
ancestry prediction and biogeographic origin. Contrary to FDP – which, as
mentioned earlier, does not aim to identify uniqueness – the NGS techniques
promise to allow searching for “discernible uniqueness”: for example, NGS
techniques are considered to be a real breakthrough in distinguishing identical
twins (Amorim & Pinto, 2018).
The expansion of genetic informativity through emerging technologies such
as FDP and NGS has profound implications for the relationship between
“individual” and “collective” human identification. These are central ontolo-
gical categories, although increasingly complicated to sustain in binary pairs.
When individual identification is not possible, the interest of criminal investi-
gation shifts to the collective (“population group,” “race”) in which an
unknown suspect is deemed to belong (Cole, 2018; M’charek & Wade, 2020).
In the next section of this chapter, we will discuss how the mutually con-
stitutive relation between the individual and the collective in human identifi-
cation produced by forensic genetics has ethical and political implications on
the genetic surveillance of criminal suspects.
Expectations towards innovations in forensic genetics
Social sciences studies have consistently showed that novel or emerging tech-
nologies do not substantively pre-exist themselves, except in the realm of the
imagination; of expectations and visions that have shaped their potential.
These dynamics have been explored from a theoretical and analytical per-
spective by the “sociology of expectations” (Brown & Michael, 2003). Studies
in this field show that expectations for new and emerging technologies tend to
be future-oriented abstractions with “generative” power: they guide activities,
provide structure and legitimation, attract interest and foster investment
(Borup et al., 2006; Brown & Michael, 2003; Konrad, 2006). More particu-
larly, expectations play a central role in mobilizing resources both at a macro
level (for example, national policy through funding) and at the meso level of
sectors and innovations networks. Expectations also play an important role at
micro-level within research groups and in the work of a single scientist (Borup
et al., 2006, p. 286). In sum, expectations guide the activities of actors within
a technological field, while, in turn, expectations will be shaped and reshaped
by research results, findings, successful commercialization, and external trends
and forces (van Merkerk & Robinson, 2006).
Expectations are also “performative”: they are wishful enactments of a
desired future, and by performing such futures they are made real. As sug-
gested by many works on the performative dimension of expectations in
innovation processes (Brown & Rappert, 2000; Hedgecoe & Martin, 2003;
Michael, 2000; Selin, 2008; Tutton, 2011), positive promises and hopes of
future capabilities are accompanied by fears and concerns about future risks,
although different in character and having different dynamics. Consequently,
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future-oriented visions can be either “hype” and “optimistic,” or less opti-
mistic, uncertain and accompanied by modest expectations. Both “high” and
“low” expectations have a role in providing momentum to innovation projects
and in encouraging innovation alliances (Gardner, Samuel & Williams, 2015;
Tutton, 2011).
With the advent of new forensic technologies, such as FDP (already in use,
although so far applied only exceptionally in a limited number of jurisdictions
in Europe) and with NGS on the horizon (not yet applied in criminal cases,
as far as we know), forensic genetics is in a transitional state (Granja, 2020;
Machado & Granja, 2020). On the one hand, the work of forensic geneticists
attempts to sustain widely disseminated notions of forensic genetics’ symbolic
power to solve criminal cases (Lynch et al., 2008), within a scenario marked
by a techno-optimism (Quinlan, 2020) that encompasses public perceptions,
the media, policy makers and forensic industry (Machado & Silva, 2019;
Podlas, 2006; Wienroth, 2020a). On the other hand, emerging technologies,
such as FDP and NGS, require forensic geneticists to deal with a range of
potentially controversial uses without much guidance (Wienroth, 2018) and to
manage a constant negotiation between high expectations, fueled by promises
and hopes, and low expectations (Fitzgerald, 2014; Pickersgill, 2011; Tutton,
2011) tainted by concerns and anxieties (Granja & Machado, 2020).
Forensic DNA phenotyping
Tensions between the individual and the collective
Forensic geneticists who participated in this study presented FDP as a tech-
nology with the ability to mitigate what has thus far been considered one of
DNA profiling and databasing’s greatest limitations: its comparative char-
acter. For instance, whenever no matches are found between a crime scene
sample and a certain suspect and/or between a crime scene sample and a
DNA database search, forensic genetics have been unable to advance criminal
investigations, as explained by the following interviewee:
One of the biggest problems in the practice of forensic genetics is that you
can only identify someone you know, because you have to have their
DNA profile; because DNA profiling in the standard way is completely
comparative. If you have a nice DNA profile from the crime scene but
you do not already know the profile you have no match, it leads you
nowhere.
(Interview A02)
Thus, interviewees present FDP as a solution to this forensic science’s self-
diagnosis. By enabling to infer characteristics from a crime sample, FDP can
“generate” a group of suspects when no other leads are available (M’charek,
2008). Forensic geneticists interviewed for this study describe FDP as a
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pivotal moment in forensic genetic technologies in the criminal justice system,
since it shifts the focus of forensic science from the construction of evidence to
the generation of intelligence valuable for criminal investigations: “It may
help the police steer their investigations” (Interview D09).
However, the discourses of forensic experts also make clear that the possi-
bilities opened up by FDP do not eliminate the need to establish, at a later
stage of the criminal investigation, a direct comparison between a crime scene
profile and a given suspect in order to confirm that both correspond to the
same individual. This requirement follows from the permanent tension
between the individual and the collective on which FDP stands. As outlined
by the following interviewee, FDP should be understood as a two-step pro-
cedure: first it implies inferring the suspect group (that is, a collective dimen-
sion of suspicion) through the production of intelligence about probable
features and then the confirmation of the individual suspect (that is, an indi-
vidual dimension of suspicion) by conducting a traditional DNA comparison
between the crime scene sample and the given suspect.
You first want to find your person of interest, for example, say “well, he
looks like this,” and then if you are lucky, you find someone who resembles
to this person. Also, you have other pieces of evidence, and if you then have
a person of interest or a suspect, you can get the DNA from this person so as
to compare it again by the usual DNA profiling procedure. And finally you
can be certain whether or not it is the person of interest.
(Interview O08)
By making an inference about the population group(s) which the alleged
suspect belongs to, FDP is portrayed by forensic geneticists in this study as a
technology that produces information which can guide the criminal investi-
gation in a certain direction, thereby reducing the potential pool of suspects,
and becoming an investigative, rather than probative, technology.
We always need to make sure that people understand that this method is
suitable to reduce the possible number of people who could have made or
placed this stain. But the actual identification of the donor of the stain
needs to be done by conventional DNA analysis. So it also means that
ultimately, what will be discussed in court is the final conventional DNA
analysis rather than the so-called extended DNA analysis.
(Interview 013)
Generally speaking, FDP will never be introduced in trial, I cannot see
that it would come to court.
(Interview D09)
The shift from the construction of evidence to the production of intelli-
gence arouses other resistances. An example is the tension caused in the pre-
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established division between coding and non-coding DNA, which several
European countries used as a baseline to create and implement forensic DNA
legislation. The challenges posed by the expansion genetic informativity to
the distinction between non-coding and coding regions of DNA is precisely a
characteristic of the third (and fourth) waves of innovation in forensic genetics
(Cole, 2018; Dimeglio et al., 2018; Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016; Wien-
roth et al., 2014). FDP tends to use SNPs, rather than STRs. Unlike STRs,
that presumably hold little value other than identification (Cole, 2007), SNPs
are characterized by informational richness. In the case of FDP, SNPs allow
enrolling appearance and race in the field of forensic genetics (Skinner, 2018).
By making use of coding DNA regions, FDP therefore violates this coding/
non-coding division, as explained by the following interviewee:
The typical dilemma in all of this is that in most European countries that
have forensic DNA legislation, it was produced in the 90s, at a time when
nobody wanted or could actually do more than standard forensic DNA
profiling, so therefore the laws were adapted to this use. For instance,
assuming that only non-coding markers were used, which of course in
this case you would violate.
(Interview A02)
This implies the existence of a variable scenario in terms of FDP regulation
across Europe. It is specifically regulated in countries such as the Netherlands,
Slovakia, and Germany (Amelung, 2021; Amelung & Machado, 2021;
M’charek, 2008; Samuel & Prainsack, 2018a), while other European countries
possess only implicit or absent legislation on FDP. Such legal vacuums,
therefore, lead to varying interpretations about the use of FDP in the criminal
justice system (Samuel & Prainsack, 2018a) which, in some cases, implies that
decision-making is placed upon local forensic users (Wienroth, 2018).
Within a framework providing little guidance (Wienroth, 2018), most for-
ensic geneticists adopt a position in defence of the need to update legislation
that can respond to the actual capabilities of forensic DNA technologies.
Thus, FDP provides an insightful analysis into how, despite their consolidated
role in providing evidence for criminal justice, there has been a continuous
investment to further expand DNA technologies’ genetic informativity
(Machado & Granja, 2020). Interviewed professionals argue for the intro-
duction of changes in the law to allow for the use of FDP in specific situa-
tions, such as cases involving crimes that are considered serious (“I think it
should also be done only in serious crime cases. Like capital crime cases,
where there is a very urgent public interest to identify the perpetrator,”
Interview O01), while establishing clear demarcations regarding the types of
information contemplated for analysis (externally visible appearance instead
of “invisible” traits). According to this position, the push for FDP’s imple-
mentation is coupled with a stand on its restrictions to preserve forensic
genetics’ social legitimacy.
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The promises of forensic DNA phenotyping
The potential of FDP to construct a composite face of an unknown suspect is
highly powerful and attracts interest among diverse actors, ranging from the
forensic industry, policymakers, the media and the general public. Forensic
geneticists have different ways of maintaining a cautious position to deal with
overly positive expectations created by the promise of FDP, nurtured by the
pervasiveness of a growing market with an interest in the marketization of
science. Notwithstanding their interest in underlining FDP’s potential to
advance criminal investigations, geneticists’ discourses also convey the ever-
present epistemic risk – degrees of certainty or uncertainty involved in the
interpretation of forensic DNA technologies (Lawless, 2010, p. 381) – asso-
ciated with FDP. In other words, forensic geneticists present FDP as a
“semi-transparent box … neither fully opaque nor fully transparent” (Kruse,
2015, p. 115) in which the associated epistemic risks remain visible (Granja
& Machado, 2020). Interviewed experts show significant reservations about
unduly positive expectations placed on this technology with disregard for its
inherent epistemic risk and limitations. In their view, such confidence is
based on a hype construed by a series of commercial, entertainment and
media interests:
But I also think that the expectations, again, are excessive for this tech-
nology. There is an over expectation of what we can achieve using the
new technologies, at the time being.
(Interview O01)
I think occasionally some scientists, companies, and the media, tend to
hype up these things and put a spin on their presentation which greatly
exaggerates their potential.
(Interview D11)
According to forensic geneticists interviewed for this study, overly positive
expectations have pernicious consequences, inasmuch as they imply a dis-
junction between the type of inferences FDP is able to produce and the aims
police investigators have in mind for this technology. As explained by the
following interviewee, police forces often demand information from this kind
of genetic testing which it cannot provide:
Quite often we get asked by police investigators to try and distinguish
somebody from the Middle East, or North Africa, from people of Eur-
opean origin. And that is not always as easy as people might think. So,
we have the ethical issue, it is an ethical issue, of police expectations
before we do the test. So they make a lot of assumptions about the
capacity of the genetic tests, because they watch CSI on television.
(Interview C04)
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Forensic geneticists, therefore, engage with what John Gardner and colleagues
call “recalibration” as innovation work (Gardner et al., 2015) referring to how
pioneering clinical teams manage the tension between highly optimistic and hyped
visions of the future surrounding biomedical innovations, and the exigencies of
delivering “effective” interventions on patients. In the case of FDP, “recalibration”
means adjusting the overly optimistic expectations placed by police officers on the
type of information FDP might provide to advance criminal investigations.
The possibility of inferring the appearance of a given individual has attracted
the attention of private companies interested in the commercialization of forensic
services. On this point, our interviewees repeatedly mention the practices and
proactive commercial behavior of Parabon Nanolabs, a company that commer-
cializes a service called Snapshot (Wienroth, 2020a). Snapshot is a tool that alleg-
edly enables a prediction of the appearance, including face morphology, of an
unknown individual. Forensic geneticists in this study clearly seek to distance
themselves from such commercial efforts. From their discourses, we understand
that so far FDP “Is not really predicting face shape but it is inferring aspects of
appearance” (Interview D11). Forensic geneticists, therefore, express considerable
reservations about companies who promise a genetic photofit. In their abuse of
what interviewees perceive as the normative standards for good science (practices
of transparency, peer-review validation, and reproducibility), such endeavors are
considered scientifically unsound, solely driven by commercial interests (Granja &
Machado, 2020; Wienroth, 2020a). As outlined in the following quotation:
The methods they are offering, at least for the physical prediction of
externally visible traits, they are not validated, and I think they are not
ready for case work. And so I am a bit worried, because if you were a
scientist you would not do that.
(Interview O01)
As widely discussed by social scientists studying the ethical implications of FDP,
this technology has the power to generate a new set of collective suspects in ways
that might reproduce stigmatization and criminalization (M’charek, 2008;
Sankar, 2010; Skinner, 2018). Such stigmatization and criminalization mainly
targets racialized populations, insofar as FDP contributes to reinforce racial
categories (Hopman & M’charek, 2020; M’charek, 2013; M’charek et al., 2020).
Considering the possibility of perpetuating social prejudice through the use of
FDP in the criminal justice system, forensic geneticists uphold that legitimate
use of FDP must be limited to the investigative phase of a criminal investigation,
as the following interview quotation illustrates:
I don’t see anything wrong in using FDP in the investigative stage, noth-
ing which can be seen as remotely wrong ethically. And that’s not all: it
improves something I know to be usually incorrect, one of the biggest
contributing factors to false accusations and false charges.
(Interview C05)
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Within such framework, optimist outlooks on FDP would find their counter
point in the inclination to exclude this technology in favour of continuing to rely on
misleading eyewitness testimonies. Interviewees therefore promote a techno-scien-
tific solution to the inherent errors of eyewitness testimonies, rooted in imaginaries
about the power of forensic DNA technology to solve complex social issues.
Arguing that eyewitness accounts are fragile, pervaded by emotions, motivations,
subjectivities and informational gaps, participants of this study refer to FDP as a
“neutral” technology, immune to social bias. In the words of one participant:
The point is this, there is a lot more prejudice, or rather, people are much
more biased than DNA trials. For instance, an eye witness might be more
prone to describe an assailant (…) as belonging to a racialized group or
as an African-American than a Caucasian, right? Why? Because he/she
may be prejudiced. DNA analysis will not have that kind of bias, it will
determine that the suspect belongs to this or that group. Therefore, I
believe phenotype inference to be much more objective than eye witness
accounts and nevertheless, eye witnesses continue to be accepted in court.
(Interview N23)
Although some interviewees mitigate the discriminatory potential of FDP
through direct comparison with eyewitness accounts, thus underlining DNA’s
alleged neutrality, others fully recognize such potential, but mitigate its rele-
vance by highlighting other issues. The following participants, for example,
explain that while FDP can indeed be used to point suspicion on a particular
group, it might also lead investigations away from them.
If I go to a village and can predict with 70 or 80 percent probability that
the person leaving traces is dark-skinned or perhaps of southern African
descent or something like that, this may lead to discrimination. At this
point of an investigation it is commonly overlooked that in many cases,
the trace may apply to a fair-skinned person and, so to speak, all the
dark-skinned people are exonerated at first.
(Interview O10)
Increased risk that racial profiling might take place. We don’t really see
that risk from the scientific point of view and also from our discussions
with the police forces. (…) It can be the case that police investigations are
led toward a certain group of people, yes, but it can also lead away from
certain group of people; and it can lead towards the vulnerable people
but also away from vulnerable people.
(Interview 013)
Another argument usually invoked by forensic geneticists while assessing
FDP’s discriminatory potential is that its propensity to focus on a particular
racial group does not constitute a valid reason to abandon the investigation of
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a certain crime. Some interviewees defend that the potential to solve a crime
must be considered more important than the potential of the technology to
reinforce the stigmatization of a particular group. In the words of an interviewee:
I am not one to take the view that because a particular type of genetic
test might be seen as placing a particular ethnic group in the frame, so to
speak, it is reason enough to reject it. I think it is a reason to handle it
carefully and sensitively. Ultimately, I do not see it as a reason not to do
it. And there are many different reasons for that: one is that a crime is a
crime, and you cannot stop investigating them just because people might
get upset. And undoubtedly, vilification is a consequence; it is a social
issue that needs to be addressed, but I suspect it is secondary to the
criminal investigation issue itself.
(Interview D11)
One other way forensic geneticists have to deal with FDP’s discriminatory
potential is by displacing the discussion away from the scientific field. They do so
by establishing clear boundaries between their field of expertise and police work.
A distinction between knowledge production and its applications and its uses is
deliberately maintained and generally accepted (Lynch et al., 2008), ensuring the
protection of scientific autonomy (Granja & Machado, 2020).
And I don’t want to say that there is no risk of racial profiling within the
police, I think that this is a completely different discussion and it’s a dis-
cussion that the police needs to have; I’m pretty sure that there are all
kinds of people within the police and I think we all know that there is a
risk. But the risk is completely independent of how we type the sample.
(Interview 013)
But this problem of stigmatization and targeting a particular community
can potentially be damaging to community relations, or the relationships
between the police and that community. And it is open to some abuse.
There is the worry that the police will abuse that knowledge or abuse the
fact that they are looking for a particular type of suspect to further pre-
judice their attitudes towards to that community.
(Interview C04)
Therefore, forensic geneticists’ views acknowledge racial discrimination as a
question de facto, which forensic genetics cannot and should not attempt to
solve, but can only work around. Forensic geneticists thereby “work around”
FDP’s discriminatory potential by acknowledging that eyewitness accounts
might also lead to discrimination, underlining that FDP can also work to
clear suspicion from a certain group of individuals, and to decouple the pre-
rogatives of science and law. More specifically, forensic geneticists locate
FDP’s potential to reproduce stigmatization and criminalization in the
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longstanding structures of power and inequality that affect the interaction
between law enforcement and racial minorities, thereby displacing this dis-
cussion away from the realm of science (Granja & Machado, 2020).
Next generation sequencing
The promises of NGS
Unlike FDP, which has been already used in a number of criminal cases,
albeit limited, NGS is still in an exploratory stage. Allegations of its promis-
ing character are present in the discourses of most forensic geneticists. The
promise of NGS assumes multiple and fluid meanings. Specifically, some for-
ensic geneticists viewed NGS as the next step in future forensics, while others
believed that NGS might already provide relevant outputs to this field in the
present. These nuances as to NGS’s promising nature − and the expected new
possibilities associated with it − can be understood in relation to differing
locations of the forensic geneticists within a developing network of innovation
relationships.
Among respondents who recognized the promising character of NGS in
the near future, the most recurrent expectation was to consider that these
technologies would be completely established in the forensic field scenario in
five or ten years’ time. This group of participants seemed to construe NGS
according to a vision where, “until proven otherwise,” technological advan-
ces are beneficial. More specifically, forensic geneticists in this study
emphasize NGS’s ability to create new opportunities for research and open
up new possibilities for providing criminal investigators with investigative
leads, thereby improving the quality of the services provided by laboratories
to the criminal justice system. The following interview quotation exemplifies
a discursive stance that considers NGS to be currently applicable in research
only, but admits it will be a matter of time before it can be used in concrete
case work:
If we are looking at 10 years [into the future], I think we have made the
switch from the old-fashioned way of doing DNA typing to the new
techniques, so NGS. (…) We will use the technology, but not in the same
way as it is used in clinical genetics. We will only use it to obtain the
information needed to solve crimes. And I do hope in 10 years’ time we
will be able to provide even more answers with respect to the traces left at
a crime scene. And to do it increasingly in real time.
(Interview A05)
Such views reflect what Nik Brown and Mike Michael (2003) designated as
engaging with the future as an analytical object to understand innovation
processes. In the authors’ words, the future is “…not simply a neutral tem-
poral space in which objective expectations can be projected [but instead] the
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future is mobilized in real time to marshal resources, coordinate activities and
manage uncertainty” (Brown & Michael, 2003, p. 4). Other participants con-
veyed their belief in the ability of NGS to have a profound impact in the field
of forensic genetics already in present time. We should note, however, that this
group of forensic geneticists display differentiated positions within a develop-
ing network of innovation relationships, inasmuch as they either reported
having close relationships with commercial providers or were benefiting from
research funding enabling the purchase of NGS equipment. Considering their
current resources, such interviewees tended to have an optimistic view on
NGS’ promising nature, projecting a forward-looking statement onto the use
of NGS in the immediate present. On this point, one of the participants
makes an enthusiastic description of a research project focused on NGS and
funded by the European Union that involves scientists, police forces and
commercial companies, with the aim to develop global standards and a
nomenclature adjusted to new techniques:
We’ve just started [a new project funded by the European Union], we’re
talking to all the commercial companies we had in our contact list to ask
them for prototypes that are liable to be compatible with the markers
we’re already using (…) The idea is to evaluate the fundamental theme of
nomenclature; we need a globally standardized nomenclature so it can be
understood. (…) Secondly, we’ll focus on communication: on which
standards to promote and on whether we will develop a software to
introduce those standards. To create the fundamental base for a standar-
dized international nomenclature to enable a successful communication
(…) I believe we’re reaching a third revolution in technology, which is
mass sequencing. It’s the future…
(Interview C01)
Besides interviewees who obtained funding for conducting research within
NGS, one other group that is also highly optimistic about NGS’ potential
comprises interviewees with close connections to private companies that pro-
vide services and material. In this case, we take the words of the following
participant as an example, describing how the collaboration of his/her
laboratory with a commercial provider created the conditions for using NGS
in case work. The interviewee mentions the organizational changes that had
to be implemented in order to create the necessary conditions for the uses of
these promissory technologies:
So, we have installed a [NGS] workflow in our laboratory. We developed
a collaboration with companies that helped us to automatize all the
analysis. And so we are starting now to really use NGS to apply them in
real casework. (…) I think a lot of laboratories should actually do the
same, because it is a very promising technology.
(Interview H03)
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As we explored in the previous section of this chapter, forensic geneticists argue
that FDP should only be applied to serious cases where no other investigative
leads are available, thereby underlining its investigative value (Granja &
Machado, 2020; Wienroth, 2018). NGS elicits a different set of perspectives.
Instead of being associated with the seriousness of the crime, the selective use of
NGS in the criminal justice system is equated with the technical specificities of
the biological samples collected from crime scenes. As the following interviewee
points out, complex mixtures, for example, are particularly suitable to NGS:
Well, it is not so much a special kind of crime [that justifies the use of NGS]
as a special type of DNA profile. In complex mixtures, which we encounter
quite regularly in routine forensic DNA research, capillary electrophoresis
fails to provide reliable answers in many cases. And in those samples, [NGS]
can provide a much better answer in many instances. And that was the main
reason why we developed [NGS]. And that is exactly the kind of samples
which we now use to deconvolute using [NGS]. That is the biggest challenge.
So, it will not be a routine tool, it will be used in a limited number of sam-
ples from all kind of different cases.
(Interview A03)
NGS is thus considered by interviewees as particularly useful for specific
types of DNA, such as mixture cases and degraded DNA samples, which
tend to raise problems when analyzed using traditional methods. This view is
shared by most of our interviewees, as the next quotations shows:
It gives a lot of additional information; can be very helpful, for example,
in DNA mixtures from various persons. We already know that there are
real breakthrough in distinguishing identical twins. So, it’s a very, very
useful technique, obviously.
(Interview O13)
I am interested in what it provides; it provides us with a whole new layer
of complexity and differentiation. (…) And I am looking at completely
new markers that are only possible with massively parallel sequencing;
they look like they will be very good for mixture interpretation, they will
be short, so they will be good for degraded DNA and they provide a lot
of information per marker.
(Interview C04)
Thus, from the standpoint of interviewees, the decision as to whether or not
to make use of NGS in their technical specificity, should be assigned exclu-
sively to forensic geneticist professionals. At a time when forensic genetics is
undergoing a transitional stage (Granja, 2020; Machado & Granja, 2020),
this concern reflects an effort to re-assert boundaries of expertise and protect
the monopoly over such decisions.
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Although among our interviewees there is a relatively common tendency to
characterize NGS as a “revolution,” we also find participants who challenge
this view. One participant confided that the initially optimistic expectations
about an NGS revolution have since waned. This participant was expecting a
kind of revolution that would render previous technologies obsolete, but cur-
rently believes that the methods already in place will continue to co-exist with
the new methods enabled by NGS. This participant explicitly alludes to
NGS’s revolutionary representation, claiming that rather than “marking a
revolution,” this new technology can be useful to increase the robustness of
already-in-use technologies:
We expected massive parallel sequencing to be something like a revolu-
tion and to completely replace the current technology that we use, but it
didn’t happen. And I personally don’t think it’s going to happen. (…) we
obviously need massive parallel sequencing for biogeographic origin or
for externally visible traits because we do have to analyze so many indi-
vidual markers that we do have to use a method like this. So this is the
impact that it will have. But a few years back, I would’ve expected it to
completely replace the current method of PCR and the fragment size
analysis. Now I’m pretty sure it will not replace it.
(Interview O13)
This account fits a pattern of expectations about scientific and technological
change described by Nik Brown and Mike Michael (2003) as “retrospecting
prospects,” whereby people refer to past representations of the future. The
authors claim that this particular interpretative pattern frequently goes hand-in-
hand with “prospecting retrospects,” whereby past futures are incorporated into
real-time constructions of the future (Brown & Michael, 2003, pp. 4–5). These
expectations help social actors to make sense of past and present expectations
and to manage or engage with changing needs of innovation.
According to one of our interviewees, the expected coexistence of new and
old systems is based on the strength of the current system, whose ability to
institute a “shared universal language” makes the implementation of a new
system unlikely. In this sense, most interviewees perceive NGS as playing a
complementary role in forensic DNA analysis, by expanding genetic infor-
mativity in cases in where it might be considered useful. As expressed in the
following interview quotation:
Never to replace what we already have, since I think STRs can hardly be
discarded, because they provide a lot of information and because they
have become a universal methodology and so we all speak the same lan-
guage; but I think that it will add another source of information and in
that sense I think it will be good (…) As far as I’m concerned [NGS] goes
in the direction of complementarity.
(Interview N08)
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In sum, although interviewees agree that NGS contains a “revolutionary”
potential to expand genetic informativity, especially in the most challenging
cases, they also consider it will not necessarily substitute previously estab-
lished technologies with long-standing records of implementation, consolida-
tion and standardization (Aronson, 2007; Derksen, 2003, 2010; Lynch et al.,
2008). Forensic geneticists recurrently mention, for example, that NGS will
very unlikely make substantial changes in DNA databasing, as expressed in
the words of one of the participants:
It [NGS] has enormous advantages insofar as the core markers that we
use, which are in the databases, can be continued. But along with those
core markers, we can provide more information.
(Interview D09)
In the next section we explore how forensic geneticists view the pros and cons
of expanding genetic informativity through NGS. While embracing the new
opportunities brought by NGS, forensic geneticists also reflect critically upon
how much more data – and more sensitive information deriving from genetic
data – is really needed to provide meaningful and useful responses to the
criminal justice system.
Between research science and forensic applied science
The overwhelming majority of forensic geneticists we interviewed frequently
mentioned the costs of NGS as the main reason not to use these techniques
on a routine basis. The following interview excerpts reveal this concern
among interviewees, who tend to find that until the costs of NGS decrease,
there is no reason to invest in new techniques which will require, among other
aspects, purchasing new equipment and reagents, training and organizational
changes in work procedures and communication with courts. According to
the following participants, before economic costs are substantially reduced,
there are no significant advantages in investing in NGS:
[NGS] has to be cost effective, if it is going to replace the methods that we have
now, it has got to be cheaper. Yes! That is the most important thing. [NGS]
becomes very cheap; that will be an argument to replace current technology.
(Interview Q01)
The field is moving, but slowly, because this is big, big money (…) there
is hope, but it is expensive. (…) Costs have to go down. (…) You ask for a
lot, namely when you think about asking a routine forensic laboratory
that has spent I don’t know how many years, if not decades, establishing
the current technology, to start again. So the question becomes, what is it
for? what is the prize?
(Interview A02)
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I think it is a lot of extra effort for nothing, it doesn’t provide anything
that we are not already getting.
(Interview X03)
In addition to high costs, forensic interviewees also recurrently point out
that NGS is still being developed and needs to undergo an operational vali-
dation processes. As noted by Matthias Wienroth (2020b), within the frame-
work of a responsible approach to innovation, reliability must be taken into
consideration, not only at the development and pre-adoption phases, where
reliability of the underlying science and veracity of data work are assessed,
but also in the adoption phases, where its reliability in terms of data safety,
security, and suitability is evaluated. According to the following interviewee,
NGS is still lacking the process of validation that ensures its reliability in the
adoption phase.
Well, this [NGS] is something completely new. Personally, I believe
this is really nice science and research. But it is not yet ready for case
work. And the main reason is … well, the very practical reason is that
there is no proper forensic validation yet. At the case work level, that
is, obviously not scientifically nor in principle. I mean, we all know it
works, and there have been nice examples, but it is a different thing to
get ISO accreditation and then to do a sort of scientific validation
study.
(Interview O01)
Within this framework, interviewees frequently reflect upon the different
aims of research science and forensic applied science (Cole, 2013). According to
Simon Cole’s categorization, research science has an open-ended time-frame,
with general knowledge claims and an interest in continuously developing new
knowledge aimed at achieving scientific “breakthroughs.” However, the same
cannot be said of forensic science applied to case work. Considering its limited
time-frame, specific goal (to identify criminal suspects) and bureaucratic struc-
ture, forensic science applied to routine case work requires constant evaluation
of potential benefits versus the additional risks involved in using new methods.
In the light of such differences, interviewees commonly view the innovation of
NGS techniques as able to boost research and publications, but impractical in
the near future in its application to case work, owing mainly to its high costs,
lengthy processes and uncertainties about its effective benefits for the bulk of
routine work.
Well, the time to obtain the profile is actually lengthier; all the steps are a
bit more difficult, and also the interpretation of the profile is pretty
complex, compared to conventional analysis. So, it is more like an a la
carte thing that you use only when the traditional method does not work.
(Interview H03)
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Some laboratories may be rich enough to invest in NGS and make this
predictive analysis, age estimation and other things, but these things are
not so often used in real life. Really, there aren’t that many cases where
such information can be used.
(Interview G01)
Another reason why some consider NGS unfeasible for forensic casework
use has to do with the “excessive” amount of information it produces.
According to one of our interviewees:
[NGS] it is what I would call a kind of bioinformatics overkill, you know?
It is the sort of data that you cannot handle, and you do not need this
data for most of the cases. Because current technology is more than
enough in 90% or 95% of the cases.
(Interview O01)
Regarding the difference between research science and forensic applied sci-
ence, forensic geneticists commonly find that currently the benefits of NGS
are mostly for research science. According to the following interviewee, the
strong push for routine work implementation is mostly a result of commercial
interests, reflecting companies’ focus on selling new products:
Well, at the moment [NGS is] a nice tool for research. When I was a
researcher, it was always good to have a new technique to play around
and then to publish the research; it’s good to publish and a new technique
offers many opportunities to do so. A second step is the implementation
and routine case work. I don’t really see that the benefit is so extreme.
(…) I’m skeptical as to whether this is the perfect tool. It’s good for …
well, obviously for those companies selling the machines; it’s nice to sell
and it’s a nice technique to see working, but I’m skeptical if this will
change our recent technique.
(Interview O09)
Besides operational and commercial issues, forensic geneticists also mention
how NGS brings additional ethical issues that must be considered. The pos-
sibility opened by NGS to reconstruct the whole of the human genome raises
many problems, uncertainties, and contingencies, leading forensic geneticists
to consider that the data produced are too sensitive, and therefore, liable to
risks of misuse. Considering its potential, participants in this study thus find
there is a need to implement forms of regulation over the forensic use of NGS
that will mitigate associated risks.
At this time, [NGS] is able to sequence the human genome within hours
(…) I can sequence the human genome and thus know everything about a
person, their entire genetic code. If I cross that information with other
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medical information, it is perfectly possible to know things about that
person that they may not want disclosed. So, it is already possible in theory.
And since it is possible. It becomes a tool one must be very cautious with.
(Interview N16)
Forensic geneticists, however, claim the monopoly of decision making
about which genetic data should or should not be analyzed, for their own
community. Thus, forensic geneticists engage with setting norms and values to
ensure their compliance with normative points of reference on how to make
an adequate and legitimate use of NGS in the criminal justice system – what
Matthias Wienroth (2018) calls “self-anticipatory practices.” Such a position
simultaneously legitimizes forensic geneticists’ way of producing scientific
knowledge and re-asserts the social boundaries of expertise and authority of
the scientific community of forensic genetics, as the following interview quo-
tation highlights:
If I get the whole genome, it will give me all the information about a
person, from things without any forensic relevance to all the phenotypic
markers of ancestry. Now everything depends on what I want to inspect.
Can this be a good thing? It can. Can it be a bad thing? Yes, it all
depends on how it is used. (…) I don’t know, it can be important just as it
can be dangerous (…) I want to be able to choose whether or not to
inspect a particular set of markers.
(Interview N23)
Expectations regarding NGS, therefore, range from the highly enthusiastic
views of NGS as the future standard in DNA analysis, to more cautious
approaches to this technology as a complementary forensic tool that might
expand genetic informativity of DNA profiles in cases where the existing
methods have not been successful. These different views correspond to foren-
sic geneticists’ divergent locations within a developing network of innovation
relationships. More specifically, NGS puts the differences between research
science and forensic applied science into focus (Cole, 2013), as well as the
differentiated access to resources among forensic geneticists. While those
professionals who have access a wide range of resources, owing to research
funding and/or collaborations with equipment providers, tend to be more
optimistic about the potential of NGS, professionals who are more involved
with routine case work tend to describe this technology as a time-consuming
and expensive process with arguable added benefits.
Long-range familial searches: another step towards expanding genetic
informativity
Among the technologies aimed at expanding genetic informativity within
forensic science, more recently there has also been a significant focus on long-
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range familial searches conducted in recreational DNA databases (where
citizens voluntarily upload genetic information) (Granja, 2020; Kennett,
2019; Murphy, 2018). Long-range familial searches are also commonly refer-
red to as forensic genealogy (Phillips, 2018; Syndercombe-Court, 2018).
Briefly, it refers to a procedure by which a crime scene sample is uploaded
into a recreational DNA database in order to search for relatives of potential
suspects. It differs significantly from previous approaches, inasmuch as sear-
ches are no longer restricted to individuals who have had some kind of
involvement with the criminal justice system, as occurs in forensic DNA
databases.
Long-range familial searches became a focus of interest in the aftermath of
the Golden State Killer1 investigation of 2018. Criminal investigators on that
case used DNA from crime scenes and uploaded the genetic information into
an online public-access DNA database, GEDmatch2. Based on that search,
officers found partial matches with the profile of the presumed suspect, which
were assumed to belong to distant relatives. Following up the partial match,
family trees were built based on information collected from several other
sources (social media and other types of online records), leading to the iden-
tification of 72-year-old Joseph James DeAngelo as a suspect, after which his
“abandoned” DNA3 was collected to conduct further analysis. The result of
the tests confirmed it matched the crime scene samples.
Since the Golden State Killer, several criminal investigations have been
solved through long-range familial searches, not only in USA but also in
Sweden and Canada (Granja, 2020). This is possible due to the transnational
nature of recreational databases, given that direct-to-consumer companies
provide services across several countries (Skeva, Larmuseau, & Shabani,
2020). Criminal investigations that resort to long-range familial searches,
however, occur within a framework characterized by a lack of regulatory
oversight (Kennett, 2019; Murphy, 2018). This implies that companies in the
market react differently to law-enforcement searches: while some claim to
resist law-enforcement inquiries, others welcome long-range familial searches
for criminal investigation purposes (Granja, 2020).
According to Rafaela Granja (2020), long-range familial searches have three
significant implications, namely, the expansion of affected populations, the parti-
cipatory turn, and the co-production of biovalue. In brief, the expansion of
affected populations means that the use of SNPs genetic informativity in long-
range familial searches enables locating distant relatives and targeting a popula-
tion that is usually not included in forensic DNA databases, namely an econom-
ically privileged population comprising European-descent individuals (Murphy,
2018). The participatory turn refers to the possibility opened up by long-range
familial searches to allow individual citizens, interested in personal genomics and
who have already purchased a direct-to-consumer genetic test, to make their data
available for law-enforcement activities. The implication here is that involvement
with the criminal justice system is no longer a pre-requisite to participate in law
enforcement DNA database searches. Finally, the co-production of biovalue
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means that individuals who voluntarily participate in databases available for law
enforcement searches are lending their genetic information to create a resource
whose significant commercial potential will be marketed by several specialized
companies (Granja, 2020).
Long-range familial searches, together with FDP and NGS, thus represent
another step towards expanding genetic informativity in ways that imply:
further compounding the interrelated dimension between individual and col-
lective identification; blurring the boundaries between coding and non-coding
DNA; increasing commodification of genetic knowledge and marketization of
science, and a general move from forensic genetics towards forensic genomics.
Such dynamics are coupled with a constant interplay between the hyped or
low expectations that determine how forensic geneticists deal with this phe-
nomenon in complex and unfolding ways, ranging from an interest in
expanding genetic informativity to concerns about the preservation of forensic
science’s epistemic authority (Phillips, 2018; Syndercombe-Court, 2018).
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to explore how forensic geneticists perceive emerging
technologies aimed at expanding genetic informativity, namely FDP and
NGS. Inspired by the previous works on the role of “expectations” in scien-
tific and technological innovations, frequently studied in fields as distinct as
economics, sociology, the history and philosophy of science, as well as science
and technology studies (Borup et al., 2006; Brown & Michael, 2003; Kriech-
baum, López Prol, & Posch, 2018), we have analyzed how these professionals
in the field of forensic genetics manage the tension between hyped visions of
innovation and concerns about the exigencies of criminal case work that is
surrounded by controversies and uncertainty.
In the case of FDP, forensic geneticists sustain FDP’s added value to
criminal investigations, while also underlining its epistemic risk, investigative
character and selective use in serious cases. The overly positive expectations
of police officers demand a negotiation between expectations and concrete
outcomes in criminal cases. FDP also implies managing the pervasiveness of a
growing market, interested in a marketization of science that does not neces-
sarily correspond to forensic geneticists’ standards of “good science” (Granja
& Machado, 2020). In addition, forensic geneticists deal with FDP’s dis-
criminatory potential by allocating this ethical and political discussion on
longstanding structures of inequality, situated “outside” the scientific domain,
thereby displacing the consequences of using FDP, transferring responsibility
from the realm of science to the realm of criminal investigation and courts
(Granja & Machado, 2020).
Regarding NGS, we argue that forensic geneticists’ expectations are het-
erogeneous and flexible, coupling “hypo” and “optimistic” expectations that
portray NGS as a revolution with modest and uncertain outlooks, character-
ized by skepticism about NGS’s added value in routine case work. Such
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diverging positions are influenced by forensic geneticists’ relative locations
within a developing network of innovation relationships, namely in terms of
access to resources or the type of work being conducted, whose focus could
be more centered either on research science or on forensic applied science.
One other particularly relevant issue when it comes to NGS, is the dis-
junction between the legitimation of its selective use and the specificities of
the criminal cases it must apply to, as we see with FDP and other innovative
technologies in cases of serious crimes with great social impact. NGS use is
considered to be solely dependent upon the specificity of the DNA collected
from the crime scene. This implies that the decision-making process on
whether or not to use NGS, becomes independent of social and contextual
criteria and totally framed according to scientific criteria. By placing deci-
sion-making processes exclusively in the hands of forensic geneticists, NGS
use actually reinforces the credibility of scientific assertions and re-asserts
boundaries of expertise. In the light of this, the forensic community claims
its monopoly on decision making, not just on which cases should be eligible
for NGS use, but also on the type of genetic data might or might not be
analyzed.
It is important to note that forensic geneticists’ heterogeneous relation to
expectations about FDP and NGS, reveal two main interrelated concerns,
where technical, organizational, and social aspects of innovation are tightly
intertwined. On the one hand, they aim to protect forensic geneticists’ work-
space and sphere of expertise from the turbulence of transitional and trans-
formative stages of epistemological, methodological and regulatory uses of
forensic genetics in the field of criminal investigation. On the other hand,
expectations surrounding FDP and NGS use, enable forensic geneticists’
engagement with modes of “anticipatory governance” (Tutton, 2011; Wien-
roth, 2018), whose discussion of reliability, utility and legitimacy-related
issues, are mobilized by forensic geneticists toward the protection of forensic
science’s credibility and autonomy (Wienroth, 2020b). These types of efforts
are increasingly relevant as more technologies, such as FDP, NGS, and long-
range familial searches, enter into the imagined futures of forensic genetics.
By focusing upon FDP and NGS, along with a brief discussion on long-
range familial searches conducted by privately owned recreational DNA
databases offering genetic tests to consumers directly, this chapter outlined the
horizons of on-going and future methods to expand genetic surveillance that
might lead to increasing discrimination and conflicts with privacy. By focus-
ing on FDP, we are able to understand an existing displacement of locus,
from individualization (i.e., identification of specific individuals) to collective
population groups. This results from clustering a suspect population that
share biogeographical ancestry and/or externally visible characteristics. As we
turn to NGS, we have shown that it is perceived as opening up a path to fully
“personalized” genetics, e.g., in the sense that it promises to revolutionize the
capability of forensic genetics to reach genetic uniqueness. However, in order
to take any sort of practical actions, individuals must be reassembled into
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groups, and the efficacy of genetics can only be measured statistically across
the group (Cole, 2018; M’charek & Wade, 2020).
Expanding genetic informativity contributes to a prevailing trend that can
be described as a molecularization of the body (Rose, 2007), rendering genetic
suspects more vulnerable to isolation, manipulation, mobilization, recombi-
nation, in new practices of intervention, and subjected to social (and political)
sorting. In sum, expanding genetic informativity by enrolling human appear-
ance and “race” in the field of forensic genetics and by blurring the bound-
aries between the “medical” and the “criminal” (Machado & Silva, 2015;
Wienroth et al., 2014) creates new dilemmas for thinking and debating ethi-
cally responsible implementation and use of these technologies, specifically in
forensic genetics practice and more broadly within the field of criminal justice.
Notes
1 The Golden State Killer is the name coined by Michelle McNamara to refer to a
serial killer and rapist who committed at least 12 murders and more than 50 rapes
in California, USA, between 1974 and 1986. He is believed to be responsible for
three crime sprees throughout California, each of which spawned a different nick-
name in the press (East Area Rapist and Original Night Stalker) before it became
evident, through DNA analysis, that they were committed by the same person.
2 GEDmatch is an online public-access public database where individuals with data
originated from different testing companies can compare their DNA with others on
the database in order to trace relatives. More information here: www.gedmatch.
com/login1.php (last accessed May 13, 2019).
3 In the USA the police can collect “abandoned DNA,” that is, a biological sample which
has been left behind by the individual inadvertently or involuntarily, such as chewing
gum or a tip of a cigarette. For a critical view of such procedures see (Joh, 2006).
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7 Non-Governmental Organizations and
the Critique of Genetic Surveillance
Introduction
The phenomenon involving the creation and development of large genetic
databases designed to host the data of thousands of citizens, coupled with the
new developments in the field of forensic genetics as an aid to criminal
investigation, has triggered fears of a threat to privacy and a constriction of
human rights such as the notions of equality before justice and presumption
of innocence. Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGO)
from several European countries have started a public debate denouncing the
risks posed by genetic surveillance regarding their application in the criminal
justice system (Williams & Johnson, 2004; Williams & Wienroth, 2014, 2017).
Generally speaking, such NGOs envisage scenarios where governments are
equipped with excessive surveillance power, while representing themselves as
essential in their role as watchdogs. In this context, NGOs consider that their
central mission is to spearhead a critical voice regarding the expansion of
biometric surveillance technologies. In particular, to raise public awareness as
to the problems surrounding genetic data, owing to their especially sensitive
nature and the extremely high level of information contained therein regard-
ing a wide range of human features (from information on physical features, to
health condition, biological kinship, etc.) (Nuffield Council on Bioethics,
2007). Civil society organizations also express concerns about an overemphasis
on criminality-related genetic explanations and the enunciation of apprehen-
sions regarding the retention of children’s DNA and the overrepresentation
of specific minorities in genetic databases (Amelung & Machado, 2019;
Skinner, 2012).
This chapter aims to explore the views expressed by European-based NGO
representatives who have accompanied and been critically engaged with the
development of forensic DNA databases, as well as the implementation of
innovative and controversial genetic technologies in the criminal justice
system. The NGOs in question have stakes in specific public issues involving
the use of genetics within security policies, police activities, and in the realm
of criminal courts. We aim to understand how these NGOs self-definition
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regarding their own goals and functions relate to meanings, value and power
structures of forensic DNA databases and innovative forensic genetic tech-
nologies. This analysis was based on 11 interviews conducted between 2016
and 2019 with NGO representatives from different European countries. The
selection of NGOs and representatives in question was based upon a review
of public reports on forensic genetics and state surveillance, as well as news
coverage on these subjects.
The issues guiding our investigation seek to answer the following ques-
tions: what is the role and mission of NGOs regarding the development and
expansion of forensic DNA databases and innovations in forensic genetic
technologies? From NGOs’ standpoint, what are the main issues at stake
regarding the use of genetics in criminal justice? What do NGOs perceive to
be the main risks and potential threats to human rights? From their per-
spective, which publics are most affected by the expansion of the said
technologies?
NGOs have reacted critically to the expansion of “genetic surveillance,”
defined by Robin Williams and Matthias Wienroth as the process by which
the expansion of forensic DNA databases and forensic genetic technologies
enable “new forms of biological surveillance of citizens, residents, visitors,
migrants” (Williams & Wienroth, 2017, p. 6). According to the authors, the
main points of controversy identified by NGOs regarding the collection and
use of human genetic material for control of criminality are: first, the
increased surveillance of citizens, as well as questions about which agencies
will have access to DNA samples and profiles and for what purposes; second,
enthusiasm for the increasing size and scope of forensic DNA databases, and
optimistic public expectations around emergent forensic DNA technologies
suggesting that these tools are an easily available solution to enhance public
security; and third, the problems of governance of forensic DNA profiling and
databasing, in light of lack of transparency and accountability aggravated by
the restricted participation of non-police actors in policy and decision-making
(Williams & Wienroth, 2017)
NGOs in several European countries have, therefore, brought the debate to
the public sphere and directly questioned their respective countries’ govern-
ments about the risks generated by the expansive growth of genetic databases
and the increasing use of other genetic technologies in criminal investigation
procedures and policing activities. In terms of general trends, NGOs defend a
deep change in state genetic surveillance practices targeting criminalized or
especially vulnerable populations, emphasizing the need to build in regulatory
and legal measures that might ensure data protection of human genetic data
and guarantee the preservation of human dignity and civil freedoms. Among
many other aspects, their policy ambitions have, in the words of Williams and
Wienroth, focused on:
The establishment, exercise, and monitoring of powers necessary for the
effective and ethical collection and use of such materials, and the balance
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between the state use of these powers and the rights – to autonomy, lib-
erty, privacy, and justice – of individual subjects.
(Williams & Wienroth, 2017, p. 6)
Despite academic, social, and political acknowledgement of the role played by
some of these organizations,1 few empirical investigations from the branch of the
social sciences have explored how NGOs construe their role and action in the
domain of governance of ethical, legal and social aspects of forensic DNA
databases and forensic genetic technologies (for an exception, see Samuel &
Prainsack, 2019). This chapter aims to contribute towards expanding knowledge
on this topic through an analysis of interviews with NGO representatives, as
relevant stakeholders in the area of forensic genetic technologies, using the defi-
nition advanced byMarinaMicheli and colleagues (2020) in the following terms:
stakeholders are all actors, such as individuals, organizations, and groups, who
are affected by, or have an effect on, the way in which data is governed and the
value that is created from it. Stakeholders differ widely in terms of the possibi-
lities to access, control, and process data, as well as knowledge about how data is
collected and treated (Micheli et al., 2020, p. 5).
Understanding how NGOs construe their own role in the ethical, social,
and political debate around the risks of genetic surveillance requires building
an analytical repertoire that is apt to map multiple views which are contingent
as well as historically and socially situated. In this chapter we anchor our
analysis on the notion of “data politics” (Bigo, Isin, & Ruppert, 2019; Rup-
pert, Isin, & Bigo, 2017). Data politics recognizes the performative power of
data as a force for generating new forms of power relations (Machado &
Granja, 2020), and also draws attention to the mutability of data, illuminat-
ing how they are adapted to different purposes by diverse stakeholders (Bates,
Lin, & Goodale, 2016; Leonelli, 2016). Data politics also allows approaching
data as an “object of investment,” produced by the social actors and organi-
zations claiming a stake in its meanings and functioning (Ruppert et al., 2017,
p. 5). Considering such a framework, we consider the views and actions of
different stakeholders on the governance of data as a heterogeneous, rela-
tional, situated, and contingent instantiation of stakeholders’ roles, their
goals, and the values guiding their actions, as well as the mechanisms they use
to address ethical and societal challenges so as to adopt a responsible
approach to data (Micheli et al., 2020, pp. 3–6). In addition, we draw on the
work of Davide Beraldo and Stefania Millan − namely their exploration of
the “contentious politics of data” (Beraldo & Milan, 2019). The con-
ceptualization proposed by the authors considers the “multiplicity of bottom-
up, transformative initiatives interfering with and/or hijacking dominant, top-
down processes of datafication, by contesting existing power relations and
narratives and/or by re-appropriating data practices and infrastructure for
purposes distinct from the intended” (Beraldo & Milan, 2019, p. 2)
Within such a framework, this chapter addresses how NGOs, in claiming
their role and responsibility in the public debate about the use of forensic
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DNA databases and genetic technologies as an aid to criminality-related
governance, adopt a contentious approach to data politics by construing
genetic data as “objects of investment.” We argue that the meanings attrib-
uted by NGOs to genetic data as an aid to criminal justice system activities
are intended to claim spaces for acting and legitimating their intervention in
the data regimes, by being active in the politics of data.
The role and mission of NGOs in the field of forensic genetic
technologies
The universe of NGOs presents a significant diversity, namely, between orga-
nizations whose primary goal is to fight different forms of human rights vio-
lations caused by the uses of genetic data; organizations with a scientific
focus, seeking to promote knowledge on questions raised by biometric tech-
nologies; or even government-funded but politically independent organiza-
tions whose goal is to monitor the uses of the said technologies. Our
interviewees represent such diversity in terms of NGOs’ mission. However,
these categories are not impervious insofar as some NGOs may act on several
of these fronts simultaneously or complementarily.
Acknowledging the social risks and ethical challenges raised by the use of
forensic genetic technologies in criminality governance is at the heart of
NGOs’ activities. Thus, with the mission to become a critical voice on the
expansion of state surveillance, the work of NGOs seeks to promote a (re)
balance of power as it poses a threat to the rights of the “biological citizen,”,
emphasizing the means by which genetic technologies lead to the violation of
human rights: “I would say that there is a risk of systemic violation of rights”
(Interview G07). By constructing genetic data as “objects of investment”
(Ruppert et al., 2017, p. 5), the work of NGOs, therefore, places a significant
focus on the connections between ethical questions associated with the uses
and expansion of biometric surveillance technologies and human rights issues,
as illustrated in the following excerpt:
Our role is also to view the ethical approach through the lenses of human
rights, to make it more rooted in the European charter of fundamental
rights, and to somehow combine the ethical and bioethics discourse with
the human rights discourse, because they often talk about the same issues
but seem still a bit separate worlds.
(Interview G07)
The role of NGOs in promoting civic education on issues of science and
technology and the stimulating information exchange regarding the social and
moral dilemmas accompanying technological change in the field of forensic
genetics, was also frequently emphasized by interviewees. Generally speaking,
our interlocutors underlined the fact that their intervention is based on pro-
viding a critical questioning of technological developments that might intrude
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upon the privacy of civic freedoms, thus stimulating public interest on the
nature and implications of said developments, as expressed by one of the
interviewees.
Our aim is to ensure that genetics is used in the public interest, and that’s by
trying to give people a say about genetic technologies and the impacts on them
(…). So all (…) to take a perspective that is focused on preserve human rights.
And so, we’re looking out at the use of these technologies in that perspective.
(Interview D05)
On this point, the following interview excerpt illustrates NGOs concern
with promoting trust building initiatives with the aim to provide the public
with transparent information about the risks of forensic genetic technologies
and to engage with social movements claiming for stricter and more trans-
parent control over data protection issues as a means to protect citizens from
abusive uses of state surveillance:
We try to provide critical, commented and interpreted information on
genetic developments to the public, and to explain the implications for
society. We also engage in specific campaigns, specific petitions with
social movements on these topics. Because the first step is transparent
information, not only about scientific and technological developments,
but also their implications on society, which power structures are they
embedded in, which implications do they have for change in society.
(Interview O03)
Another domain of intervention claimed by interviewees for NGO activity is
the promotion of a democratic engagement of affected publics in the scrutiny
of genetic data uses for criminal investigation purposes. Democratic engage-
ment might imply taking the discussion of surveillance-related issues to a
wider public debate, enabling a model of decision-making that aspires to a
collective political movement that can articulate different agendas and specific
interests (Amelung & Machado, 2019). Such initiatives illustrate a con-
tentious approach to the data politics, inasmuch as citizens and civil society
entities are becoming increasingly aware of the issues at stake, as well as of
the opportunities for democratic empowerment embodied in data practices
(Beraldo & Milan, 2019, p. 4). In the words of the following interviewee,
NGOs should mobilize not only citizens, but also (and primarily) profes-
sionals and organizations from different fields, whose cooperation can gen-
erate a broader social impact:
… [our] aim is to provide news and information, and analysis and
research, on developments in relation to the law and the powers and
policies of state agencies, in order to inform the activities and responses
of society at large, or journalists, lawyers, students, advocacy groups and
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so on, within our various areas of interest, such as policing, or migration,
police surveillance, criminal law, agencies and so on.
(Interview D16)
The model of political participation, engaged with public decision-makers, is
also an ambition for NGOs of a more institutional character and with a more
permanent presence in the public sphere, interacting with scientists, human-
rights experts, and political actors both nationally and transnationally. Although
these kinds of NGOs have a strong monitoring and advisory role, in some cases,
as one of our interviewees pointed out referring to the NGO where he/she works
and which is partially government-financed, their role is also to embody and
create the conditions for national jurisdictions to comply with international
directives on human rights. The following excerpt, therefore, highlights the cen-
tral role of mediation between transnational and national political actors:
Virtually all Member States of the United Nations were asked by the
general assembly to install a so-called national human rights institution,
which basically has this special role of monitoring the implementation
status of the new international human rights convention in the Member
States. We are not just doing monitoring I would say, but we also take an
advisory role for politics in order to further the protection and advance-
ment of human rights in our country.
(Interview O12)
Inspired by the work of Marina Micheli and colleagues (2020), we outline on
table 7.1 the main characterizing features of NGOs regarding forensic DNA
databases and forensic genetic technologies, including their fields of action,
goals, values, mechanisms and procedures. Within this framework, goals are
conceived as “value-based objectives established by different stakeholders for
governing data” (Micheli et al., 2020, p. 5).
In the context of NGOs’ self-description of their roles in the field of forensic
genetic technologies, goals range from a critique of state surveillance aimed at
(re)balancing power in terms of the threats posed on the rights of the “biological
citizen,” to informing the public about science and technology innovations and
adopting a responsible approach to genetic data. Values refer to the expected
results (Micheli et al., 2020) which, in the case of NGOs claiming to have a role
and responsibility in the domain of public debates about genetic surveillance,
reflect upon the protection of human rights, the democratic engagement of
decision-makers and affected publics, and the promotion of transparency and
accountability. Finally, by mechanisms and procedures we understand the “the
strategies and instruments adopted by different agents to achieve their goals and
direct change in a socio-technical system” (Micheli et al., 2020, p. 5). Concerning
the theme in point, mechanisms include watchdog actions, trust-building initia-
tives, co-construction of decision-making policies, and taking on monitoring and
advisory roles.
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As previously explained, according to the analytical repertoire adopted in
this chapter, focused on understanding our interlocutors’ narratives in the
light of the concept of data politics (Bigo et al., 2019), the views and actions
of NGOs constitute a heterogeneous, relational, situated, and contingent
instantiation. The meanings and significance attributed to their goals, to the
values guiding their actions and to the mechanisms used to address ethical
and societal challenges, thus serve as spaces of public visibility and legitima-
tion. In other words, and as the next section of the chapter will describe, this
self-reflection of NGOs about their place and impact on society relates to the
broader prevailing cultural, political, historical, ethical, and economic context
resulting from a mediation between the transnational sphere and the local
and national levels at which particular NGOs operate.
Diversity of non-governmental organizations within Europe
By conducting interviews with representatives of NGOs that operate in dif-
ferent European countries, some of which are part of international networks,
it is very clear how the diversity of historical and political trajectories of for-
ensic genetics within the European context affects the role and impact of
NGOs (Amelung & Machado, 2019). Such a differentiated impact is also
influenced by the heterogeneity, within the European context (Amelung,
Table 7.1 Summary of NGOs’ role and mission in the field of forensic genetic
technologies
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Granja & Machado, 2020), of political and democratic regimes with varied
and complex implications on assertions about social order, affirmations of
common values and civil rights, and promises about security and justice
(Wienroth, Morling & Williams, 2014).
An empirical case that is especially revealing of the NGOs visibility in
terms of the social and ethical challenges posed by forensic technologies is the
United Kingdom. The UK’s National criminal Intelligence DNA Database
(the oldest DNA database in the world) is an illustrative example of how
expanding the criteria for collecting and storing DNA data in a database for
criminal identification purposes might generate public controversies and
instigate worries about threats to human rights and civil liberties (Amankwaa,
2018; Williams & Johnson, 2008). The expansion of the forensic DNA data-
base in the UK, which ultimately led to the creation of the largest databases
in the world, brought about what has become known as an example of
“maximum surveillance society” conceived to put a discrete population of
“active criminals” in a “closed circuit” of surveillance (Williams & Johnson,
2004). In light of this scenario, several civil society groups and NGOs have
campaigned against the expansion of genetic surveillance, defending the pro-
tection of human rights and echoing demands for more civic accountability
(Amelung & Machado, 2019; Wilson-Kovacs, Wyatt, & Hauskeller, 2012).
Previous studies based on the UK context have equated NGOs construing of
their role and place in the public arena as processes that have accompanied
the historical development of the UK’s national DNA database throughout.
The UK’s example, therefore, was mentioned by our interviewees as an
emblematic instance of a consolidated presence in the public sphere of diverse
NGOs. These organizations dedicate their activity to denouncing state sur-
veillance activities, while also potentially defending quite different courses of
action, agendas, and interests. In the words of one interviewee:
In the UK specifically, there is a whole range of different organizations
concerned with state and corporate surveillance, with different sort of
political agendas or alignments, more or less radical, more or less media
friendly, and sometimes they do things wrong and sometimes they do not.
(Interview D16)
In a different situation, although equally embedded in the specificity of their
national contexts, our interviewees also pointed out the complex and parti-
cularly visible challenges posed on NGOs dealing with human rights in Eur-
opean countries with a recent legacy of dictatorial and oppressive regimes. In
these contexts, the role of NGOs that address genetics and biotechnology-
related issues from a human rights perspective is looked upon with suspicion
by some state agencies. One of our interviewees mentioned the tensions gen-
erated by the NGO’ work, given that since their activity depended on inter-
national collaborations, it seemed to arouse more suspicions, for fear that it
might reflect upon and put into question the reputation of national police
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agencies and government. According to this testimony, mistrust of NGOs
working at an international level is an endemic problem to former communist
eastern European countries:
Every organization which receives foreign funding is [in former commu-
nist countries in Europe] considered a “foreign agent,” which sounds
almost as a spy (…) The cooperation with international organizations is
also treated as treason. NGOs are accused that they are ruining the
reputation of the country by preparing reports on human rights abuses
and talking to people outside national jurisdiction (…) the next step will
probably be to limit the activities of NGOs.
(Interview G07)
Acknowledging that the context in which an NGO operates strongly influ-
ences the latitude of a contentious politics of data (Beraldo & Milan, 2019),
therefore becomes a crucial matter. While in some contexts, with a long his-
tory of contestation, there is place for an ample diversity of NGOs to operate
with different roles and missions, in contexts marked by an endemic suspicion
and mistrust, the possibility for action is faced with enormous obstacles. The
following sections of this chapter will explore NGOs’ constructions and defi-
nitions of roles, missions, and spheres of action from the perspective of social
actors who are members of these organizations, looking out especially for
critical views about the expansion of genetic surveillance and subsequent
exacerbation of discrimination over specific groups that are more susceptible
to criminalization.
Critique of the current landscape of genetic surveillance
Expansion of genetic surveillance
The starting point for NGO action is the trend of genetic surveillance
expansion, generally accompanied by a generally enthusiastic public accep-
tance. At an initial stage, the tendency in most countries is to create genetic
databases following strict criteria of DNA profile collection and storage (for
example, limiting data to the collection of genetic profiles of serious crime
offenders). However, subsequent developments tend to give rise to changes in
the criteria, leading, for instance, to include suspects and persons convicted
for crimes considered less serious. This movement of loosening the criteria of
collection might result in the disproportionate expansion of database size,
with implications for thousands of people. Several of our interviewees com-
mented on the fact that legislative changes to increase genetic surveillance
through DNA profile criminal databases and other biometric databases tend
to occur in political atmospheres that instill fear of crime and threats to col-
lective security. In the following excerpt, one of our interviewees characterizes
such a phenomenon occurring at the level of the European Union on the
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whole, referring the lack of democratic debate, whose importance is obscured
by “feelings of urgency”:
The proposals [for changing legislation] are all introduced in a language
in terms of crisis and urgency and the need to do things very quickly,
which means that things may not be done very well. The EU legislative
process is already extremely flawed from a democratic perspective. Pro-
posing to introduce new methods of biometric data collection and storage
at that level, and collection of data from more people, without making
sure that there is time for all considerations and debates, with magistrates
being pressured all the time by this sense of urgency and crisis, is poten-
tially very problematic. And also unhealthy in what is supposed to be a
democratic system.
(Interview D16)
The situated cultural embedding of technology and innovation influences the
public acceptance, ethics and accountability of innovations (Bowman, Stokes,
& Rip, 2017; Pfotenhauer & Jasanoff, 2017; Rip, 2017). The concept of
“imaginaries of innovation” proposed by Pfotenhauer and Jasanoff (2017),
allows us to deconstruct the almost omnipresent rhetoric of technological
innovation and to map the cultural and political elements surrounding tra-
jectories of innovation. The authors explore, on the one hand, the culturally
distinct collective “self-diagnosis” of current societal problems and the
understandings of why a particular innovation is needed and perceived as a
“cure”; on the other hand, which social and institutional changes and reac-
tions would be acceptable in this context. In the case of our current analysis,
we would say that the diagnosis made by NGO representatives is that of a
society tending to express enthusiasm over the expansion of databases and
forensic genetic technologies for criminal investigation purposes. The reasons
for this to happen are diverse: from the influence of media on public in gen-
eral, as well as political decision-makers’ enthusiasm with the potential of
DNA technologies to solve crime problems.
Media influence on the expansion of genetic surveillance takes pride of
place in the narratives of participants in this study. Members of NGOs con-
sider the media to convey an inaccurate portrayal of DNA technologies. By
exaggerating the possibilities, the speed and the outcomes of DNA technolo-
gies in solving crimes and enhancing public security, media narratives are
perceived by NGOs representatives as failing to provide a comprehensive
description of the inherent risks of genetic technologies. Such a portrayal
implies that critical perspectives on the implications of such technologies,
anchored in the defense of human right protection, are absent from media-
constructed narratives, as one participants manifests:
The public debate connect[s] very simply to the politics and the desires of
the security (…) without developing any critical reporting on their own.
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(…) Data protection, questions about civil rights and the constitutional
state don’t play any role at all, neither does exact information regarding
the scientific foundation, the technical foundation.
(Interview O03)
The general public is considered by interviewees to be highly susceptible to
media influence, usually portraying DNA technologies as infallible (Amelung
et al., 2020; Cole & Dioso-Villa, 2009). In the words of one interviewee, the
public’s enthusiasm with technologies such as genetic profiling reflects a pre-
valent trend in popular culture of the idea that the identification of persons
through DNA provides a kind of “truth machine” (Lynch et al., 2008):
What I feel is that the general public (…) they think that DNA is gold. As
soon as DNA is found on a crime scene, you can solve the issue because
DNA will prove who has done it. I think that this is why it is a bit proble-
matic, a lot of people do not know that DNA is not as easy as saying. So, I
think there is a big gap in information in the general public as to the use-
fulness of DNA and the risks that DNA profiles carry with them (…) this is
why the debate issues lead in the direction if we need to have more of these
DNA profiles, because it will become easier to solve cases.
(Interview A11)
Besides adopting a critical stance on how the media portray genetic technol-
ogies used for criminal investigation purposes, influencing the public to favour
its expansion, interviewees also highlight the role of media in some legislative
changing processes. Specifically, they point out how these agents set the
ground for the expansion of genetic surveillance by exploring prominent
criminal cases that attract high public attention (Jong & M’charek, 2017;
M’charek, Toom & Jong, 2020; Machado & Santos, 2009, 2011) – see also
Chapter 5. One of the interviewed persons described the enormous media
pressure felt in the wake of certain high profile criminal cases, which influ-
enced the government to ponder introducing changes in legislation to increase
the number of individuals whose genetic profile should be included in the
forensic database.
[There were two high-profile criminal cases] that caused quite a bit of a
stir in my country, and the public debate was generally one: that everyone
should provide their DNA to solve these cases. There was not a lot of
counterbalancing, at least not from within society.
(Interview A11)
Criminal cases that attract great public attention have thus played, in sev-
eral countries, a central role in legitimizing the creation and expansion of
forensic genetic databases and/or the introduction of controversial genetic
technologies. Garnering emotional support from the public by nurturing
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compassion and sympathy for the victims as well as feelings of moral repul-
sion against offenders (Machado & Santos, 2009), genetic technologies are
portrayed by the media as responding to public needs of security and justice,
thus attenuating (or obscuring) its risks. Consequently, such criminal cases
create a context in which the general public appears to be largely in favour of
expanding different forms of genetic surveillance and politicians appear
favourable to legislative changes. This potential to influence public opinion
and the legislative framework, generates apprehension and concern among
NGO representatives, as the following interviewees attest:
“But what’s so bad of that if you catch the bad people with it?” And this
is the perception of many, many people in the society (…) the police is
very much making use of highlighting crime cases. (…) I mean, there’s
nothing in the media about all the risks or the problems with that.
(Interview O04)
I think that in practice the media would put something on the agenda, so
if there is a big case, for example, then suddenly everyone thinks it is
important and the parliamentarians would start running and yelling that
something needs to be done. So, the media is, almost always, the one who
puts something on the agenda.
(Interview A11)
Media discourse that conveys unrealistic and inflated views on potential
contributions of DNA analysis to criminal investigation processes, coupled
with the general public and politicians’ enthusiastic responses are, therefore,
considered by all interviewees to be the main reasons for the general trend of
public acceptance of genetic surveillance expansion. Several academic studies
in the fields of the social sciences socio-legal studies confirm that these trends
of public acceptance of genetic database expansion and other forensic genetic
technologies (Amankwaa, 2018; Machado & Silva, 2014, 2016, 2019), result-
ing from the alliance of state and law enforcement agencies with some sectors
of the scientific community and the media, curtails the space for visible cri-
tical action and public awareness campaigns on the risks of these technolo-
gies. Thus, the adoption of a “contentious politics of data,” seeking to
question relations of power and reappropriate data practices and infra-
structures (Beraldo & Milan, 2019), is made enormously difficult. The fol-
lowing excerpts exemplify the opinion of interviewees on this point:
It is becoming increasingly difficult to defend the idea that you want the
DNA profiles to be limited or at least the DNA database to be limited.
(Interview A11)
Of course we are, as an NGO, or human rights activists or lawyers, we
are concerned about state surveillance and express that concern. And we
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gather some support for that, but the fact that those bills are being
adopted without a huge public outcry would suggest that the concerns
are not as big as ours, and that in the end the people are convinced that it
is for their own safety and that the reasons of security outweigh the
privacy concerns.
(Interview G07)
The notion that the general public responds enthusiastically (or otherwise
indifferently) to DNA profile databases and forensic genetic technologies, has
been explained as a trend associated with cultural and social processes of
differentiation between law-abiding citizens and criminal offenders. As Helena
Machado and Susana Silva (2016) put it, in connection to public surveys and
opinion polls about the acceptance of DNA profile database expansion:
(…) the application of genetic technologies in the field of forensic criminal
investigation is viewed as having important implications in terms of labelling
the moral status of individuals, distinguishing, for example, between crim-
inal suspects and “non-suspects.” These classifications are also associated
with the hierarchies of trust placed in judicial and scientific institutions, dif-
ferentiating between the fears of dangers and the collective and individual
expectations of the potential benefits.
(Machado & Silva, 2016, p. 337)
In this context, the enthusiasm for DNA technologies and the acceptance of
genetic technology expansion and development might be questioned from the
moment the public is confronted with the effacement of differences between
non-suspect populations and criminals. The case of UK’s DNA profile data-
bases has been frequently mentioned by interviewees as a notorious example
of such tensions. According to one of our interviewees, the initial stages of
creating a forensic genetic database in the UK did not arouse much con-
troversy or public debate (Downey, Stephens, & Flaherty, 2012). However, as
the criteria of collection and storage of profiles were broadened, allowing the
genetic data of suspects or even children to be stored permanently, the data-
base problem was no longer viewed by the public as something that only
concerned individuals who had committed crimes. From the moment people
felt implicated in the network of suspicion, society at large began to find this
concerning development to deserve its attention (Skinner & Wienroth, 2019).
In the opinion of the following interviewee, the fact that people began to feel
themselves and their families being enmeshed in the web of suspicion, led to
an engagement with this problem unseen thus far:
In the UK what happened is because ordinary people started being
caught up in the system, particularly children, because there was a push
at the same time to tackle anti-social behaviour and arrest children for
very minor offences. Then you did get ordinary people on the streets that
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were engaged in the debate, and you know, actually talking about that
kind of thing… But that’s quite unusual, and I think it did result from the
fact the people’s own families were affected, or they knew people… We’ve
reached a state where most people knew somebody whose child or
themselves were on the database. Perhaps that is not normally the case;
normally you’re seeing other people, you know, criminals that’s real
criminals, so that is a good thing, so… I think there is an issue of how to
engage people in the debate if they don’t feel they are going to be affected
personally.
(Interview D05)
Notwithstanding the existence of some manifestations among the general
public against the inordinate expansion of genetic databases, as in the UK’s
example, there is a relatively uniform tendency favouring the expansion of
genetic surveillance throughout European countries. Such a tendency sub-
stantiates what previous literature had called the expected development of a
“logic of convergence” (Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 2010; Machado & Silva,
2009) under which the growth in scope of all national databases, constituting
an ever-widening population of genetic suspects, is assumed as an inevitable
outcome. Some of our interlocutors even referred to the creation of universal
databases (including the genetic profiles of the whole population) in non-
European contexts (Wallace et al., 2014), showing their concern with this
phenomenon:
The moment when basically entire parts of the population or the entire
population is being captured indiscriminately, entire new questions
emerge. When you look at what is happening in Saudi Arabia or partly
also in China where indeed the entire population is recorded genetically –
there we don’t just have a problem of discrimination, there we have a
general problem of state surveillance, meaning that at any point you can
be controlled, monitored, identified, accused, prosecuted and so on.
(Interview O07)
Another domain identified by interviewees as highly conducive towards a
logic of convergence is connected to the power of industries and lobbies
interested in expanding the forensic genetics market. From the point of view
of NGO representatives, the expansion of increasingly integrated genetic sur-
veillance systems reflects market interest in expanding and make databases
more and more interoperable. The following interview excerpts underline how
NGO representatives interpret the commercial and political interests under-
lying the design of security policies generally associated with concerns about
terrorism and crime fighting in Europe. From the standpoint of our interviewees,
this expansion results from a strategic confluence between the commercial and
economic interests of IT corporations, security and law-enforcement agencies,
and political decision-makers.
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The plans for interoperability of databases [involve intensively] industry
expertise (…) contracting from transnational IT and technology cor-
porations (…) My hunch is that one of the main drivers for the process
leading to interoperability is that the industry has told to a lot of public
officials: “This is great, you should do it, and we can do it for you. And it
will be easy, do not worry about that.” So, most times it is more than just
a sort of technocratic management agency, it also has a political stuff in
advocating for interoperability proposals and various other measures.
(Interview D16)
Some countries and some industry players were like pushing projects for
the whole EU (…). The idea was having a project among some Member
States where it’s easy to install and easy to get running, and then you can
explain it as “Look, how successful we have this exchange. Let other
countries connect. Why don’t we make European system of legislation on
that?”
(Interview O04)
Despite these developments in genetic surveillance towards a logic of con-
vergence, genetic surveillance’s greatest impact is still undeniably directed at
individuals and groups considered high-risk (Williams & Johnson, 2004). The
next section of this chapter will explore how NGO representatives give
meaning to processes of social, ethical, and racial discrimination of particular
social groups. This is one of the main aspects of how NGOs working in the
domain of human rights and data protection and privacy safeguards view the
perceptions and development of public concerns related to criminal DNA
databases and innovations in forensic genetic technologies. In other words,
NGOs’ recognition of a positive and enthusiastic “public” reception of genetic
databases does not preclude a “contentious politics of data” (Beraldo &
Milan, 2019) that outlines the need to identify and acknowledge public pro-
blems and risks affecting particular groups more directly and acutely.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, our approach to the “data
politics” performed by NGOs implies interpreting interviewees’ narratives
as a situational and relational study object. Thus, we find that our con-
ceptual repertoire gains by incorporating Nina Amelung and Helena
Machado’s (2019) argument as to the need to go beyond conventional
approaches to public understanding of forensic genetics. The authors pro-
pose, in the wake of authors such as Noortje Marres (2005) and Mike
Michael (2009), focusing on how collective issues create publics in the
domain of forensic genetics, namely by mobilizing people who are indirectly
and seriously affected, forming a distinctive enough group to require recog-
nition. In light of this, the next section of this chapter will analyse NGOs’
views on a group of publics construed as especially problematic, owing to
their acute vulnerability to forensic genetic database surveillance, namely
immigrants, refugees and racialized minorities.
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Genetic surveillance and suspect communities
“Illegal migration,” “transnational organized crime” and “terrorism” have
become standard political “categories of blame” (Aas, 2013). Such categories
serve to legitimize rigorous and sometimes extreme measures to defend states
and societies against their perceived enemies. One of the structuring character-
istics of surveillance technology use, both in the ideological as in the operational
and technical domain, is the growing connection between crime management,
terrorism and migration policies (Aas, 2011; Ajana, 2013; Amelung et al., 2020;
Amoore, 2013; Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Broeders, 2007; M’charek, Schramm &
Skinner, 2014; Skinner, 2018a; Tutton, Hauskeller, & Sturdy, 2014). As shown by
David Skinner, “notions of citizenship, mutual benefit and of deserving and
undeserving subjects are built into the architecture and conventions of security
systems” (Skinner, 2018a, p. 3). While research has shown that national DNA
databases tend to reflect policing practices that usually target minorities, such as
foreigners and racial monitories (Chow-White & Duster, 2011; Duster, 2006;
Skinner, 2013, 2018a), less is known about how genetic surveillance targeting
migrants and other risky populations is being directed towards both justifying,
implementing, and normalizing transnational networks of DNA data exchange
(see Chapter 3 in this book).
Nonetheless, the narratives of NGO members interviewed for this study
reveal many concerns with the growing affinity between migration and crime
control, as well as with how genetic surveillance is becoming increasingly
transversal across different domains of action. Interviewees find meaning in
their action and mission in terms of their contribution to a public criticism of
how vulnerable populations, namely migrants, refugees, and racialized mino-
rities, become the primary targets of genetic surveillance and are amalga-
mated into the category of “suspect communities.” Following Christina
Pantazis and Simon Pemberton’s proposal, we adopt the concept of “suspect
community” as referring to:
A sub-group of the population that is singled out for state attention as
being “problematic.” Specifically, in terms of policing, individuals may be
targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected wrongdoing, but simply
because of their presumed membership to that sub-group.
(Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009, p. 649)
In the words of the following interviewees, migrants are prominent examples
of “suspect communities” in the eyes of police agencies and state surveil-
lance. In their view, there is a systemic pattern of discrimination and pre-
judice towards these social groups, which projects and reinforces stereotypes
according to which certain communities are considered particularly prone to
commit crimes. This process occurs within a setting where human rights and
privacy protection are suspended and police action operates without control
or constraint of potential human-right abuses:
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The idea that migrants are more likely to commit crimes or more sus-
ceptible to becoming criminals, or alternatively that because there is
information available the police should have access to it, but without
certain safeguards and provisions, but that is still sort of the basic prin-
ciple underlying giving them access to it. (…) In the case of the migra-
tion, asylum databases, it seems to me they are designed to implement
policies which in many cases are extremely harmful…
(Interview D16)
With regards to non-national citizens it is the Wild West, the police can
do whatever they want.
(Interview G07)
The heightened vulnerability of migrant groups to state and police surveil-
lance based on biometric systems (whether DNA profiles or any other kind of
biometric data technology, such as facial recognition or fingerprinting) is also
sharply summed up in the following interview passage, which refers to how
technological innovations tend to be initially tested on migrant populations:
I am quite right to say, that migrants are guinea pigs for introducing
more surveillance capacity in the European Union (…) the purpose of the
government is to collect as many data about migrants because they are
one of the biggest receiving countries.
(Interview O04)
Therefore, all interviewees recognized the dramatically expanded DNA sur-
veillance of migrants through which many countries collect DNA from
immigration detainees and store their genetic information in the respective
national database (Aas, 2011; Makhlouf, 2020; Tutton et al., 2014). The fol-
lowing excerpt also reveals the ethically troubling nature of the expansion of
DNA surveillance of immigrants since no oversight mechanisms are in place
to address the potential privacy harms that it creates.
We need to be sure that all that information technology including taking
DNA from migrants is used in a responsible way (…). Is the system built
in such a way that people can take responsibility? Can they access the
information?
(Interview A10)
Suspect communities, including immigrant and refugee groups, are there-
fore part of a collective modality of suspicion that very clearly affects groups
and populations which are more liable to the discretionary power of the
criminal justice system. Considering the substantial opacity enfolding state
surveillance practices, representatives of NGOs call for the need to implement
regulation frameworks and mechanisms of oversight capable of producing
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accountability and transparency. As outlined by the following interviewee, the
publication of bulk statistics is insufficient to grasp the complexities of how data
is being collected and used, or how it discriminates between different groups.
I know that what they are only required to do is provide like bulk statis-
tics, and in a way gives opportunity to control how this is performed.
With how they access data, I would say no, there is no information (…)
But the law, as far as I know, does not create the obligation for the
agencies to report publicly, to create some kind of transparency report of
what they are doing with regards to data collection.
(Interview G07)
Besides calling for the need to implement oversightmechanisms in pre-established
surveillance practices, the narratives of NGO representatives also express the need
to adopt an approach to data politics that critically addresses innovative genetic
technologies at a research and development stage, considering its potential to con-
solidate stigmatization and discrimination of certain suspect communities. This is
what Matthias Wienroth calls “anticipatory governance deliberations,” which
mobilize the promise of the new technological capabilities, while managing expec-
tations about its operational, epistemic, and legal dimensions (Wienroth, 2018).
Racialized genetic surveillance
Coupled with the growing surveillance over refugees and immigrants through pre-
established systems of transnational data collection and exchange, we also witness
the development of forensic genetic technologies, which find favourable conditions
for their implementation and legitimation in the dominant rhetoric about the fight
against crime. A particularly illustrative example of how a technology might be
linkedwith systemic modes of discrimination is forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP)
(see Chapter 6 in this book), a constellation of techniques that infer physical fea-
tures, such as eye, skin and hair colour, as well as information about biogeographic
ancestry, from biological samples found at crime-scenes (Granja & Machado,
2020; Granja, Machado, & Queirós, 2020; Wienroth, 2018). Considering how
FDP is directly related to racialization (M’charek et al., 2020; Queirós, 2019;
Skinner, 2018b), since it produces inferences about the racial or ethnic appearance
of as yet unknown suspects, most interviewees tend to adopt a very critical view of
it, underlining its potential to consolidate racial discrimination. As straightfor-
ward enunciated by one of the interviewees:
I think that with phenotyping the danger of racist discrimination is increas-
ing enormously.
(Interview O12)
From the point of view of our interviewees, in assessing the risks associated
with FDP, two main elements must be taken into consideration, which in turn
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are linked with two distant stages of a technology’s social life (Kruse, 2016),
namely, its development and implementation. Regarding the development of
FDP, interviewees outline how this technology relies on a computerized
comparison that uses reference databases with variable composition, repre-
sentativeness and organization. This implies that results are based upon
cohort biases (Granja et al., 2020; Skinner, 2018b), which raises doubts about
its reliability. This perspective is illustrated by the following interviewee:
These databases which are necessary for it, and also the collection of data
from the population which is necessary for it, that they alone constitute
discrimination against people by their looks or even their origin, which is
very closely linked to a danger of racist discrimination.
(Interview O03)
In addition, NGO representatives outline the risks associated with the fact that
FDP is anchored on probabilistic statistics (Hopman & M’charek, 2020). The
implications are two-fold: first, there is certain degree of uncertainty associated
with the interpretation of forensic DNA technologies that must be considered
and managed in the use of FDP in criminal cases. Second, the results of FDP
cannot be communicated as a definitive certainty. Instead, they are commu-
nicated as a score of a threshold of probabilistic accuracy about each physical
feature (Granja et al., 2020). According to one of the participants, FDP there-
fore constitutes “an unfinished technology,” which presents severe risks deriving
from their potential to shed suspicion over a certain group or individual.
The risk that a lot of information is that an unfinished technology mis-
interprets probabilities, not with regard to the real population but with
regard to the probability of predictions; that there could be many wrong
suspicions.
(Interview O03)
Besides expressing concerns over technical issues in FDP, NGO representa-
tives also point out how this technology raises implementation-related issues.
More specifically, interviewees outline how this technology might relate to pre-
existing discretionary practices in police activity, associated with institutional
racism. By indicating that a given suspect is from a particular suspect commu-
nity, FDP holds the potential to further consolidate pre-existing discriminatory
practices. This perspective is illustrated by the following interviewee:
We would say that especially those expanded DNA analyses are highly
sensitive to connections with discrimination and racist associations, so
therefore we would be fundamentally against them. (…) In the daily
police practices there are currently many open questions regarding insti-
tutional racism.
(Interview O03)
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Such perspectives thereby shed light on what David Skinner terms “race
datafication” to explain how “data do not speak for itself: we should appreciate
the processes by which it is brought to light, organized, and interpreted − that is,
turned into racialized information” (Skinner, 2018b, p. 7). The creation of
racialized suspect communities through FDP implies translations between dif-
ferent contexts (laboratory, police station, media, and community) (see Kruse,
2016), in which data will be re-interpreted differently according to the context.
According to the following interviewee, by enhancing the racialized character of
potential suspects, FDP thus ends up concentrating attentions on crimes whose
suspects are racialized.
So we are not just saying in sweeping generalizations that this is all
racism, but we are saying that we see that ethnicity, geographical origin
and the expected looks, phenotypic associations, which then is directly
racialized, are directly combined. (…) Certain acts of violence are only in
the public eye at the moment if refugees or people with migration back-
ground are suspected to be the culprits.
(Interview O03)
As observed by David Skinner, “creating racialized suspect populations thus
potentially generates a double disadvantage, by directing suspicion towards
members of minorities and by inviting further group stigmatization by associa-
tion” (Skinner, 2018b, p. 18). In considering the contingencies associated to the
technology, as well as the social context in which it is embedded, characterized
by structured inequalities linked to discrimination and stigmatization of racial
and ethnic groups, representatives of NGOs therefore generally oppose the use of
FDP without a strictly regulated framework. By doing so, NGOs claim spaces
for action and legitimation to intervene in the data regimes, by being active in
the politics of data (see Table 7.2).
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Conclusion
In this chapter we aimed to explore the views of NGO representatives based
in Europe who follow and engage critically with the development of forensic
DNA databases and the application of innovative and controversial genetic
technologies in the criminal justice system. Following Didier Bigo, Engin Isin,
and Evelyn Ruppert (2019) we consider data politics to generate new forms of
power and knowledge that reconfigure relationships between subjects and
citizens. Following this premise, genetic data was approached as an “object
of investment,” in whose meanings and functioning NGOs claim a stake
(Ruppert et al., 2017, p. 5), thus carving out spaces of public visibility and
legitimation.
While addressing how NGOs perceive their role and mission in the field of
forensic genetic technologies, it is clear that, despite internal diversity and
differentiated national contexts, the main aims of NGOs associated with the
use of genetics within security policies, police activities, and in the realm of
criminal courts, are oriented towards a critique of the expansion of genetic
surveillance as a means to rebalance the power threatening the rights of the
“biological citizen.” Informing the public about science and technology
innovations, as well as enforcing the adoption of a responsible approach to
genetic data are also considered essential pillars of their mission. However,
the possibility to act on such ideals is not the same across Europe. While
some NGOs operate in contexts whose historical, social and political trajec-
tory promote public debate and facilitate public visibility of critical perspec-
tives that counterbalance the indiscriminate expansion of genetic surveillance,
other contexts are characterized by atmospheres of suspicion which hinder
such initiatives. This demonstrates the situated and contingent nature of
NGOs’ role and mission, inasmuch as they relate to the broader historical,
social-political, and economic principles embedded in each country’s specific
contexts and infrastructures.
As we address the current landscape of forensic genetics, it is clear that
NGO representatives find that critical responses to the expansion of genetic
surveillance have been largely confined within specific communities of experts.
Resistance to data collection and efforts to implement a social justice agendas
are usually unknown to the general public and political decision-makers who,
highly influenced by the media’s portrayal of DNA technologies as “truth
machines,” (Lynch et al., 2008) are usually enthusiastic about the expansion
of forensic DNA databases and/or the implementation of innovative technol-
ogies. This situation, also influenced by the omnipresent uncertainty of
threats, creates an apparent necessity and justification for taking ever-
expanding measures. Within such a setting, high profile criminal cases, con-
strued by the media as public dramas (Machado & Santos, 2009), also play a
significant role in gaining support for the expansion of genetic surveillance
(Jong & M’charek, 2017). According to NGO representatives, a further factor
influencing the expansion of genetic surveillance significantly is the power of
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industry and lobbies with an interest in the expansion of the forensic genetics
market, thus advocating in favor of expanding interoperability initiatives.
Besides engaging in a critique of the overall context of genetic surveillance
expansion, NGO representatives also argue for an increased emphasis on the
fact that genetic surveillance does not impact everyone equally. The potential for
social sorting implied in genetic surveillance ends up affecting more acutely
those groups that are more vulnerable to the action of the criminal justice system
and which require particular recognition, such as migrants, refugees and racia-
lized minorities. Being constructed as suspect communities, requiring state
attention owing to the alleged risk that they pose (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009),
such groups have an increased vulnerability to the action of state surveillance.
Representatives of NGOs therefore underline that the targeted use of forensic
DNA technologies upon such suspect communities ultimately reinforces patterns
of inequality, by directing suspicion towards members of minorities and, there-
fore, inviting further group stigmatization and criminalization (Skinner, 2018b).
Under these circumstances, NGOs assume the responsibility of reporting situa-
tions where there is a clear violation of human rights, claiming for the need to
establish routes of transparency and accountability, as well as to accomplish
“desired futures” (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015) for the governance of innovations in
forensic genetics. By creating spaces of public visibility and legitimation of their
claims, NGOs attempt to construct paths towards an active engagement with
data politics, thus instituting their contentious approach.
Note
1 In the UK, the NGO GeneWatch UK has been actively interrogating official
statements and statistics of the UK National Criminal DNA Database, as well as
appearing before several Parliamentary House of Commons Committees. In other
European countries, groups like the “Campaign against DNA collection frenzy” in
Germany and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union have been very active in bring-
ing critical standpoints related to genetic surveillance to national parliaments.
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8 Conclusion
Introduction
The expanding uses of genetic surveillance in crime governance pose impor-
tant challenges to democratic societies in the 21st century. This book has
aimed to provide empirically sustained information upon which to develop a
critical reflection on these pressing issues, namely: the many problems raised
by the emergence, consolidation and spreading of genetic surveillance for the
governance of crime in Europe; the transnational exchange of DNA data
among laboratories and police agencies in the European Union (EU); the
risks of racism, discrimination and stigmatization of groups, families, and
individuals resulting from poorly regulated forensic technologies; the growing
use of genome-wide technologies and the consequent blurring of boundaries
between the criminal and medical fields; and the prevalence of deficient civic
engagement, coupled with gaps in transparency and accountability of state
surveillance activities involving genetic technologies and criminal DNA
databases.
By addressing such topics, this book portrayed the ambiguous and con-
voluted social, cultural, political and historical processes involved in the
expansion of centralized and decentralized modes of genetic surveillance for
the governance of crime. By centralized modes1 of genetic surveillance, we
mean the genetic data stored in large, computerized databases, run by public
authorities within the criminal justice system. In this respect, we are referring
to state criminal DNA databases that operate under the legal regulation and
data sovereignty principles of national jurisdictions (Hindmarsh & Prainsack,
2010). Decentralized modes of genetic surveillance imply the activity of enti-
ties other than national DNA databases and their use of data, especially of
genetic nature, to prevent, solve and punish crimes. For example, in local
laboratories and commercial companies (Granja, 2020; Samuel & Kennett,
2020), and in networks such as the Prüm system − a decentralized database
system designed to facilitate the mandatory exchange of forensic DNA data
among EU Member States to control criminality and terrorism (Machado &
Granja, 2018; Machado, Granja, & Amelung, 2020; McCartney, Wilson &
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Williams, 2011; Prainsack & Toom, 2010, 2013) – a case study that actually
provided our empirical starting point for this work.
But although Prüm provided a starting point, our data and the scope of
our reflections greatly exceed this particular case. In this book, we explored
power relations, subjectivities and social identities constructed and performed
by geneticists and other stakeholders in the specific field of forensic genetics,
as a response to demands of the criminal justice in its endeavors to advance
criminal identification. Our reflections allowed us to explore the implications
of being a scientist, a member of transnational police agencies, or an activist
in the area of human rights dealing with genetics and crime governance in the
course of the first two decades of the 21st century. This is a particularly cru-
cial period in forensic genetics since, despite the already consolidated role
achieved by DNA technologies in providing evidence for criminal justice
(Lynch et al., 2008), the recent ongoing development of new forensic DNA
technologies – such as familial searches, forensic DNA phenotyping, and next
generation sequencing (NGS) – represent a historical turning point in terms
of the presence of forensic genetic technologies in the criminal justice system.
First, because it implies a shift in the focus of forensic science from the con-
struction of evidence to the generation of intelligence (Wienroth, 2018); and
second, because these emergent DNA technologies move the locus of sur-
veillance from individualization to collectivization (M’charek & Wade, 2020).
Thus, our enquiry into genetic surveillance for the governance of crime was
guided by the following research questions: to what extent and in what way
do shifts in power and in assumptions about knowledge, affect scientific,
policing, or activism practices? Who are the people behind the technologies,
and how do they address the difficult ethical challenges and professional
issues that arise in a period when the uses of genetic technologies in the for-
ensic field are undergoing dramatic changes?
Since our primary interlocutors were forensic geneticists, this book provides
the social sciences with a relevant contribution to understand scientists’ con-
stant endeavor to interpret the present through their projections of an ima-
gined emerging future riddled with volatility, caution and uncertainty
(Marcus, 1995). Our work also contributes to the science and technology
studies (STS) scholarship on science representation and knowledge construc-
tion, as well as to the relationships between science and politics. In line with
the influential work by Bruno Latour (1987), our work demonstrates the
extraordinary mobility of scientific representations of DNA data, showing
how scientific protocols and processes of harmonization and standardization
tend to move from particularity to universality. In the wake of our own past
work, (Amelung, Granja, & Machado, 2020a; Granja & Machado, 2020;
Machado & Granja, 2018, 2019) we have also explored how scientists’
expectations engage with distributed responsibilities among the scientific
community and the criminal justice system, legitimating and protecting the
autonomy of science in a messy, complex and sometimes ambiguous way
(Lawless, 2012).
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Although our book provides a contribution to the knowledge on “techno-
scientific imaginaries,” in the sense conveyed by other scholars in STS – as the
reflective and visionary thought of scientists in their ambiguous positionings,
practices, and locations – we have sought to go beyond the realm of the
imagination. Specifically, we outline how aims and achievements are tied to
forms of scientific production (Jasanoff, 2015), questioning how the mobility
of scientific representations contribute to reinforce distinctions between cen-
ters and peripheries (Latour, 1987) in the EU. Our ambition in this book has
also exceeded the context of science production: our work aimed to investi-
gate how the imaginings constructed by varied social actors influence the way
science and technology in the domain of forensic genetics become enmeshed
in performing and producing diverse visions of governance of crime, at a
variety of scales and affecting diverse publics.
The continuum of utopian and dystopian imaginings of
genetic surveillance
The findings presented in this book might be framed as elements deriving
from the power of imagining produced within genetic surveillance in the
governance of crime. The term “imaginings” is used here in the sense inten-
ded by a number of social theorists and philosophers, as the shared concep-
tions which enable common practices and a widely accepted sense of
legitimacy. In fact, our work has been deeply inspired by the term “socio-
technical imaginaries” − a concept coined by Sheila Jasanoff and developed
in close collaboration with Sang-Hyun Kim (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009, 2015) to
describe how visions of scientific and technological progress carry implicit
ideas about public purposes, collective futures, and the common good. The
“sociotechnical imaginaries” we have explored in this book refer, for instance,
to the continuum of utopian and dystopian imaginings of genetic surveillance
in the governance of crime, described by Robin Williams and Mathias Wien-
roth as follows:
The promissory narratives of some – policy and commercial – advocates
of the expanding uses of forensic genetics have often been contested by
social actors outside the scientific, policy and commercial networks that
are directly involved in promoting relevant innovations. While utopian
narratives might have dominated some accounts of this history, civil
society and academic groups have often offered dystopian counter narra-
tives in which the uses of forensic genetics and their consequences are
imagined quite differently.
(Williams & Wienroth, 2014, p. 15)
Over the past decades, different fields within the social sciences, and most pre-
eminently STS, have shown the distribution of visions and expectations in rela-
tion to the contrasting positioning of different actors (scientists, regulators,
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publics, etc.) in the technological innovation cycles and in the processes of
establishing technical infrastructures and stabilized scientific protocols (Lynch et
al., 2008; Lynch, 2016). In addition, STS studies have also underlined the deci-
sive role of the heterogeneous and hybrid socio-technical character of technology
and knowledge production, and how views referring to technology and its uses
are able to draw together highly heterogeneous actors (Berger & Luckmann,
1996; Hacking, 2000; Sismondo, 2003). In this book we developed an in-depth
understanding of the values, judgements, power relations, and agendas incorpo-
rated in the hopes and promises, as well as in the fears and anxieties regarding
genetic surveillance in the governance of crime. This volume has thus provided a
mapping and interpretation of visions and expectations, understanding the
extent to which “utopian” and “dystopian” visions of forensic genetic technolo-
gies are shared among different stakeholders and practitioners, or conversely
might be specific to certain stakeholders only.
Besides the pivotal role played by the concept of “sociotechnical imagin-
aries,” the work of authors such as Benedict Anderson (1983), Arjun Appa-
durai (1990), and Charles Taylor (2004) also became important tools for
deepening our understanding of genetic technologies in the governance of
crime, connecting it to broader questions of social and political theory.
Anderson’s work (1983) and his idea of an imagined community led us to
explore the subjective dimension of inclusion and exclusion of a group, be it a
professional community, a nation state or the very idea of the EU, as it is
shared or resisted by different individuals, groups and communities (Ame-
lung, Granja & Machado, 2020b). On this point, it is important to clarify the
diversity of communities whose points of view were addressed in this book.
Our use of qualitative methods from the social sciences, gave us an insight
into how “imagined communities” are formed. We were able to understand
that individuals working in forensic genetics or in EU police cooperation tend
to imagine themselves as communities in the terms proposed by Benedict
Anderson (1983): a socially constructed community, imagined by the people
who perceive themselves as members of that group. Although Anderson’s
work originally focuses on the analysis of nationalism, his conceptualization
of imagination as a means to grasp subjective and “imagined” dimension of a
community, proved highly useful for our own understanding of the complex
and sometimes contradictory nature of the narratives constructed by the par-
ticipants in our work. For instance, participants might sometimes refer to
their “European” or “international” community, in the sense of a group made
up of members scattered across different countries but working together
toward common goals, while at the same time occasionally describing them-
selves as included in logics of social exclusion and discrimination of particular
nation-states towards specific groups (non-nationals) (for further readings, see
Machado & Granja, 2019, 2020; Machado, Granja, & Amelung, 2020).
Arjun Appadurai’s work (1990) has also decisively marked our analysis by
providing a framework within which to interpret genetic surveillance in the
governance of crime as a global phenomenon, albeit constantly transfigured
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by what the author calls “imagined words” − that is, the multiple worlds
constituted by the historically shaped imaginations of groups and people spread
around the globe (see also Appadurai, 2010). The emphasis of Appadurai’s work
on the role of the imagination in legitimizing what he calls the “disjuncture and
difference in global cultural economy” (Appadurai, 1990), allows us to under-
stand the fluidity, complexity and hybridity of the expectations created by a
myriad of social actors differently positioned in relation to genetic technologies.
The results obtained in our investigation lead us to agree with Appadurai when
he affirms the complex, overlapping, and disjunctive character of the new global
cultural economy. In the light of this, appreciating how genetic surveillance in
the governance of crime is “imagined,” becomes a central point to explain two
key aspects: on the one hand, the fluid and volatile nature of center and periph-
ery relations within the EU concerning the diffusion of technology and science,
the dissemination of technological innovation in the area of forensic genetics and
the expansion of genetic databases. On the other hand, we realize that genetic
technologies now move within what Appadurai calls a “technoscape,” as one of
the dimensions of the global cultural flow and its inherent bridging of previously
impenetrable boundaries (Appadurai, 1990, p. 297).
As previously stated, the empirical study that formed the basis of this book was
developed in the arena of EU politics on police and judicial cooperation in the
fight against crime and terrorism, more specifically taking the Prüm system as its
starting point. Although our approach lead us well beyond this particular phe-
nomenon, the Prüm system maintained its centrality throughout, giving us access
to interviews or conversations with diverse social actors interested in elaborating
on their views about genetic surveillance in the governance of crime. In this
regard, Charles Taylor’s work (2004) was particularly useful and inspiring, namely
his analysis of the role played by elites in shaping the imaginary on which a given
social reality is construed, while other social actors actively resist, reinforce or
transform this moral order imposed from above. Based on this analysis, we are led
to interpret the institutional framing of the Prüm system as a conceptual con-
struction upheld by EU political elites connected to social structures of western
modernity – the economy, the public sphere, the nation-state, and transnational
borders – while also incorporating the practices and ideas produced in much
broader forms of imagination circulating among other groups. In the case of our
work these other groups include forensic geneticists, laboratory practitioners,
members of police organizations, and activists. In sum, following the investigative
paths trailed by Taylor (2004), we have addressed genetic surveillance in the gov-
ernance of crime as embedded in social imaginaries that form a common under-
standing, which simultaneously reinstates the common sense, mobilizes a variety
of knowledge and enables the practices that constitute social life.
Biosociality in forensic genetics
If we had to choose a single word to describe the main contribution of our
work to the scholarship of the social studies in the specific field of forensic
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genetics, it would possibly be summarized best by the notion of “biosociality”
− a term coined by the anthropologist Paul Rabinow following developments
occurred in the field of genetics in the late 1990s linked to research on the
human genome (Rabinow, 1996). We believe this work to be, above all, an
innovative contribution to deepening and broadening the scientific and aca-
demic debate on how the bio, social and cultural elements mutually interact,
interplay, and reinforce each other. As a heuristic category, biosociality was
primarily conceived to highlight the new hybrid relationships between biology
and culture made possible by research and intervention in the human genome.
Thus, it might be considered as an experimental tool for examining the
interface between recent developments in the life sciences, social practices,
and individual and collective subjectivities.
Our findings and analysis presented in this book contribute to broadening
the understanding of forms of biosociality in the particular context of forensic
genetics: addressing genetic surveillance for crime governance reveals the
dynamics of complex and ever-changing processes and practices that draw the
bio and the social together so as to reconstruct, reshape, and diffuse their
effects upon the field of criminal identification and their multiple and hybrid
intertwining with forms of coordination between knowledge, truth, and
action.
During the last two decades, social sciences work has illuminated the vari-
able and diverse manifestations of biosocialities, with a particular focus on
developments in the field of biomedicine (Gibbon & Novas, 2008; Raman &
Tutton, 2009; Valle & Gibbon, 2015). Other works have sought to extend the
boundaries of biosociality defined by Paul Rabinow to the field of forensic
genetics (Lynch & McNally, 2009; Tutton & Levitt, 2010). Michael Lynch
and Ruth McNally, in their work about forensic DNA databases and novel
configurations of suspect bodies, proposed the term “biolegality” to define a
symbiotic relationship between law and biotechnology (2009, p. 284). In their
words:
Biolegality is a type of biosociality that involves different identity cate-
gories than those associated with the biomedical sociality (…) instead of
producing “at risk” medical identities, biolegality produces “risky” sus-
pects, “pre-suspects,” and “statistical suspects” (…) although “selves” are
deeply implicated, suspect identity is primarily an object and product of
policing and forensic expertise, rather than a technically defined basis for
the formation of the individual and group identity. One of the features of
the biolegal marking of the bodies is its potential to expand, driven by
diverse logics, potentially encompassing entire populations.
(Lynch & McNally, 2009, p. 284)
In our perspective, this book has gone beyond manifestations of what Lynch
and McNally called “biolegality” as a form of biosociality in forensic genet-
ics, by exploring manifestations of “biological citizenship.” One important
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work for inspiring our reflection was the text by Richard Tutton and Mairi
Levitt (2010) which proposed to explore the convergences and divergences
evinced in the development of forensic and biomedicine databases, aiming to
provide innovative and productive insights into the forensic arena. The
authors used the discussions of biological citizenship (Petryna, 2002; Rose &
Novas, 2005) – a new type of citizenship that has been taking shape in the age
of biomedicine, biotechnology and genomics – to explore the forms of biolo-
gical citizenship in the context of forensic genetic databases (Tutton & Levitt,
2010). In the medical domain, the “biological citizen” might seek to relate to
others in biological terms by seeking alliances and forming communities with
those who might share a genetic trait or disease. Biological citizenship in the
medical domain is therefore oriented by social values such as choice, auton-
omy, and self-responsibility (Rose & Novas, 2005; Tutton & Levitt, 2010, pp.
95–100).
In the field of forensic genetics, biological citizenship has to be approached
in a quite different manner. There are, indeed, a few instances where self-
organizing citizens made to provide a biological sample for a criminal genetic
database, formed support and advocacy organizations (Amelung & Machado,
2019). The range of action of non-governmental organization in denouncing
the potential abuses of genetic surveillance is also preeminent in the public
space, particularly in countries like the UK (see Chapter 7). However, rather
than the autonomous and individual self-governance described by Nikolas
Rose and Carlos Novas (2005), in the field of forensic genetics, biological
citizens have to conform to a category imposed by the state (Machado &
Prainsack, 2012), socially sorted into suspect and non-suspect police cate-
gories. In the words of Richard Tutton and Mairi Levitt:
From the perspective of biological citizenship, we might read inclusion in
the police database as the removal of choice and self-responsibility, as
reducing individuals to the ‘bare life’ of being a data subject on a police
database.
(Tutton & Levitt, 2010, p. 99)
This book demonstrated the limitations of centering the discussion of biolo-
gical citizenship and its inherent social sorting on the activities of social con-
trol and surveillance enacted by the state. The discourses of forensic
geneticists, members of police agencies and social actors involved in the arena
of human rights protection, play an increasingly relevant role in the social
and political construction of “biological citizens” – whether “DNA donor,”
“arrestee,” “suspect,” “criminal,” “volunteer,” “victim,” “common citizen,”
or “affected public.” This book paid particular attention to a specific group of
stakeholders: the forensic geneticists who work in forensic laboratories and/or
university forensic science departments in different European countries. This
focus is justified by the central role played by forensic geneticists as social
actors in constructing and defining forms of citizenship that exceed the strict
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set of rights and obligations applied of individuals who provide biological
samples to satisfy security and legal purposes. Therefore, one relevant con-
tribution of our book has been to further the exploration of social, cultural,
and political constructions of biological citizenship through the views, prac-
tices, and expectations formulated and performed by forensic geneticists.
This book expands also the theme of biosociality in forensic genetics by
addressing underexplored topics that emerge from the connection between
various practices, actors, social forms and subjectivities with genetic surveil-
lance applied to the governance of crime. An important aspect of our work
was to show that the socio-cultural dynamics produced by genetic surveillance
for criminal identification are bound up with novel practices of knowing and
manipulating the biological body, mobilizing scientific knowledge of the
human genome, and reifying certain visions, promises, and expectations about
the future. In sum, this volume has sought to promote a critical reflection on
the social and political transformations that result from genomic knowledge
and technology – biosocialities – in the forensic genetics field.
As we claimed elsewhere (Granja & Machado, 2020; Granja, Machado, &
Queirós, 2020), the networks of professionals with expertise and competence
in the specific domain of genetics applied to criminal identification, possess an
authoritative status that might deeply impact both policy-oriented strategies,
as the negotiation of future developments in genetic surveillance for the gov-
ernance of crime. Besides considering the role of forensic geneticists, we also
explored the implications of other stakeholders’ actions, such as non-govern-
mental organizations – concerned with the protection of human rights and the
threats posed by genetics and biometric technologies – as well as the views
and actions of professionals dedicated to international police cooperation in
DNA data exchange used to fight cross-border crime and terrorism. From
those perspectives, we concluded that the modes of genetic surveillance for
the governance of crime are co-produced and informed by political, ethical
and historical contexts, while at the same time highlighting preexisting social
vulnerabilities and inequalities that instigate transformations in citizenship
and subjectivities. Combined, these social, cultural, and political constella-
tions form a common matrix within which to address genetic surveillance for
the governance of crime through the lens of biosociality.
Paths for future research
This book reflects upon how the forensic technologies established as the “gold
standard” of identification (Lynch, 2003) have been subjected to continuous
expansion and investment with the aim of further increasing its capabilities,
either through the complex architectures of EU transnational police and
judicial collaboration and/or through increasingly sophisticated methods of
analysis able to expand genetic informativity. This implies that while forensic
geneticists, laboratory practitioners, members of police organizations, and
activists continue to be faced with a set of issues that have been identified as
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ethically and pragmatically challenging, other increasingly complex questions
continue to emerge. Among those that remain as long-standing unsolved
controversies in forensic genetics, we could list the following: the commu-
nication of forensic genetics across different domains of practice and diverse
epistemic cultures (Amelung, Granja, & Machado, 2020a; Amorim, 2012;
Kruse, 2013; Machado & Granja, 2019); the discriminatory potential of
genetic technologies and databases (M’charek, Toom, & Jong, 2020; Skinner,
2013); the disparate models for regulation, legislation and organization of
increasingly connected databasing systems (Santos, Machado, & Silva, 2013),
and the insufficient civic involvement and gaps in transparency and account-
ability in the establishment and expansion of genetic databases (Amelung &
Machado, 2019; Toom, Granja, & Ludwig, 2019). As new issues continue to
arise, the different actors are faced with additional challenges: the expansion
of transnational systems without a corresponding efficacy assessment (Toom
et al., 2019); the obsolescence of certain legal and regulatory frameworks in
the light of forensic genetics’ permanent transformations (Samuel & Prain-
sack, 2018); the increasing intersection between systems conceived for crim-
inal investigation and civil identification (Smith, 2017); the increasing
relevance of private providers specialized in complex analysis (Wienroth,
2020), whose promises are considered scientifically unsound by some forensic
geneticists (Granja & Machado, 2020); and the blurring of boundaries
between previously distinct kinds of genetic collection and genetic practice.
On this last topic, we emphasize both the increasing connections between the
medical and forensic fields, made possible by the development and investment
in NGS, and the use of recreational DNA databases for criminal investigation
purposes (Granja, 2020; Samuel & Kennett, 2020). These ongoing debates
reveal the coexistence of old and new controversies within forensic genetics,
demonstrating the need to continue investing in research that can point the
critical lens of the social sciences on this highly specialized and technological
field of knowledge. While the aim of this book was to explore some these
themes within the context of the EU, the interrogations and conclusions it
presents can be projected to other political, socio-economic and cultural
spaces. More particularly, we believe it might be useful to address other con-
texts that are highly invested in establishing and expanding forensic technol-
ogies but which remain largely underexplored. Moreover, such an exercise
serves to resist the temptation of treating the social, ethical, and political
challenges of genetic surveillance for the governance of crime a “universal”
phenomenon, promoting analyses grounded on a situatedness that anchors
them in broader historical, social, and political issues. We believe that such an
in-depth analysis provides a vital instrument for scientists, as well as for the
commissioners and users of research, to develop an understanding of the
various social and ethical promises and problems posed by emerging tech-
nologies, thus helping to better negotiate between the rationales behind new
ethical and human rights challenges, and new deficits of transparency,
accountability, and public trust.
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Finally, we hope that the findings presented in this book might be used as a
source in the design of pragmatic recommendations to support the ethically
responsible implementation and use of forensic technologies. Although this
book avoids evaluating or assessing the phenomenon of genetic surveillance
for the governance of crime in any normative way, we cannot ignore the
potentially significant impact of our reflections in addressing two main socie-
tal challenges at a national, European, and global levels (UN Agenda 2030) –
fostering just and inclusive societies and envisaging a world of respect for
human rights and dignity, justice, equality and non-discrimination.
Note
1 Centralized database systems might have other meanings. An important body of
scholarship has dedicated attention to the political and technical integration of
biometric data at the EU level (Amelung, Granja, & Machado, 2020b; Misa &
Schot, 2005; Rommetveit, 2016). The Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen
Information System II (SIS II), and EURODAC are examples of the largest and
most important centralized database systems operating in the EU.
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